

ΑΡΧΕΙΟΝ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ

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The volume in hands is dedicated in memoriam of the late Professor Jacob J. Krabbe of the Wageningen Agricultural University.

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Το «Αρχείον» διανέμεται δωρεάν και δεν φέρει ουδεμίαν ευθύνη δια τα δημοσιευόμενα άρθρα τα οποία εκπροσωπούν μόνον τας απόψεις των συγγραφέων.

ΟΔΗΓΙΕΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΕΙΣ

Διά της παρούσης εξαμηνιαίας εκδόσεως αποβλέπομεν να παρουσιάσωμεν διερευνητικές εργασίας δοκίμιον οικονομολόγων, καθώς επίσης και οικονομολόγων της νέας γενεάς, οι οποίοι ενδιαφέρονται δια την εξέλιξιν της οικονομικής ζωής και της οικονομικής σκέψεως.

Το "Άρχειον Οικονομικής Ιστορίας" σκοπόν έχει να φωτίση την οικονομικήν πολιτικήν δια του ιστορικού υλικού και της οικονομικής σκέψεως. Το "Άρχειον", επίσης, επιθυμώντας όπως συμπληρώση την αποστολήν του επί του πεδίου της Οικονομικής, θα δημοσιεύη και επιλέκτα ποιήματα αφορούντα εις γενικώτερον επιστημονικόν ενδιαφέρον.

Αι αποστέλλόμενα εργασία, οι οποία εγκρίνονται, κατόπιν κρίσεως αρμοδίων κριτών, ειδικών επί του περιεχομένου της εργασίας, πρέπει να τας χαρακτηρίζη απαραίτητως η πρωτοτυπία και να μην έχουν δημοσιευθή ή υποβληθή προς δημοσίευσιν εις έτερον περιοδικόν. Αι διαδικασίαι και οι προϋποθέσεις υποβολής άρθρων έχουν ως ακολούθως:

1. Το άρθρον, το οποίον θα συνοδεύεται με δισκέτταν (ASCI), υποβάλλεται εις δύο αντίτυπα δακτυλογραφημένα, μεγέθους Α4 (τυπωμένη ή μία μόνον όψις) και με αριθμόν σελίδων που δεν θα υπερβαίνει τας 25, μετά των υποσημειώσεων. Γλώσσα των άρθρων είναι μόνον η Ελληνική ή η Αγγλική, και θα πρέπει να συνοδεύονται με περιλήψιν (abstract) εις την αγγλικήν γλώσσαν (έως 120 λέξεις).

2. Εις την πρώτην σελίδα του άρθρου, εκτός του τίτλου δέον να υπάρχει το ονοματεπώνυμον του/των συγγραφέως/ων (με κεφαλαία), καθώς και το Ίδρυμα εις το οποίον ούτος/οι εργάζεται/ονται (ΑΕΙ, ΤΕΙ, Ινστιτούτον, Ερευνητικόν Κέντρον κ.λπ.). Αναφορά ευχαριστιών ή πρωτογενούς πηγής προελεύσεως του άρθρου πρέπει να γίνεται με αστερίσκον εις υποσημείωσιν εις το κάτωθεν μέρος της πρώτης σελίδος.

3. Οι Πίνακες ή Διαγράμματα, που τυχόν υπάρχουν εις το κείμενον, πρέπει να είναι καθαρογραμμένα μετά τίτλου και συνεχή αριθμησιν (π.χ. Πίναξ 1, Διάγραμμα 1 κ.λπ.) το μέγεθος των οποίων να μην υπερβαίνει αυτό της μιας σελίδος.

4. Αι παράγραφοι και υποπαράγραφοι πρέπει να είναι ηριθμημένα με αραβικούς αριθμούς, αρχίζοντας την αριθμηση από την εισαγωγήν (π.χ. 1, 1.1., 1.2., 2., 2.1., 2.2., κ.λπ.).

5. Έκαστον άρθρον δέον να συνοδεύεται απαραίτητως από βιβλιογραφίαν έχουσαν σχέσιν άμεσον με το περιεχόμενον του άρθρου. Αι υποσημειώσεις (footnotes) θα έχουν συνεχή αριθμηση εμφανιζόμενα εις το κάτωθεν μέρος έκαστης σελίδος.

6. Αι βιβλιογραφικά παραπομπά εις το κυρίως κείμενον ή τας υποσημειώσεις θα αναφέρουν το όνομα του συγγραφέως, το έτος και την σελίδα, λ.χ., ως εξής: (G.R. Elton, 1967, σελ. 71). Αι βιβλιογραφικά παραπομπά εις την τελευταίαν σελίδα του άρθρου θα αναγράφονται κατ' αλφαβητικήν σειράν (με κεφαλαία τα ονόματα των συγγραφέων) ως ακολούθως: i) Δια τα βιβλία: λ.χ., ELTON, G.R. : (1967), *The Practice of History*, Fontana-William Collins Sons & Co., London, ii) Δια τα άρθρα: λ.χ., SINGLETON, J. : (1994), "The cotton industry and the British war effort, 1914-1918", *The Economic History Review*, Τομ. XLVII, No 3, σσ. 601-618.

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Above all the "Archives of Economic History" will endeavour to illuminate the economic policy through historical material and the economic thought. The "Archives" also in order to complete its mission on the field of Economics it should also publish some selected papers of general scientific interest.

These submitted papers, which are approved by specialists in the field (referees), must be original work and not have been published previously or are not currently being considered for publication elsewhere (confirmed by a letter). The following procedures and conditions for the articles submission should be taken into consideration:

1. Each article, must be accompanied with diskette (ASCII) and is submitted in two copies. Type on only one side of an A4 size paper. The number of pages should not exceed 25 with footnotes included. The articles must be written either in Greek or in English and contain an abstract (written in English) not exceeding 120 words.

2. The title of the article, the name and surname of the author/authors (in capitals) and the Institution (University, School, Department, Research Center, etc.) in which the author works, should be clearly indicated and appears along with the corpus of it. Acknowledgements of references of the original source of the articles should be denoted by an asterisk at the bottom of the first page. Any relevant information (full address, telephone etc.) should be included in a separate page which will accompany the article.

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THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE DURING OUR CENTURY AND THE EFFORT FOR A THIRD WAY IN ECONOMICS

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1.

World War I gave birth to the Bolshevik Revolution and the foundation of Leninism, the Great Depression inspired Keynes to formulate “The Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” where he shows that Say’s Law, according to which the produced goods are absorbed by the income generated by their production, do not have any relationship with reality and that the crisis provoked within the system is not periodic but permanent. Thus Keynes proposed a remedy in order to maintain the present economic system enlightening his economic concept by the rate of interest as a dominating income. Before him, Knut Wicksell had worked more or less towards this direction with his distinction between natural rate of interest and money rate of interest. Keynes perceived the permanent crisis of capitalism based on his psychological law according to which with the increasing income men save more than they spend.

John A. Hobson - as Keynes too - also argued an underconsumption theory as an heretic disciple of Alfred Marshall. Before them, going back to the 19th century, Thomas Robert Malthus and Sismonde de Sismondi supported underconsumption theories.

Malthus was an heretic disciple of Adam Smith and of course an adversary from this point of view of Jean Baptiste Say’s law of markets. He de-

nied more or less the “invisible hand” at a rate to establish equilibrium. Herein I shall repeat a quotation from his book (Principles of Political Economy, 1820) which the nobelist Laurence Klein is also referring in his book (The Keynesian Revolution, 1950, p. 127) “...but the national saving in reference to the whole mass of producers and consumers must necessarily be limited by the amount which can be advantageously employed in supplying the demand for produce; and to create this demand, there must be an adequate and effective consumption either among the producers themselves or other classes of consumers”.

The keynesian revolution had an effect on the entire Western world just as marxism-leninism had on the Eastern world so that during this period Schools were to appear that would fall back on influencing theoretical economic thought and political economy.

During the 20th century appeared another School, the “Institutional School” endeavoured to institute ways of confronting the economic problem through the setting up of selective institutional principles which - according to this School- give rise to progress as they evolve. The Institutional School however did not probe deeply into the mechanism of economy because it did not penetrate into this particular field having an interest only in the environment of the acting person who moves («homo organizer») in the economic arena and whose behaviour was under the influence of super-individual factors. Because of this and the method used, the School was of mainly historical-institutional interest.

During our century there has also been a group of economists who have their origins in a number of Schools which have endeavoured to demonstrate (far removed from dogmatic principles) measures for the establishment of peace, order and social justice, the limitation of monopolies or their abolition, the establishment of just taxation and political-social reform. This current, called “Welfare Economics” is opposed until a point to both Keynesianism (less) and Institutionalism (more) and objects more towards naturalism. Of course, because of the large doctrinary frames of this School or better Stream in Economics -as to it belong adherents of Keynesianism or Mild Socialism (Mead) -there is a confusion concerning a basic doctrine to direct a unique economic policy. From this stream as also from the Austrian School emerged the Neo-Liberal School supported by the New Austrians (H. Mayer, L. von Mises, F. von Hayek, W. Röpke and others) to which belong economists accepting the limited

intervention to assist the unhampered function of economic laws (!). In this manner the philosophy concerning “economic man” has returned, in a quasi moderate form.

It is a fact that the attention of the economists of the Austrian School was turned to the exploration of the side of demand, which caused a reaction and the reappearance of the old Neoclassical School (Marshall, John Bates Clark, Davenport, Carver, Taussig) which maintained the importance of supply. Thus, in our days, after the World War II, appeared a new School (NCS) which accepted economic equilibrium by means of logical expectations (private and public) and the application of economic forces in accordance with them. The New Classical School also based itself on individualism and the analytical-deductive method and the ideal type being economic man. Unfortunately, during the 20th century ideological matters retreated before the specific conceptions and proposals concerning the economic unit or the economization of the national or the worldwide community. Within this wilderness and with the retreat of Marxism and Keynesianism the “International Society for the Intercommunication of new Ideas” has appeared. It is governed by the endeavour to find a new road, beyond the already formulated systems; it is led by Professor Anghel Rugina who has based his philosophical ideas rooted in Kant and his economic theoretical edifice on the theories of Walras and Eucken, the foundation being money-commodity. The present writer also supported this same third road based on: the philosophical principles rooted in Berdyaev’s existentialism -the human being as supreme value of life - and from the side of economics the mixture of the principles of individualism and sociality and the cornerstone of his system -“Humantitarian Economics”- the cost of dependence, about which I shall speak briefly below. Anyway, today Marxism collapsed in the so-called socialist countries and Keynesianism provoked stagflation in the capitalist countries. For this reason, present-day economic life and economic science suffer from the dissolution of the system of socialism and the crisis of capitalism and the seeking to open a new way to theoretical economics and thus to applied economics. The opening of such a road is not easy because it is hindered by the present structure of the systems and the ruling doctrines among the academic circles which are held captive to them.

If men are able to achieve the harmonization of their needs with the existing reserves of goods, and their environment is exploited for the just

distribution of produced wealth, then the conflict of their interests will tend to disappear. And we say “tend” because by the nature of the scarcity of wealth and the element of freedom in man this conflict will never disappear completely.

Thus I am obliged now to explain my theory of cost of dependence starting from my theory on value which is the heart of Economics. (Lewis Haney).

2

In the development of our thoughts we will not combine in the beginning the phenomenon of value with money, in order to develop a general theory, because value cannot be explained “en soi” by a “general theory”. In addition, the factor of money is not the main factor of economic forces with which we can direct the economy. Such a process of thought would certainly lead us into the nets of inflation and would lead us away from the problem of distribution which has value as its touchstone. But we will not, however, take the factor of money as completely neutral, since this would be impossible in a dynamic economy, in which the credit money creeps into an economy as well, influencing the level of prices.

Since man estimates all things, value is the individual evaluation of a commodity and this in combination with other commodities which can be acquired by him. This is the reason for which Rugina and myself we agree for a money-commodity in order to achieve a steady equilibrium.

The first value is direct, in relation to this good, and indirect, in the relationship of the significance of this to the other goods, and is a formulation concerning value, investigated by Edgeworth and the New Austrians. In general subjective value in which the evaluation is related to the need of the good was examined by the Hedonists of the Austrian and Mathematical Schools. Of course, these evaluations are not unrelated to the cost of production or the labour as a precondition of value. When, however, we refer to value, as this is shaped in the perception of economically acting individuals in their co-existence, then we must consider above all others the influences of the social factor, given that individualistic subjective value is under the control of social value. We will examine this viewpoint

below, but first we will proceed with what we consider to be the indispensable distinction of goods.

Goods are divided into three categories:

- a) The scarce goods
- b) The not easily multiplied
- c) The easily multiplied

The value of scarce goods is determined by their scarcity-utility (rare statues, rare pictures, rare works of art, rare raw materials, rare services, etc.) and their price is formulated by their demand, which is measured in the relationship of the scarcity-utility among these scarce goods or services, based on individual perceptions or those of the society concerning value; their demand is that which effects upon price.

The value of the not easily multiplied goods is determined in short run as much by their scarcity-utility, which directs demand, as by their supply, which in long run is directed by the cost of their production.

The value of easily multiplied goods is determined by the cost of their production; their supply is that which effects upon the formulation of price.

If we take into account an isolated man, the significance which he gives to a good determines the value of that good for that individual. And the smaller cost he pays out in relation to the desire he has to acquire this good the more value this has, in relation to another good of a like degree of desire, but requiring greater sacrifice for its acquisition. Thus, the preference of the individual will turn toward the first good and he will abandon the second, with which he will become involved if he is able to sacrifice for this enjoyment various goods left over from the first endeavour which he undertook in order to be satisfied by the first good.

If now our individual is placed within society, his personal choice, as an economic calculation, will be changed, because he will not be independent of social control, in Durkheim's expression and sense. And when we speak about social control we mean the influence of the "society" factor on the desires of the individual, turning him toward preference a or b and giving him the social concept of the value of the object he prefers.

Thus, the value of a good or service will not completely depend on the significance which the individual gives to it, because of its scarcity-utility for him, but also from the society's evaluation of the scarcity-utility of this object in relation to the cost expended for it as cost is a precondition

of value also in the case of social evaluation. Ferdinando Galliani (Della Moneta, 1751) called this influence of a community upon an individual's choice "voce".

Consequently value is not only an individual estimation but also social. The latter refers to the plexus of exchanges in the market and the price formation as a consequence of the partial and total evaluations of utility in the unit of quantity through the cost of this.

Also, we must take into account during the shaping of social control not only a static equilibrium -which is a speculative consideration- but the dynamic as well, in the formation of price, and indeed historically, from historical stage to historical stage. Because the former concerns an abstract approach and the latter places price under the control of reality.

A completely monopolistic organization of the market does not refer to the real value of goods, as the supply is arranged by the monopolist at a level to dominate on the market.

The justification that the monopolist will improve the product in order to preserve the monopoly, has relative significance because greater effort is expended in free competition in the market game which also refers to quality.

In an economy, such as the humanistic and of course rational, the mechanisms of the market and their strengthening via the statistical numerical index and accounting, will be strengthened and become more flexible and semi-automatic, so that there will arise the adaptation of production to saving and consumption, the flow of money will encounter the flow of goods and services without a gap. A chance diversion of this mechanism from its harmonious function will be replaced by the policy of public works, the direct taxation and the monetary policy.

Here we must observe that the price of one category of goods or services (scarce, non easily multiplied, easily multiplied) will rise or fall as much as the prices of the other categories of goods or services and vice versa, on the basis of the system of the interdependence of prices in the market.

Present day economic theories revolve around consumption, having turned their backs on production, which is basic for distribution and supplementary from a point of view to value. Thus, they have distanced themselves from the correct direction for the interpretation of the phenomenon of value. Also Marx's theory of value and surplus value, which

constitutes his fundamental supposition on economy and through which he proves the antinomy of the capitalistic regime -I repeat herein- is not correct. Marxian theory of value does not explain why two goods of the same quantity of labour have different values and does not explain why goods deprived of labour or with last payment of labour have a large value. Also Marx explains scarce quality of labour as a multiplied simple labour without to determine in a concrete way both these kinds of labour. Another weak point of view in marxian theory is the transformation's of values in prices ect.

3.

The cost of labour is composed of two elements: The one is material and concerns the subsistence of the worker and his family, including education and other expenses and the other is *psychical* and this is the sacrifice to which the worker is submitted in his inferior position in the hierarchy of production and above all in his dependence of the employer. This is what I call *cost of dependence*.

The worker not only compares repose with wages, but also he takes into account his dependence in production and the psychological effect on him of such inferiority, especially as regards his employer or he is an entrepreneur or the State, whom he is ready to avoid. The higher is the reward of the worker the lesser is the cost of dependence and vice versa. For when the entrepreneur seeks to reduce wages or to increase the working hours, then the cost of dependence rises and the reaction against the existing system of social production on the part of workers, increases. For this purpose the regulative intervention of the State becomes indispensable in order to diminish the cost of dependence, to avoid monopolies, to come to the aid of small incomes, to supervise the just distribution of income and to create outlets for the prevention of unemployment etc.


The above cost of labour it appears as social estimation, which with the disposal stock of labour and its capacity determines supply. When, however, we talk of social cost we should have in mind the marginal social cost and this is the minimum cost of each working stratum (unskilled, skilled and highly skilled labour) below which the cost of dependence will be increased with a consequent active reaction of the workers.

At the contrary, if wages are high the cost of dependence will diminish but never being equal to zero, because of the basic psychological law of the disutility of dependence. These changes in the level of the wages are of the highest significance and prove the importance of the syndicates in their resistance against excessive displacements, the stabilization of the workers in the developed countries and the difficult posture of the workers in the under-developed ones, where there do not exist organized Labour Unions. The marginal social cost is the minimum level of wages which determines, the supply of labour, while the highest level is its marginal social utility, which determines the demand of it.

In case of highly skilled labour the demand will determine its price, while of the skilled labour the supply and (in long time and short time correspondently) demand and of the unskilled labour the supply will be effective in determining its price.

Competition, the sway of institutions and the resistance of Labour Unions obligate the entrepreneurs to continually increase the technical capital and to engage in rational ameliorations. But whilst the technical capital is increased at the expense of labour (preferred by the entrepreneur as being more disciplinary and effective) there is, on the other hand, an increase both in output and in profits as also in wages.

On the basis of the above, the cost of dependence between the worker and the entrepreneur is illustrated by the following figure:



On the above figure, the curve of the cost of dependence is the line of the linear function of the form: $y = a - bx$, where $a, b > 0$ or of the form of

$$y = \frac{a}{x^b} \text{ where } a > 0.$$

Through the wages and the adopted labour policy under the status of the collective forces of Democracy, the rate of the wage is determined on the basis of the level of preservation -including not only the necessary means for his subsistence but also all means for the satisfaction of cultural claims which are imposed by the modern life. Yet, this rate can rise according to labour stratum, but it can never fall under the level we determined so that the Labour Unions concede to the policy adopted by the State. During the recovery of the business cycle this has to ensure the wages so that saving on behalf of the workers can exist, while during depression of the business cycle it has to lower wages to the level which we determined for the ones who are employed, while it has to provide for an unemployment level covering this level. This is the humanitarian policy of the Humanitarian Economics in its application. The diminishing of the wages in favour of the lowering of cost is a benefit which the liberal economy sustains but cause both deficient demand and -accentuating the downward of the business cycle- social turbulence. This is the Maastricht's fallacy as they have asked a decreasing of wages and not a stability of wages for a fixed period of time.

The question which is asked is how syndicates can be disciple to such a policy and how the entrepreneurs can accept during the recession of cycle wages which, no matter how they are diminished, can cover the level of the preservation of the worker, and how the State can avoid -if possible- working allowances, or at least keep them in a fix level. In my opinion-except the as above stability of wages- this can be achieved with the following policy.

Every enterprise, big or small, has to publish its balances for the information of the investors and for the distribution of the profits which has to take place as follows: after the deduction of the tax, the rest has to be distributed as follows: a) the 1/3 for the entrepreneur for his whole work (his entrepreneurial initiative included), 1/3 for the enterprise fund and 1/3 for the workers who do not participate in the administration of the enterprises but take this 1/3 on the basis of the "labour's bonds" in addition to their wages, of course.


The land rent is a monopolistic income and in tandem differential because of a) the locality, b) the land fitness, c) the land fertility. The deletion between land renter and land owner is also a cost of dependence having in form of the function : $y=ax$, where $a > 0$.

In order to achieve social justice and not accepting monopoly -which nevertheless exists due to the relation between population and land- Humanitarian Economics proceeds to the taxation of the unavoidable rent. Yet, this taxation has to be imposed on cultivated and non-cultivated lands for their cultivation and, consequently, for the encouragement of the competition of the lands.


As far as the reward of the capital, which is the interest, its level will be determined:

a) By the supply of capitals for loan, that is by i) savings, ii) waiting and impatience, iii) by the Bank system and b) their demand, by i) the productivity of the last used unit of capital, ii) the income of the marginal consumer and the intensity of his desire (desirability) for expense iii) as well as by the propensity of the entrepreneurs to invest, the said entrepreneurs being motivated by their expectations.


The entrepreneur is a talented labourer, while the capital owner is a functionary who worked after having gathered the capital for the accumulation of which it is probable that he did not work having obtained it by inheritance. The relation between these two factors -entrepreneur and capital owner- capitalist is a relation of dependence as well, of the interest, the highest the interest is the highest the cost of dependence is and vice versa, as it is illustrated by the function $y=ax$, wherein $a>0$.




We referred here also to the holding of cash balances by the public which are kept in the Bank and thus they are not susceptible of interest and, consequently, from the supply of capital for loan which certainly is rewarded with interest, as it is shown by the following graph:



The above figure (as it was presented by : R. Fairchild, E. Stevenson, F.N. Buck Economics ed. Macmillan N.Y. 1940 p. 276) shows the relation of the capitals upon loan with the interest in the relation of their supply and demand and the hoarded money (OS) in the Banks which does not pay interest.



This figure above shows -if demand (D) for loanable funds is constant- and since the supply of loanable funds decreases from C_1 to C_2 the rate of interest rises from R_1 to R_2 too, so that the already mentioned cost of dependence between the entrepreneurs who ask for them and the banker who supply them increases. And vice versa. Extending the relation: interest/investment, we shall observe that the employment which depends on investment will depend on this relation, as it shown by the following figure:



Since the interest will rise to R_2 , the investment will remain limited from OI_1 to OI_2 , so that there will exist a gap I_2-I_1 , which means a proportional negative influence on income and on effective demand and then on employment. For this reason, in order to encourage the entrepreneur's expectations an analogous Bank organisation is indispensable as well as an institutional and economic environment for the mobilization of hoarding for savings and the fall of the interest. For this purpose, Humanitarian Economics supports the bank policy upon a Central Bank which controls -in the case- the quantity of money and the free circulation of the capitals in the Stock Exchange while a general policy will increase the income of the marginal consumer in order to encourage effective demand.

As far as the *entrepreneur's initiative* is concerned its net profit will depend on: a) the talent and initiative for the undertaking of entrepreneurial work, b) the magnitude of the risk and uncertainty which he undertakes, c) the differential nature of the enterprise which he decides to run. Consequently, the reward of the entrepreneurial initiative, the *profit*, will depend on the demand of *scarce utility of the entrepreneurial initiative* and its supply which will be determined by the number of the entrepreneurs who enter the game of the production of the good. But in his reward-profit intrudes, beyond the element of the scarce utility of the talent, the element of the cost and methods of the combination and organisation of the used factors of production; in this case we distinguish three kinds of profits:

- a) the profit which is *net profit*, that is beyond the entrepreneurial cost,
- b) the *normal* profit, that is the profit which covers the entrepreneurial cost (the entrepreneur's reward as organizer of the enterprise (own expenses etc.),
- c) the conjunctural profit and the differential profit.

In the above mentioned we must have in mind the formation of the profit and the element in short and long term -to use the known distinction of Alfred Marshall- we mean the possibility of the entrepreneur to respond to the supply and demand of his talent, as far as profit is concerned, and consequently in long term there exists the possibility for the loss this monopolist gift possessed by him since in the game (free entry) other entrepreneurs enter using the same virtues or analogous ones or better talent and initiative.

For these mechanisms of the function of the market, Humanitarian Economics believes that since there exists a free competition, the price of the use of the factors of production tends to coincide with their reward-cost. For, the monopoly -beyond the personal talent which means a contribution of the personal ability which is also legitimate and justified- causes a disequilibrium in the economy and a disturb which more or less destroys the existing Say's Law. We say more or less -except the element of lags of time as above- because friction forces too do not permit the direct adaptation of the production for savings and consumption while the Law which is attributed to Say tends to equalize the mentioned magnitudes since otherwise there would exist an anarchy of the economic forces.

Humanitarian Economics impose a proportional taxation during the upward or the downward of the business cycle -as life is a «mobile perpetum» and programs annually through motives the whole of the economy in short-term, middle-term and long-term periods of time. Beyond these, Humanitarian Economics declares the freedom of trade and decrees short-term protective taxes for the new productions and in certain regions while it strengthens the agricultural products which demand direct supervision.

The dependence cost is the α and the ω which governs the history of mankind during the period when the stronger dominates the weaker and in consequence when in time differentiation appears in the hierarchy of production. However with the retreat of the old organization of society the dependence cost would diminished through the intervention of the collective forces of democracy and will tend to disappear without however this ever happening entirely for individual freedom reasons.

According to us the conflict of interests, as has been shown, always continues while the dependence cost precisely reflects the degree of this conflict of interests, which always exists. And only through social democracy and rational economy is it possible to reduce the dependence cost, *toward zero*.

In the paradigm of the Pure Economics, the dependence cost does not exist because each of the factors of production receives what it offers. Reality, however is different, because here the economic world is not isolated from the other ones and life as we have already said is *perpetum mobile*.

The Physiocrats and the Classicists were the first to perceive the meaning of this dependence, but they passed through this without conceiving the size of its presence. Marx let astray by the Hegelian dialectic, interwove the dependence with the theory of surplus value. Thus, according to Marx, when surplus value has been eradicated, with the founding of communism, this will entail complete equality and naturally, he could say, the disappearance of the dependence cost. But in a regime of tyranny - like the communist- the cost of dependence becomes always greater until regime' s collapsus.

Generally, the originality of theory concerning value and prices, is not due to the investigation of the choice of the consumer and the measurement of marginal utility, as for example with the curve of expenditure of J.R. Hicks, but to the generalization which the economists proceeded to for their purpose, so they were included in the research concerning value

and price and other variables, relating to technology, the establishment of enterprise, the presenting of product, the existing institutions, etc.

Nevertheless, the angle of imperfect competition was examined (E. Chamberlin, J. Robinson, etc.) as the reality of the market, combined with the viewpoint concerning expectation and value under the Institutional School through the concept of «Futurity» by J.R. Commons. Marshall's theory concerning short and long periods also included the dynamic of economic factors via perspectivity, to which J.M. Keynes contributed. Thus, the price of supply during the short period cannot be considered independently of future prices and costs, while anything relating to long periods must take into account the technological variable (J. Robinson, O. Lange) and the improvement of production (M. Kalecki). These theories, however, did not take into account the supra - individual factor, nor the dependence cost as governing the distribution of wealth, and in consequence the theory of value was not supported on a correct basis. There is still the older contribution such as that of von Wieser concerning the stratification of prices and that of Seligman and the Institutionalists who also aided economic thought, but they did not succeed either in correctly placing the phenomenon of value.

We must not only examine the stratification of prices, for the sake of certain kinds of goods, which are demanded by a certain level of income, but we must examine the sequence which combines these goods with the other ones their prices with the prices of the other goods and the validity of the law of imitation of the remaining income levels toward the demand for these goods etc.

This complex of prices and the relationship between prices of wholesale and reetail buing was examined by W. Mitchell and the prices of the interdependence of the multiple markets by F., Oulès both of whom, however, were led astray by the investigation of the institutional nature (Mitchell) or by generalizations on behalf of economic equilibrium (*harmonie économique*) (Oulès) without, however, being able to investigate economic value and dependence cost.

A luxury car, i.e., is demanded by the highest income levels and this calls forth agitation for its acquisition by the lower income levels. It is possible, however, for an ordinary automobile to be sought by the high income levels for reasons of fuel economy or the desire to imitate the possession of a car similar to that of the lower income levels.

4.

Democratization, mass production and the shaping of common needs on the part of the rich and the poor income classes, refers not only to consumption goods, but shapes knowledge of needs, quantity of needs and stability of prices.

In a social democracy, within which the various incomes are directed toward certain basic goods of general use that can be acquired as well as demanded by all, the level of prices will show stability and the cost of dependence will lessen. Here, however, we must take into account economic progress, which is expressed in terms of satisfaction and of pain. Naturally, when we speak about this progress it is necessary for the satisfaction to be collective, in the sense of the just distribution of the product. That is, when the technology and the expanded production constitute basic factors of economic development and progress, as well as social justice when the product is distributed justly. Thus, with Humanitarian Economics we plan not only on the basis of the consumer model, as according to the Galbraithian proposal, but also via the more general “model” of the citizen of social democracy so that justice will be achieved and in consequence the dependence effect will be mitigated.

It would be possible to say against all that we have maintained that such a system would limit and direct the needs at the expense of progress, which is shown by the appearance of very numerous markets which elicit new production. Our position, however, we have to reply, does not rule out the appearance of new needs and more demand of luxury objects. That which stands out is the grouping of needs, as much as possible. This is basic for a truly democratic society. If previously certain needs referred to one social class exclusively, today these are the prerogative of the entire people, so that the continual democratization of our life, politically, economically and socially, will mitigate the dependence effect and strengthen the social equilibrium.

The Humanitarian Economics are not based dogmatically on private enterprise or nationalized enterprise but adapts itself, according to the circumstances, of course always more towards the former as it is more efficient. Governed by the principle of justice it harmonizes the rewards in

the most just manner, because it is not based on the egotistic motives of individuals, wherein each factor is rewarded at the expense of another and each social group at the expense of another and thus the cost of dependence rises. This is achieved under a regime of natural parameters in which a system of equilibrium dominates because of the minimalization of monopolies and the credit money.

Humanistic economy achieves this precisely through the emphasis on speciality and state assistance, that is the harmonious regulating of the relations and the rewards between various cooperating levels of the society on the basis of a beneficent programming plan of economic operation.

For this reason the regime of the Humanistic Economy is not based on one social class, but on all the social strata, thus representing the interests of the entire collective forces of social democracy.

The Humanistic Economy does not allow the existence of excessive work, which is the exploitation of the worker by the employer, but strengthens free labour unionism and intervenes through the state as an arbitrator of labour relations. In addition, under a humanistic economy the state undertakes public works and some enterprises, so that work of social production will be co-ordinated more effectively, as private initiative could be unable to achieve the increase in the volume of product and its just distribution. Because Humanistic Economy is also flexible, based on numbers and experience, it is consequently neither formally capitalistic nor formally socialistic but an economy combining individualism with sociality.

Humanitarian Economics is not the system of laissez faire of capitalism nor the expropriation of ownership and the non-existence of entrepreneurial initiative of socialism. It is not capitalistic, nevertheless it protects ownership; it is not socialist, nevertheless it accepts social control. Also this economics accepts individual ownership, but now however, in its absolute sense, as in capitalism, which places it under the absolute proprietorship of the individual, nor in the absolute sense of communism, which places it within the untransferrable and inviolate right of the state, coinciding with the political party of its ruling class, the members of it. Humanitarian economics conceives the meaning of ownership as a gift of the freedom of the individual, of his creative forces in his freedom and the ownership of means of production, not however for this to be a cause of exploitation of man by man so that a class struggle will arise from it. This

system of Economy does not abolish individual ownership but it controls it, when it comes into conflict with the public opinion. Because we must not forget that freedom in society means the freedom of all its members and not the freedom of one meaning the lack of freedom for another, so that the co-operation of the social levels will be achieved. This is the reason why the Humanistic and also Rational Economy is flexible and realistic, accepting private enterprise, as well as moderate intervention in some cases, if this is considered necessary on the basis of indices, and not dogmatically so that working at the expense of the total functioning entrepreneurial unit is avoided.

Under the humanistic economy we have the co-operation of the five factors of production (land, labour, capital, entrepreneurial initiative and state's assistance) for the production of the income so that dependence cost between these factors is minimalized in their reward thus allowing the normal proceeding of economic and social life.

At the peak of the social pyramid is where the strongest of all the vehicles of the economy is, the banker, which is why in order to regulate the dependence cost it becomes necessary to concentrate Banks according to type and to control them through a series of control measures to apply banking capital to social function, serving the interest of the whole. However, to achieve the minimalization of dependence cost, which constitutes the basic psychological and social law, there must be established a rational governing of loaning. Precisely here arises the shaping of the third way, in which all the factors of production are harmonized on behalf of the interests, of the whole and the development of the moral and material forces of the Nation.

In order to lessen the dependence cost from unemployment, the Humanitarian Economics espouses a policy of public works devoted to its lessening and as much as possible to its eradication. Also, it controls the monopolies according to their kind so that the dependence cost of the consumer because of the monopolist will disappear, and limits via co-operatives the parasitic working middleman, which augment the dependence cost to the consumer.

And as for land relations under the humanitarian Economics, the state, imposes taxes, having in mind the composition of the land and the products growing on it, also helps the organization of large firms of agricultural exploitation, according to whether the type of product allows it, and

strengthenens the agricultural cooperatives, as an independent economic unit, backing works of drainage and land reclamation proceeding to the re-forestation of the land and the regulation of agricultural debts, as well as ceeding lands to communities and individual cultivators.

For all this and for its other services and its needs, the State receives payment which is, as was shown, tax, which must be in proportion to the magnitude of the utility of the assistance granted by it. And the greater the magnitude and the kind of tax, in relation to the utility of the services offered by the State, the greater is the dependence cost of the citizens to the State and vice versa, while when the magnitude of the provided tax is proportionate to the utility provided by it, the cost of dependence becomes smaller.

With the treatment by the state of dependece cost is achieved the founding of social democracy, which does not set up social classes and social conflicts but co-operation among social strata. Thus, the democratic state is not as a formality independent of the interests of the various social groups but in its essence represents the interests of the entire people, acts on its order and regulates the partial interests of the social levels on behalf of its progress and proseperity.

Under the Humanitarian Economics the free activity of individuals is permitted as well as the development of their capabilities and initiative as long as these are harmonized with the interest of the social whole. Because the interest of the social whole requires the unhindered activity of individuals since this is a social benefit. Precisely for the strenghtening and the promotion of individual virtues, social democracy allows ownership, the right to inheritance and free consumption. With the only difference that the democratic social state imposes its control, when the individual initiative strays from its social aim while the economic unit is not productive, then through competition it is undertaken by a better entrepreneurial initiative.

In addition, under the Humanitarian Economics the state proceeds on to works of state ownership, undertaking organizations of public benefit and taking part in other enterprises. Also it occasionally enters into certain restrictions of consumption, imposes a just tax structure and in general adopts all measures to avoid social differentiation such as the participation of workers in profits, etc. Ownership is a sacred right of man, but the limitation of the social antinomies arising from this is the basis on

which is supported the modern form of social democracy. Thus, the businessman is considered as a factor of production since he works *socially* and the State through the taxation and the participation of the workers in the profits achieves the redistribution of income.

Under the regime of humanistic economy through econometric and statistic methods on the economy we get a flexibility in the adaptation of production oward saving and consumption. It is precisely the mathematical and statistical view of the economic phenomena, along with the other coefficients we have already reffered.

5.

I think that now is the time to discuss the phenomenon of the value of money which aids in the regulation of its flow and its harmonization with the flow of goods and services. And for this the Humanitarian Economics accepts the rational mechanism of the market as the best judge of production, distribution and of consumption for this reason is rational. On the other hand with the regulation of the economic forces and the rationalized cost of dependence we succeed in limiting the quantity of credit money and thus insuring a more steady economic equilibrium, which it is impossible to obtain with the system of credit money.

The legacy of Keynes to science was so important that we are obliged to refer to him as also to his followers or simply to those influenced by him. This legacy can be limited to two basic views which compete with each other as far as monetary theory and policy are concerned. The first one is that o Monetarists (Friedman) and the second one that of the Fiscalists (Samuelson), which are working the same foundation of the paper money and monetized credit system to maintain full employment and price stability, while a third one tries to go through the first two (Aschleim). Friedman's view that money can come from heavens in a percentage which produces a steady rise in its quantity gives us the idea, on the one hand, about the easy money supply, yet it explains that the increase of the prices and incomes, as Kaldor says, comes from the sky by means of a helicopter.

But the importance of the dynamic process from the increase of the quantity of money depends, as Don Patinkin claims, upon the manner in

which this came into the economy. Thus Don Patinkin and other economists as well, would not disagree to the policy of handling a deflationary gap with a budgetary policy.

There is no doubt that the quantitative theorists follow the easy way of the monetary supply and through it the stimulation of the economy, but the fiscal policy is fundamental for the economic development bringing the economy to expansion has consequences to the rise of prices. Also the wrong distribution of public resources may cause inflation.

According to our opinion the Walras model, assumes the existence of a system of economic and monetary equilibrium and by the method of successive approaches we may have the State replace the entrepreneur coordinator, who is between the two markets of services and products. We can say that the natural parameter -to use the expression of professor Rugina -replying also to his aspect for a steady equilibrium, is not destroyed if we replace the private monopoly by the State monopoly for certain enterprises, so that the natural parameter is strengthened in case the State replaces the private initiative, which avoids undertaking a certain business or because a firm monopolizes the market with a higher price than the free competition's price. Thus the monopoly will be conducted by the State at prices of perfect competition so that the marginal cost is adjusted to the price.

Consequently in the model of a Rational Economy, which is not dogmatic we have domination of perfect competition prices with a monetary stability, with differential profits but with different changes of a social-institutional nature which minimize the cost of dependence.

We must now add a per functionary reference to the factors which determine the value of money.

The various equations and functions, which have been presented in the literature up to now, on the determination of the value of money and its changes, are not satisfactory.

The classic quantitative equations of the Fischerian type (Newcomb, Pantaleoni, Fisher, Kemmerer, Lubbock, Cassel, Schumpeter, Penderson, etc.) have not taken into consideration, in principle, the factors of production, as well as other elements, while P does not give the explanation of the value of money, except -as an index- only the change of prices between two periods of time. They also display the weak point of not giving a complete interpretation of the velocity of money.

The quantitative equations of the Cambridge School (Marshall, Pigou, Robertson, Hawtrey, Keynes of “A Tract on Monetary Reform”) determine from their side the value of money at a moment in time, when relative prices are conceived as steady. In addition, they examine the demand form money and they overlook the investment goods.

With Walras’ view on equilibrium, the cash, which people desire to hold (*encaisse désiré*) are not excluded.

Keynes’ equation in “A Tract on Monetary Reform” (1923) as well as his fundamental equation in “A Treatise on Money” (1930) relate the quantitative theorise of the classical type conceiving money as a medium of exchange. The “General Theory” on the other hand examines money also in the sense of a store of value by the combination of these within the general theory of value of interest and employment, a path that Wicksell first opened with his book “*Geldzins und Guterpreise*” (1898).

Say’s Law of Markets always accepts the equality between the value of distributed rewards to the factors of production and the value of the produced product excluding the possibility of disequilibrium in view of the assumption that production creates its own demand.

Keynes opposed Say’s law because of deficient demand, and combining this with liquidity preference and the propensity to invest or otherwise with the interest and the marginal efficiency of capital. But Keynesian theory has been proved erroneous because: a) The deficient demand is relative and cyclical and not permanent and is not verified by today’s reality, having -as we already observed- excessive demand and of course because the previously adopted policy of expense-abundance of the “affluent society”. This economic policy does not bring the monetary flow towards an equilibrium with the flow of goods and services.

b) The increase of the liquidity preference appears with decline of the marginal efficiency of capital, which occurs during the downward phase of the cycle, proving in this way a transient and not permanent decrease in investment.

c) The increase in the liquidity preference happens also, when the stock exchange market booms in the upward phase of the cycle. Thus while interest determines the investment, at the same time the interest is determinant by the investment (L.Th. Houmanidis: *Aspects on the History of Monetary Fluctuations and Inflation* “International Congress of Public Finance and Fiscal Policy”, Athens, November 1976, p.19).

Don Patinkin through his own theory has placed himself also outside actual realities having accepted that the needs are unchanged and also the production and prices are steady. He therefore -in my view- disregarded the time element and the changes herein. In continuation, he did not consider the advance payments and the increase in the quantity of money. The importance of the fluctuation for various factors is missing from his theory.

Friedman's theory too, in spite of his attempt to renew the quantitative theory, has some weak points. Because, on the one hand his is a pure theory of choice and on the other it is a short time analysis from which the element of foresight is missing. In addition, changes in prices and the nominal income can precede the changes of the actual cash that the owners wish to keep. Of course, Friedman in his wellknown article: "The Quantity Theory of Money - A Restatement, Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money" (1956) used a broadly defined variable, which is supposed to represent "any... variables that can be expected to affect tastes and preference..." such as indexes of migration miles of railway travels and the like". He also interprets u as "including variables affecting... the relevant technological condition or production".

We shall just mention many variables which affect the value of money and we shall proceed here below to formulate a function.

In general, the above theories, with Patinkin as a partial exception, are anti-numéraire in the problem of the value of money and in this way they result in inflation.

Aschleim's and others' reaction, without referring to some views on neutral money as that of von Hayek, was justified as we have suggested. Yet these views do not formulate a function which can show the determination and change of value of money and which could contain not only the production factors but also the technological factor as well as the non-monetary factor and expectations.

To this effect I present the following function according to my own views:

$$V_m = \frac{1}{P} = f\left(M, V, r, \frac{E}{O}\right)$$

The V_m in the above function is the value of money, P is the general level of prices, M is the volume of the circulation of money, V is its ve-

locity, r the general level of interest, O the possibilities of production (capital and technological equipment, rationalization of production and its general conditions, the reaction of Labour Unions from the one side and of the entrepreneurs from the other side, the fundamental banking system, and other basic factors affecting production directly or indirectly), E the possibilities of production, expectations on future results of production.

According to our function the quantity of money influences the level of prices and the rate of interest through the holding of cash; the prices in turn affect the quantity of money, as the rate of interest through the quantity of money affects the level of prices. The velocity of money affects its quantity and, through this, the rate of interest and the level of prices. But the quantity of money also affects the velocity, and also the rate of interest and prices. All parts of the function affect the value of money, which is the dependent variable.

In the relation E/O we must take into consideration certain factors concerning the special condition of a country in as much as this relation concerns the social, economic, political and institutional structures, etc.

In the case $O > E$ then the prices will fall but if $O < E$, it is obvious that the opposite will happen. As the productive forces evolve and develop, the ratio E/O will increase and we shall have a rise in prices, in the long run. In the case again where we have full employment, the increase of E in relation to O as well as the increase of the E/O will cause inflation. If $E=O$ we have equilibrium and in this case money may be counted as a numéraire and the rate of interest should be such as to equalize the holding of cash and the total quantity of money.

6.

On the basis of what I have examined above, it becomes obvious that the new tendency in Economics is to create a new system and to avoid uncontrolled freedom, which brings anarchy in its wake, and the metaphysic socialism (Marxism) which guides to the minimalization of freedom which in the end leads to tyranny. Therefore, through the proposed by us system of «Humanitarian Economics, «1978,1994» are laid the foundations for a new philosophy of Economics -of the human being as the supreme value of life- and of an economic mechanism operating under

this concept. The more perfect mechanisms in a regime of individual freedom are the limiting and control of the monopolies so that their prices to be adapted on a level of free competition, and the money commodity dominates as already Professor Angel Rugina has argued (Rugina, 1994).

I have developed my thoughts with the consideration that History is directed on the basis of the processes of overcoming various resistances and that the achievement of this led mankind to progress, for otherwise we are faced with decline. For us, the History of the world is nothing more than the endeavour to overcome both natural and human resistances through the enlightenment of Logos (Λόγος) for the achievement of prosperity and the most suitable institutions for *peace, order and social justice*.

History follows a process of complex factors which act in concert, each one of them influencing, more or less, historical evolution in accordance with existing conditions. Within these, the class struggle is developed in some historical moments or periods more or less brief as a phenomenon of human society, but not as permanent phenomenon the one only cause of historical change and evolution. In our era particularly appears the phenomenon of contradictions within the same social stratum itself as well as the alliances between them are temporary and constantly transforming without making any distinction between social stratum.

Frequently, the political motive dominates in the historic process while at other times it is the economic or the religious motive. It is possible for the lower classes to be strengthened, and this usually occurs through individuals belonging to the upper income strata or from a part of the upper social strata which make an alliance with the lower one or part of it. Consequently, this conflict of interests does not refer only to two classes as Marx maintained during the middle of the past century.

The transformation of the social, industrial and economic structure began with the French Revolution (1789) which brought about a quasi equality on the political level. The truly democratic society bridges social and economic distinctions so that instead of a class struggle -I repeat again- in keeping on with its antagonistic meaning, we have a conflict of interests of the social strata, within which individuals move about, sometimes toward one and sometimes toward another social stratum. And these social strata, despite the fact that they clash, they also work together on behalf of the general interest of the Nation -or as it would appear to the future, I wish it- to a further community of Nations. Consequently, the various

groups of interests are placed in a condition of finding the most suitable institutions as well as co-existing in regard to the remaining factors. The more successful these are, the more techniques and economics evolve in harmony with these, the more social income increases and is distributed in a more just manner as the antagonism between the social-income strata is lessened.

If people ever achieve the harmonization of their needs with the existing stocks of goods and exploit the environment worth a just distribution of the produced wealth, then the conflict between the various interests will tend to disappear. And I say "tend" because from the nature of the scarcity of wealth and the egotistical nature of man it is not possible for this contradiction to completely disappear.

The conflict of interests is due to the cost of dependence. And, as has been noted, the greater the recompense for the factor of production is, the smaller the cost of dependence from the recompense of another factor that has been expended on it will be, and vice versa.

The concept of the cost of dependence derives from the basic psychological law according to which no one accepts working under another, whether that is another person or the State itself.

The cost of dependence rules the history of mankind, from the period when the most powerful prevailed over the less powerful and when the social differentiation appeared. But with the fading away of the old structure of society, the cost of dependence also more or less faded away and with the intervention of the collective forces of Democracy, this will tend to disappear, though -I repeat- it will never completely disappear because of the fundamental law of freedom. Democracy is not right or left, it is merely Democracy and not Paradise which concerns the dream of any social philosopher.

The problem which derives is what kind of economic system we could propose in order to minimize the dependence's effect. We proposed a regime of combining the principle of individualism with the principle of sociality and this is right. but the question which appears is how to obtain such a regime in a society.

I think that the idea of an extremist free competition is out of any reality as "the competition policy is submitted to a standard within the rule of law" (Wernhard Möschel), in other words to protect from the one hand the action of individually and from the other hand of the institutions. Oher-

wise the weaker would be the victim of the stronger because as Senior and Proudhon maintained, competition destroys competition. Thus consider as very important to assist competition by a law. In a system like that the dependence effect -in accordance with my view- should be minimized as further as possible.

For me the following policy must be adopted in order to establish a Humanitarian Economy:

- a) A monetary policy based on a currency of money-commodity.
- b) The restriction of monopoly the most to the percentage of 5% and to control this 5% by a Bureau of Statistics and Econometrics to define the price under free competition in order to adapt the monopoly's price at this level.
- c) Income redistribution by a progressive taxation in connection with the business cycle (recovery-depression) and by the participation in the profits as I proposed in my «Points of View...» (1993).
- d) Control and liability in connection with a free market policy.
- e) Constancy of political life.

Abstract

LAZAROS HOUMANIDIS : *The Evolution of Economic Science during our century and the effort for a third way in economics*

The above paper is a summary conclusions of my "Humanitarian Economics" (1994) with a proposal for a third way in Economics based on the following principles:

- a) Man is supreme value of life
- b) The restriction of Monopoly and the adapting of it at a free competition price level.
- c) The diminishing of the cost of dependence between the factors of production.
- d) The establishment of peace, order and social justice of a Democracy governed by the individual free spirit and the social democratic power.

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ROOTS OF ECONOMIC ORGANICISM

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In nineteenth-century Germany an historically and organically oriented type of economic thought was applied, which type of thought was focussed on economic development. The idea of development was partly formulated in organic terms, which later came to be expressed by the Darwinian term “evolution”. Romanticism became the philosophical basis for socio-economic thought. Into this situation appeared the works of Roscher, Knies and Hildebrand, founders of the Historical School. It was believed that Classical theory wrongly claimed to be applicable to all stages of economic development and that it was specifically individualistic. The Historical School attempted to avoid such shortcomings by using a methodology which was, at least partly, “organistic”.¹

This current in economic thought became differentiated in the last quarter of the century. The tradition of “historicism” was continued by the so-called “Younger” Historical School. The man who played a dominant role in it was Schmoller. In the field of organically oriented economics, however, Schmoller’s antipole, Menger, also inherited part of Roscher’s legacy, laying the foundation of what I call New-Organicism.

Earlier, rational thought, a physics-oriented idea, was applied by philosophers of the Enlightenment to social problems. Society, at least in its ideal form, was conceived of as a “natural” order. Thought was banned by the aprioristic idea of a social development from obscure feudalism to a brilliant future, caused by the gradual breaking through of “reason”. Inher-

1. This essay is based on Krabbe’s *Historicism and organicism : the evolution of thought* (1996). In a way, it is complementary with his essay “Schmoller’s evolutionary economic’s, *Archves of Economic History* (1991)

ent to this type of thought was the idea of progressive development. This includes the evolution from a primitive society with uncomplicated social relationships, little personal freedom and low productivity, to a society with a refined social structure, personal freedom and welfare.

This type of social progress can be found in the thinking of Montesquieu [(1748), 1979]. He presented societies of differing types in which the various institutional structures were conditioned by factors like geographic structure and, above all, were determined by a certain “spirit”. According to him, a form of society determined by a certain way of thinking can arise from another form, characterized by a less “enlightened” way of thought. However, this development pattern is no historical picture, in which every stage has its own value. Montesquieu’s thought was focussed on a specific social order that was supposed to appear: the “natural order”. Enlightened thought had a political dimension. In France philosophers were critical of the society that then existed, the *ordre positif*, “positive order”. Many laws of the eighteenth-century state were supposed to frustrate reason. They were seen as obstacles to the *ordre naturel*, “natural order”. This aspect was developed by the Physiocrats, whose world of ideas was an economically oriented variant of Enlightened philosophy.

The name “Physiocrats” of the Quesnay School was derived from the word *physiocratie*, the key word in the title of the book of Dupont de Nemours (1768). This name was rightly chosen. It refers to the most characteristic aspect of this variant of Enlightened thought, the integration of biology into the idea of natural order. For the Physiocrats, this order was not just a universal metaphor, ruling itself, but was supposed to include the organic nature that serves mankind. Members of the Classical School, although not all, while continuing the Physiocratic tradition in many respects, lost interest in this organic aspect. However, it remained a parochial idea of the German Historical School.

As a physician, Quesnay was acquainted with the functioning of organisms, and it is in this field that his contribution to economic thinking lies. His idea was that the working of the “laws of nature” is not confined to the sphere of human intercourse, but also includes the biological aspect of agriculture. According to him, only in agriculture could mankind take advantage of “the Free Gift of Nature”. Agriculture was supposed to be the only form of productive activity.

The Classics modified the Physiocratic idea of production and analyzed the economic process further. This “classical” way of thought was the great antipode of German historicism. The philosophical background of the early Classical School was put into words by David Hume. According to Hume’s idea of society, the individual plays an significant constructive role. He said that “[e]very man’s interest is peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree”. His idea of social development is optimistic, in agreement with the Enlightened idea of progress (Hume, 1777 : pp. 228, 239, 281-82).

In Enlightened thought there was an individualistic as well as an authoritarian approach to politics. It was into this field of tension that Romanticism arose, forming the basis for a renewed way of thought in Political Economy, particularly in nineteenth century Germany. It is essential for an historical view to have an open eye for gradual changes in human thought and behaviour, in the sense of in the image of man and society over the course of time. The Enlightenment had already contributed to this social empirical approach. Romanticism, however, shaped the historical view, putting “historicism” in the centre of the approach.

There are three writers to be mentioned as forming the transition from Enlightened to Romantic thought : Rousseau, Herder and Kant. All of them took the initiative to “shake off the chains of reason”, each in his own way. Jean-Jacques Rousseau should be mentioned for his attention to emotional feelings and the glorification of primitive man. Johann Gottfried von Herder should be considered the pioneer of organic thought in German Romanticism. According to his view on cultural development, he conceived of a harmonious connection between an unfolding culture and (biologically oriented) nature. He, and later Wilhelm Roscher, assumed that human existence is rooted in organic nature. Neither saw a sharp boundary between the social and the biological world (Barnard, 1983; Krabbe, 1987).

Immanuel Kant was the founder of the idealistically oriented current in Romanticism, and, as such dominated nineteenth-century German philosophy. Kant wanted to find an equilibrium between Cartesian thought and the empirical thought of Bacon, Newton and Hume. His follower, the philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel, was particularly interested in scientific thought on the social phenomena of his day. In his approach there in an

identity between the subject of knowledge and the considering spirit. Unlike previous ideas, he considered “dialectics” to be a way towards knowledge on the basis of the idea that society has a specific development pattern. In this way Hegel made idealistic philosophy suitable for reflecting the dynamics in social empiricism. Hegel’s dialectic approach supported the idea of History being a series of development stages, in which every stage is determined by a certain way of thought.

The most typical characteristic of the Historical School is economic historicism, which partly coincides with organicism. In this context historicism means that the scientific observer has a good eye for the changing picture of society; that he puts socioeconomic development in the centre of his economic philosophy. This idea is not the same as the concept of historicism, introduced into economics by Karl Popper (1957). This concept refers primarily to predictability on the basis of development of society. It was rightly criticized by Popper. Although the form of historicism mentioned by him is also found in the Historical School, it is the other concept that was dominant.

Old organicism

Not everyone agreed with the Classical’s idea of an individualistically oriented “natural order”. In Great Britain another approach was taken by Edmund Burke, statesman and philosopher with early Romantic ideas. German thought was influenced by Burke’s ideas, as exemplified by the philosopher and politician Adam Müller. Although Müller was an admirer of Smith, he nevertheless rejected the latter’s rationalism and individualism. He presented an advanced form of mediaval social thought. Instead of tying up cultural phenomena with the individual, in the way Hume did, he implicated them in the idea of the Staat. Müller connected the idea of the German state with the “spirit” of the nation. For him, the state is a whole, formed in the course of time, and has a producing as well as consuming identity. Production was supposed to be the result of “productive forces”, the result, in their turn, form “higher” productive forces. Friedrich List was apparently inspired by this to form his “theory of productive forces”.

Roscher agreed with Müller that society has both historic and organic

traits. However, the great precursor of the Historical School was the German Friedrich List. In the United States he became involved in business, and became convinced that young industries in agrarian countries need tariff protection. There he wrote his *Outlines of American Political Economy* (1827), in which he criticized reflective economics that was based, without question, on *laissez faire*. List commented on the ideas of Adam Smith, which had been put forward in America by Thomas Cooper. Actually, the contradiction was not so large. List, just as later most of the members of the Historical School were to do, believed that a policy of intervention is complementary to a policy of free trade and that it should not replace it. This interventionist policy was focussed towards economic development (List, 1841).

Wilhelm Roscher was the founder of the "Old" Historical School. It was his aim to correct and amplify contemporary. Classical theory, the merits of which he recognized. He wanted to integrate the Classical view into a picture of society which was shaped by a new way of thought, characterized by him as the historical or the historico-physiological approach. In Roscher's view, a national society is considered to be an organism in which households function as mutually dependent parts. He claimed that in this way an insight could be gained into the functioning, and the rise and decay of both the whole and its parts, the specific organs. This process was supposed to be in accordance with "laws" which were not considered to differ essentially from those of biology. Hence, his use of the adjective "physiological". According to Roscher, all cultures are characterized by analogous stages of rise, flourishing and decay, which were also considered the development pattern of mankind as a whole.

Roscher made the well-known distinction between "what is" and "what should be" (Roscher, 1854, 1868 : p. 42). Relying on Hume, he wanted to express the idea that, in economics, only the former is under discussion, the latter being supposed to belong to a world of thought that was indicated as "practice". It is doubtful, however, whether Roscher himself fully succeeded in shaping such a value-free science, particularly when he spoke, in organic terms, of the diagnosis and the therapeutics of social ailments.

It is not easy to summarize what Roscher understood by the "historical" or "historico-physiological" method, which he believed should be followed in economics. To begin with, it must be said that this approach was

tied to the aprioristic idea that in the economies of all cultures there is an analogous development governed by “general laws of life”, indicated as “laws of nature”. He held that in the development of any culture three stages can be distinguished : youth, maturity and old age, according to the development of the individual man. These “development stages” were not supposed to appear in identical forms, but in analogous shapes. For Roscher, the validity of universal laws of socioeconomic development was assumed a matter of course. However, his attempt to support this idea with historical observations is not convincing. His kindred spirit, Karl Knies, rightly asked which part should be assigned to the free will of man in the process of social development.

According to Roscher, “value” depends upon the good’s significance to the user. On this point Roscher was close to the School of Marginal Utility. Therefore, as C. Brinkmann rightly noticed, it is not surprising that in 1871 Menger dedicated his epochmaking work to Roscher (Brinkmann, 1956). Another motive might have been that his student Menger felt a certain affinity with Roscher’s organically oriented approach.

In his book on “Political Economy from the point of view of the historical method” (1853) Knies related economic causality to a man acting in freedom. His idea of human behaviour, however, was not purely individualistic. He distinguished between an individual and a collective man. He had in mind a “national man”, whose behaviour is determined by the *Volksgeist*, “Spirit of the Nation”. In Knies’s approach, this “national man” should be placed into an historical context, in a holistic way. In Knies’s view, economics is focussed on the economic aspect of the development of national cultures. So, in his approach, many cultural phenomena are drawn into the scope of economics.

Another principle of economic development, mentioned by Knies is that in society everything is related to and consistent with everything else, a structure of social phenomena which is subject to systematic change (1853 : p. 109).

Like Roscher and Knies, Hildebrand maintained that aiming towards self-interest does not necessarily lead with necessity to general welfare. According to him, the quintessence of economic causality is that any social situation arises from the previous one. However, Hildebrand’s interest in the collectivist state did not prevent him from noticing that “all mankind’s civilization arises from individuality” (Hildebrand, 1848 : p. 271).

New-Organicism

The economist Carl Menger was also a methodologist who allowed space for organically oriented ideas. I focus on him in this function. In this connection I use the term “new organicism”, considering it, on the one hand, a modern version of Wilhelm Roscher’s organicism, drastically transformed and, on the other, an entirely new approach. The term is reminiscent of Francis Bacon’s *Novum organum*, characterized by empiricism and “inductive logic”. I do not consider this problematic since Menger himself approvingly referred to this work.

Jan Zuidema (1988) stressed the significance of causality and time in Menger’s work. He distinguished three causality patterns in it : the causation of value, the causality in “roundabout” production, and a vague historical causality, which referred to the institutional context of the economic process. It is this historical causality that is of most interest in the context of this essay.

Menger did not agree with the idea that the social sciences should be distinguished, in principle, from natural sciences. This idea had been put forward by neo-Kantians like Windelband, and adherents of the philosophy of life, represented by Dilthey and Schmoller. Menger even strongly opposed this type of methodical dualism. In adopting a homogenous method in economic science, he was in line with Roscher’s thought, although he rejected Roscher’s idea that socio-economic development is determined by “laws of nature”.

Menger made a distinction between a mechanistic and an organistic approach (Menger, 1883, 1985: p. 132n). In contrast to the mechanical system, the organic system was characterized as being a “higher whole”. According to him, the proper approach for studying the core of economics is the mechanistic one, resulting in a “theory” of utility and prices. This theory was supposed to have an “atomistic” and an “exact” character. However, when dealing with the economic system as a whole, including its institutional aspects as well as the development of it, he adopted a partly organically oriented approach, calling it “realistic economics” and assigning to it both an “empirical” nature and a “descriptive” one. However, he had strong objections to Roscher’s organistic approach to the state (Milford, 1990 : p. 219).

Menger assumed that his “organistic” approach did not conflict with an atomistic price analysis. His consumer-oriented valuation system was not based on individuals’ rational considerations only, but also on human impulses (Menger, 1883, 1985 : p. 87). For him, man’s needs are caused by a combination of biological, instinctive and psychological factors. Menger used Roscher’s expression “physiology and anatomy of wants”, but he assigned a specific meaning to the term. According to his view, components of the institutional structure can serve the functioning and the development of the Classicals, a stream of thought which was based partly on Bacon. Menger’s organically oriented ideas were thus conditioned by an “essentialist” approach of Aristotelian stamp. This form of essentialism differed fundamentally from that of most of the members of the Historical School, in which the “essence” of social phenomena was supposed to be in an historical process of coming into existence, expressed by the proposition “being is becoming”. Menger’s “organistic” ideas refer to the empirical-realistic sphere, in which time also has to play a specific part and in which teleology is of a special nature (see also Berns, 1989).

Menger’s approach is based on the idea that wants must be seen in their relation to “properties” of scarce things: private and public goods. Another principle of Menger’s thought is that satisfaction of wants must be put in a causal context, which is bound to an interval of time. He noticed that causality could contain an element of uncertainty. His concept of wants has a typically organic dimension since he stated that wants arise partly from *Trieben*, inclinations in human nature. In this context he put forward the idea of a hierarchy of the wants, which are subject to development. He maintained that although total human wants are unlimited, specific wants are satisfiable. Thus, after certain wants are satisfied, others will arise. Another organistic trait in his thought was the idea that the social pattern of wants and its counterpart in the sphere of goods form an “indivisible unit” (Menger, 1883, 1985: p. 139).

Menger presented a harmonious picture of wants and means, the corner stone of which was the idea of complementarity. He made it clear that the direct or indirect utility of goods also depends upon the quantities of other goods available. The idea of complementarity refers to the structure of wants of individuals, as well as to that of society as a whole. He believed that these structures of wants are reflected by the composition of consumption packages of families, as well as by the total package of

means applied in society. Menger held that the development of society's institutional structure has an impact on the structure of "theory". (Menger, 1871, 1950 : p. 56ff, 75-6, 96-7, 162-3).

Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, who recently passed away, elaborated Carl Menger's thought in a creative and syntetic way, also taking notice of the idea of "ordered systems", put forward by systems-oriented authors like Gustav Schmoller, to be discussed below. He referred to Menger only in connection with the hierarchy of wants and on a few other points. Nevertheless, it is clear that Menger preceded him in various respects.

Georgescu-Roegen's basic idea is that the main distinction in Science is between the inorganic sphere and the organic sphere, and not between social science and natural science. The methodological contradiction is between a physical and an organistic epistemology; mechanism *versus* organicism. He distinguished two levels in the world of economic phenomena: organic and superorganic. The organic domain comprises the typically biological world, the superorganic one embraces the social world. Both Menger and Roegen noticed that "organic" systems are characterized by a high level of organization. The idea of the purposefulness of organic systems is also found in works of both writers. Both were of the opinion that the mechanistic approach complements the organistic one. Georgescu-Roegen, however, intergrated both approaches into a unified methodology (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; 1976).

Key words in Roegen's approach are "entropy" and "qualitative change". He stated that qualitative change is manifested in the development of man and his environment, according to the principle of "exosomatic evolution". This concept was based on the idea that man has a specific property to exploit nature. The species man will become extinct if nature is exhausted, useful law entropy being converted into useless high entropy. Qualitative change, however, is also manifested in partial processes. 'Evolutionary change' Roegen said, 'is inseparable from the Whole'. However, it 'cannot be seen except in an isolated, at least quasi-isolated, system'. In institutional problems he complements "analysis" (with its arithmorphic theory) with "dialectics" (Krabbe, 1993).

Like Menger before him, Georgescu-Roegen paid a great deal of attention to causality. Like Schumpeter earlier, he distinguished between "time" and "Time", mentioning "duration" of processes in terms of the first, and evolution in terms of the second. The latter is what Hutchison

meant by “historical time” (Hutchison, 1979 : p. 212). In connection with the two concepts of time, reference might be made to the *chronoi* and the *kairoi*, respectively, of the classical Greeks. Roegen noticed that analytical economic models should reflect valued “inputs” and “outputs”, crossing the analytical boundaries. These include unpriced means, unpriced benefits and waste. The nature of the causality reflected on should be mentioned if the process or a part of it, is irreversible.

Georgescu-Roegen transformed Pareto’s idea of *ophélimité* in an organic way. Roegen’s idea that wants are partly biologically-determined, however, is reminiscent of Menger. The idea of complementarity is found in both Pareto and Menger, in mathematical terms and verbal terms, respectively. Georgescu-Roegen rejected the hedonistic philosophy integrally. For individual welfare, the income of other members of society are considered conditional. So, he inserted altruistic considerations into the utility functions of individuals.

Georgescu-Roegen’s welfare theory has three postulates on the idea of hierarchy of wants. The first is the principle of the subordination of wants. There is a scale of wants in which the satisfaction of a certain want ‘creates a desire of a higher character’ or ‘permits the higher want to manifest itself’. This postulate implies the principle of satiable wants. Connected with these two postulates is the third, the principle of the growth of wants, ‘which is tantamount to the absence of absolute saturation’. Georgescu-Roegen’s idea of “saturation points”, in indifference maps, is based on these three principles of the hierarchy of wants. He relativized the idea of ordinal measurement of welfare. (Georgescu-Roegen, 1966; Krabbe, 1992).

Organicism in economic systems theory

Gustav Schmoller was the dominant figure in what was called the Younger Historical School, in which he had many disciples. For him, Economic History and History of Economic Thought were strongly linked. Schmoller was an idealist, in the sense that he assumed that ideas arising in society form the basis of its organization. This is seen in his interest in institutional phenomena and their analysis. The holistic idea of the spirit of the nation, put forward earlier by both Müller and Knies, can also be

found in Schmoller. In this however, he was referring especially to his kindred spirit, the historian and philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey. Schmoller approached the complex phenomenon of economy and nature in a way that can be seen as an early form of economic systems theory. In Roscher's economic system, nature had been fully integrated. Schmoller replaced this unified system by an "ordered" one, with subsystems, each of which should be analyzed by a method adjusted to the phenomena under investigation (Krabbe, 1993).

Schmoller stated that moral conduct coincides with efficient behaviour. The essence of his historicism is found in the statement that the ethical judgement is "a developing datum" (Schmoller, 1900, 1908 : 434). Developing morals result in ever new or renewed institutions. Certain institutions and their corresponding institutes were typical of certain stages of socio-economic development. Institutions are understood as crystallizations of the economic ideas of that time and place. According to Schmoller, the economy consists of both ethical and natural elements. Economics, however, was supposed to focus on the first.

Schmoller was of the opinion that economic reality has two aspects, which should be scientifically examined in two fundamentally different ways. The first is the ethically and physiologically based behaviour of man. The other is formed by the world of capital and nature. He saw the latter world of phenomena as an intergral part of the economy. Knowledge about the first aspect should be gained from economics as a "mental" science. Knowledge about the second aspect must be gained from the natural sciences, and from economics in the broad sense of the word.

Schmoller was strongly influenced by Dilthey's "philosophy of life", in which economics is part of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, the "mental sciences", or "humanistic sciences".² He narrowed the proper subject matter of economics to "the ethico-mental spher". However, he acknowledged that the sciences of nature contribute to economics. Thus, as well as a narrow approach, Schmoller also had a broad concept of the scope of economics. "National economy" can be seen as a system of moral as well as natural forces. It is both, at the same time, according to the point of view considered (Schmoller, 1900, 1908: p. 59). In this holistic approach, "natural"

2. When discussing the influence of German idealism on Schmoller's thought, Athanasios Giouras mentioned Fichte in particular (Giouras, 1993 : pp. 9-13). Dilthey's influence is discussed by Schefold (1989).

and “mental-historical” causes interact, “nature” and “culture” are intertwined (pp. 105-7, 125, 139).

Schmoller’s “dualistic” approach can be elaborated along the lines of systems theory, conceiving of the economy as a system of systems. These systems are the “mental” economic system, the system of technological thought, and the system of the environment, consisting of capital and nature. Organistic systems theory contains a specifically holistic approach, in which typical properties can be perceived that are not derived from properties of elements of the system as a whole. This idea is also found in Schmoller. According to him, the characteristics of the whole correspond with the functioning of the subsystems described. Therefore, the subsystems concerned were perceived as components of economic life, being the economy in its broadest sense. According to his view, this economic life, being the economy in its broadest sense. According to his view, this economic life economic life forms a whole. The term he used is “the social body”.

The first report by Club of Rome, *The limits to growth*, convinced many scientists of the significance of “systems thinking”, in both quantitative and qualitative terms (D.H. Meadows *et al.*, 1972). This way of thinking was mainly “mechanistic”. Jay Forrester (1971) supplied the basic model. His son, Nathan Forrester (1973) and D.L. Meadows *et al* (1974). made it clear that such models can have an organic trait, giving attention to “life cycle” aspects. The Club of Rome’s “second report” had a clear organistic dimension (Mesarovic and Pestel, 1974). Economic systems theory attempts to reconcile the idea of organistic equilibrium with Tinbergen’s primarily mechanistic approach (Tinbergen, 1943). In biologically oriented dynamics, the central idea is “evolution”, with its aspects of historical modification and organic growth.

Ecology deals with mutual interactions of organisms in the context of an adapting physical environment. Daly contributed to the integration of this type of systems theory into economic thought. He used the term “steady-state” in an economic sense (Daly, 1991). Boulding (1981) advocated an “evolutionary” approach for specific problems in economics, alongside a “mechanistic” one. This analysis focusses on both natural and institutional factors, which determine the development process. Entropy is seen as loss of potential. Boulding’s approach agrees with the ecologically oriented economic systems theory.

Conclusions

Organistic ideas found a place in modern economic thought, especially in institutionally oriented economics. Like other Institutionalists, Hounanidis (1994) used the term “evolution”, which idea is bound up with the moral and cultural development of man. This concept is reminiscent of Schmoller’s thought. Many modern economists attempt to reconcile the typical methodological features of economic science on the one hand and natural sciences on the other, by integrating natural science thought into economics. Rugina (1986) mentioned a number of twentieth-century economists who have also done so.

Traditionally, organically oriented production is the central idea of agricultural economics. In environmental and resource economics such concepts play a crucial role. Another issue is the idea that the economic system itself can be conceived of as an organism, the warning given by both Menger and Schmoller that the significance of the analogy is limited is still relevant. Nevertheless, this approach enables the insight into the development of the whole is also based on biologically oriented ideas can give an insight into the degree of uncertainty inherent in mechanistic economic extrapolations, particularly if long-term developments are subject to investigation. A test for a proper application of the organic metaphor is that results are complementary to and not antagonistic towards mechanistic conclusions.

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CONSUMER METAPHYSICS : THE NEOCLASSICALISTS VERSUS THE INTERSUBJECTIVISTS

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1. Introduction

The he only thing really amazing about the new “Intersubjectivist Economics” is that it did not appear sooner. Emerging in the 1990s as a coherent research program, it has its basis in work of the 1980s by the French economists, Michel Agietta, André Orléan and Jean-Pierre Dupuy. Remarkably free of dogma and of ideology, its main claim to significance is that it offers a new approach to the study of economic phenomena. In this essay I will explain some basic Intersubjectivist ideas, especially those concerning consumer theory. Like most major theoretical advances in knowledge, Intersubjective Economics emanates from a fundamental change in the presuppositions of metaphysical foundations which underpin because the primary metaphysics of Neoclassical Economics are rarely discussed and therefore little understood. It is rather as if the relevant archives have been sealed, leaving economists in the dark as to the ultimate presuppositions from which twentieth-century consumer theory springs. I will attempt to disentomb this set of metaphysical beliefs, and then explain the alternative offered the Intersubjectivists.

2. Neoclassical Metaphysics

2.1. The Greek Legacy

As with so many things, one must begin with the philosophers of Greek antiquity to find the beginnings of systematic thought on the nature of consumer demand. Lazaros Houmanidis identifies in the writing of Xenophon the concept of use-value as a **relation** between an object and a person, rather than as a property of the object. In his recent essay on Xenophon's economic ideas, Houmanidis writes: "A flute in the hands of a flautist has value -[Xenophon] says- but not in the hands of a man who does not know how to use a flute." [Houmanidis, 1992, p. 85] Without the ability to use it, the most exquisite of musical instruments is only so much inert matter to its possessor. Similarly, Gino Barbieri noted that Xenophon's parable of the flute shows that the use-value of "goods originate from their capacity to satisfy the need of the who possesses them" and that such use-values are "conditioned by the judgement of the subject." [Barbieri, 1992, p. 5]. Because this concept of use-values as a relation between an object and a human subject is kindred to philosophy's view of knowledge as a relation between an object and a knowing subject, the history of the theory of use-value is entwined in theories of knowledge.

Among philosophers, disagreements regarding epistemology centre on the nature and extent of the roles of the two terms of the knowledge relation. Aristotle's empiricism and its famous British variant lie at one extreme, Platonic rationalism at the other, and, in between, all manner of more moderate positions. Because these epistemological debates have been taking place for 2500 years, it seems unlikely that the central issue will ever be resolved. But much more than just this philosophical issue is at stake. What is important in terms of social welfare is that philosophers, by having the courage to participate in free and open debates, provide a public forum for an ongoing conceptual critique of "knowledge". Because use-value, like knowledge, is understood as a relation between objects and a knowing subject, one might expect to find disputes roughly paralleling those of the theory of knowledge surrounding the idea of use-value. Like knowledge, the relational character of use-value invites argument over the nature and relative importance of the contributions of the object and of

the human subject to its existence. Yet through the ages -and especially in the twentieth century- there has been paucity of informed debate about the nature of the use-value **ralation**.

This absence stems, in part, from the way the history or the ideas of use - value and exchange-value has been compromised by nationalism and by bias from English-speaking economists against non-English-language writes. For example, there is a tendency to credit Adam Smith with the distinction between use-value and exchange-value, when, in fact, he was merely conveying a long-established idea to his English readership. It is necessary to digress here momentarily to review the principal points regarding the emergence of theories of use-value. In this task I have the benefit of Houmanidi's corrective essays. [Houmanidis, 1978, 1992, 1994, 1995].

Xenophon's parable of the flute is not only subjectivist, it is also, as Houmanidis has explained [1992, pp. 85-85], highly suggestive of the distinction between value in use and value in exchange. But it was Aristotle in his **Ethics**, his **Rhetoric** and his **Politics**, who first extensively "explored value from the subjective poing of view" [Houmanidis, 1995, p. 19], and who contributed ideas on value which, filtered through the Enlightenment, became part of the foundational concepts of modern economics. The most well-known of these ideas comes from Aristotle's **Politics**:

"... with every article of property there is a double way of using it; both uses are related to the article itself, but not related to it in the same manner; one is peculiar to the thing and the other is not peculiar to it. Take for example a shoe; there is its wear as a shoe and there is its use as an article of exchange; for both are ways of using a shoe, inasmuch as even he who borters a shoe for money or food with the customer that wants a shoe uses it as a shoe, though not for the use proper to a shoe, since shoes have not come into existence for the purpose of barter." [**Politics**, Book I, 8-9, 1257 a, 5-15. Houmanidis's translation].

This example —well-know both to the French Encyclopedists and the figures of the Scottish Enlightenment— establishes clearly the distinction between use-value and exchange-value so central to modern economic thought.

Economics' debt to Aristotle for the distinction between the two categories of value, if not always fully acknowledged, is nevertheless well-known. The same cannot be said for the metaphysics which Aristotle offered in support of his concept of use-value. His theory of human pleasy is rarely, if ever, mentioned by economists, and yet via Locke, Bentham and Mill it entered very substantially into the metaphysics upon which contemporary demand theory is based. The **Nicomachean Ethics** offers not one but two accounts of the nature of pleasure, and it is the second of these, the one found in Book X, that is germane to the development of economics. Here Aristotle identifies pleasure as the response to a stimulus, the result of an object acting ("stimulating") in a favourable way upon a sensory organ or the mind. Consider especially the following:

That each of the sense has its corresponding pleasure is obvious, because we say that sights and sounds are pleasant. It is also obvious that the pleasure is keenest when the sensory faculty is at its best, and exercised upon the best object; when both object and organ are at their best, there will always be pleasure so long as there is **something to produce it and someone to feel it**. [Thomson's translation, Book X, Chapter iv, emphasis added].

This theory of pleasure is notable for the passive role it assigns the human being and for its notion that each sensory organ generates pleasure independently of the others.

2.2. Newton/Locke/Bentham

Aristotle's empiricism foreshadowed the radical empiricism of the seventeenth century and the metaphysics of Neoclassical Economics. John Locke, the primary founder of radical empiricism, believed that ideas originate through external things acting on our senses, "knowledge inlets". [See also Houtmanidis, 1994, page 64 for an account of Locke]. When material objects stimulate our sense organs, they produces effects, called "sensations", in our consciounes. Locke called these sensations and our recollections of them "simple ideas". It follows, he argues in **An Essay Concerning Human Understanding**, that:

simple Ideas are not fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular production of Things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended... [IV. iv. 4]

Locke claimed that all our ideas were either these simple ideas, for which we act as mere passive receptors, or composites of such ideas. Isaiah Berlin has described the profound influence of Newtonian physics on this model of the mind.

The mind was treated as if it were a box containing mental equivalents of the Newtonian particles... These “ideas” are distinct and separate entities ... literally atomic, having their origin somewhere in the external world, dropping into the mind like so many grains of sand inside an hour glass; there they continue in isolation, or are compounded into complexes ... [Berlin, 1956, p. 18].

Locke’s identification of inertia as a fundamental property of the human individual, also seems inspired by an analogy with Newtonian mechanics. Newton’s first law of motion, also called “the principle of inertia” (from Latin word meaning “idleness” or “laziness”) is:

A body remains at rest or, if already in motion, remains in uniform motion with constant speed in a straight line, unless it is acted on by an unbalanced external force.

Locke claims **a priori** a similar principle of inertia for human beings, a view which continues to be profoundly influential in shaping economics. Consider the following passage from Locke’s **Essay**.

3. The infinite wise Author of our being ... to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of, has been pleased to join the several thoughts and several sensations a **perception of delight**. If this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another, negligence to attention, or motion to rest. And so we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds... It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects and to the **ideas** which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees: that those faculties which

he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and un-employed by us.

4. **Pain** has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that plesure has, ... [2.7]

In other words, Locke—and through Locke, Noeclassical Economics—assumes that like material bodies, the human personality will not be brought into “motion” unless disturbed by extraneous forces, in this case, sensations bringing pleasure or pain. This metaphysics of the human personality attributes to every sensation a measure of pleasure of pain belonging to a single scale applicable equally to every experience and every moment of every person’s life. [2.21.31] It is this inbuilt system of reward and punishment which overcomes the inertia of the human personality. Locke insists repeatedly that without the impetus of sensory pleasure and pain, no one would do anything.

The causal theory of perception, the principle of human inertia, and the doctrine that a pleasure-pain continuum is the cause and rational of all human exertion, both mental and physical, combine to create a coherent metaphysics. But it is one whose realm of plausibility is severely restricted. Locke’s metaphysical vision exludes the on-going **individuality** on human experience- that is, a person’s perceptual field, including their goals, hopes, anticipations, knowledge, prejudices, social conditioning, etc.. All these existential and individual facts of life have no place in Locke’s conception of perceptual experience as a simple relation between physical stimuli and physical organs. Furthermore, if we relinquish the idea that the individual human self is self-identical, that is, unchanging like the Newtonian atom, then the pleasure/pain principle begins to look hopelessly inadquate as a comprehensive explanation of human behaviour. If we think of the individual instead as an emergent phenomenon, something continually in the making through intentional human effort and through interaction with other selves, as a kind of project which, short of death, is never completed, then the structure of human behaviour begins to look not nearly so simple as Locke would have us believe.

In **An Essay Concerning Human Understanding** Locke ignores these other aspects of human reality which, when seen, render its theory decidedly inadquate. In the contex of his theory, its major omissions tend to go unnoticed baccuse of the confusion which arises when one term or sign stands for two distinct but connected concepts. With reference to human

beings, we commonly use the word “self” to signify two very different things. There is “self” in the **biological sense** of a life that extends from birth to death. A “self” in this sense is self-identical: a person remains the same person, for example Isaac Newton or Simone de Beauvoir, from one day to the next and for the whole of their life. But there also is “self” in the **existential sense** — of a being who inscontinuously in the making and who to some degree changes with each and every experience. An individual learns, grows up and grows old, acquires new sensibilities, finishes projects and begins new ones, amasses memories, change their self-image, etc., etc.. When not engaged in life-and-death struggle, it is this **non-self-identical-self**— note the biological self— which acts as the focal point of human life. Obviously, Locke’s metaphysical system cannot accommodate this fundamental ambiguity of the human condition, so he includes only the biological self in his discussion of selfhood. He makes no mention of the existential self. By this omission Locke gains the confidence to declare: “consciousness ... is **self to itself** now, and so will be the same **self** as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come. [3.27.10]

Locke’s introverted, asocial, static, passive, inert, hedonistic, materialistic model of humankind become the basis of that set of presuppositions called **homo economicus**. The following passage from Locke’s **Essay** encapsulates many of the main points of what was to become the key concept for the Neoclassicalists.

Happiness, then, in its full extent, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and **misery** the utmost pain: and the lowest degree of what can be called **happiness** is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which anyone cannot be content. Now, because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects either on our minds or our bodies and in different degrees, therefore, what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us we call **good**, and what is apt to produce pain in us we call **evil** ... when they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference. [2.21.42]

When, a century later, Jeremy Bentham sought to popularize these ideas under the banner of “utility”, he began by merely paraphrasing

Locke, substituting for the latter's "good", the word "utility". In **an Essay Concerning Human Understanding** Locke wrote as follows:

Things then are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good which **is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us, or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil.** And, on the contrary, we name that **evil** which **is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us, or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good.** [2.20.2]

In his **An Introcuotion of the Principles of Morals and Legistation** (1789) Bentham reworted Locke's statement as follows:

By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness ... or ... to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhapiness to the party whose interest is considered. [Chapter 1, Section 3]

2.3. The Neoclassicalists

The Lockean theory of human reality and, by implication, of use-value became the anvil of Neoclassical Economics. This strategic function is especially obvious in Stanley Jevon's **The Theory of Political Economy** (1871), where, in his enormously influential Chapter III "The Theory of Utility", he establishes some of the fundamental preconceptions of the new school by quoting Bentham's paraphrase of Locke [Jevons, 1970, p. 102], and spelling out his own Lockean vision of the human being as a simple pleasure machine. Eric Roll notes that, via Bentham, Jevons "found ready at hand a complete philosophy whose aim was precisely the establishment of the principles of human action." [Roll, 1973, p. 379] Jevos, believing the human psyche revealed to him, proceeded to list "the laws of human enjoyment". [Jevons, 1970, p. 102] Whereas ethical hedonism advocates the organization of one's whole life for the purpose of giving maximum pleasure, the Neoclassicalists, from Jevons onward, infer that such advocacy is utterly beside the point, since we all are programmed to behave like hedonists in any case. Belief in this psychological hedonism, notes Houmanidis, leaves the human being "without past or fu-

ture,... abandoned in a static situation.” [Houmanidis, 1994, p. 89] Furthermore, when embraced dogmatically by economists, this set of presuppositions works against the advancement of human knowledge, as it sweeps aside the larger part of economic phenomena from the field of systematic inquiry.

In the twentieth century, the concept of **homo economicus**, rather than being modernised or postmodernised or having its narrow metaphysical base extended, has tended to be pushed even further into its seventeenth-century shell in economics’ pursuit of ever greater conceptual purity. With its progressive distancing of itself from the world of economic affairs, “mainstream” economics descends deeper into the fiction that its metaphysics of human reality is either credible or useful. Marooned in its self-sufficiency and beguiled by its narcissism, the queen of the social sciences slides into a travesty of scientific partice. The eminent philosopher of science, Alexander Rosenberg, observes that today’s observes that today’s consumer theory does not enable us “to predict consumer behavior any better than Adam Smith”. [Rosenberg, 1994, p. 224] But in the discipline’s inner sanctum, this state of affairs has gone unnoticed for too long. John Hicks, at the beginning of his **A Revision of Demand Theory** (1956), sets out his metaphysical basis with typical imperiousness and in the best scientific vernacular.

The human individual only comes into plain economics as an entity which reacts in certain ways to certain stimuli; all that the Plain Economist needs to be interested in are the laws of his reactions. [Hicks, 1956, p. 5]

Laws, indeed. Objects, goes the fable, cause sensations in **homo economicus** who, in the modern and postmodern eras, continues to make decisions exclusively on the basis of a set of preferences between the expected different sensations caused by different objects—preferences which are totally independent of the preferences of other human beings. Kenneth Arrow’s landmark paper “Utility and Expectation in Economic Behavior” (1963) takes the sensationalist, social-isolate view of economic reality to its definitive position. Arrow considers a pair of papers by Neal Miller on electric shock experiments with rats. Rats, says Arrow, have utility functions which they seek to maximize, and he concludes that the difference between theories about economic man and theories about rats “is probably more semantic than anything else”. [Arrow, 1984, p. 135]

3. Intersubjective metaphysics

3.1. Introduction

Just in time of the Millennium, comes the emergence in France of a group of economists, the Intersubjectivists, who propose the most fundamental revision of the metaphysical foundations of economics since the rise of the Neoclassicalists in the 1870s. Issuing originally from the *École Polytechnique*, the research program of Intersubjective Economics already includes the dynamics of financial markets [Orléan, 1988, 1989a, 1990; Dupuy, 1991; Levy, 1996b], the theory of value [Orléan 1989b; Levy, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1995a, 1996a], monetary theory [Agietta and Orléan, 1982; Levy, 1991, 1995b], the economics of technical change [Dalle, 1994, 1995], and the theory of the firm [Levy, 1993, Eymard-Duvernay, 1994; Favereau, Biencourt and Eymard-Duvernay, 1994]. But most of all, the Intersubjectivist project focuses on reformulation of the theory of consumer demand, beginning with its metaphysical presuppositions. [especially : Dupuy, 1988, 1989, 1992; Orléan, 1988, 1989b; Levy, 1991].

Whereas a cardinal principle of Neoclassical demand theory is the independence of individual consumer desires, the Intersubjectivists begin with the proposition that individual demands are neither independent between consumers nor independent of the process of market exchange. The new school seeks to develop a theory which is consistent both with observed patterns of consumption in affluent societies and with modern philosophical sensibilities. It aims to provide a system of analysis which can take into account the large, and today dominant part player by interpersonal phenomena in the determination of market outcomes. As I have done with the Neoclassicalists, I will first explore the philosophical origins of the metaphysics which underpin the new approach to consumer economics.

3.2. Brentano/Beauvoir/Girard

A key ingredient of much characteristically twentieth-century thought is the **principle of intentionality**. Ignoring its Scholastic antecedents, this idea originated with the Austrian psychologist and philosopher Franz Brentano in his **Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint** (1874). The

principle of intentionality offers a way of thinking about the mind and about human experience which differs fundamentally from radical empiricism and, therefore, from Neoclassical Economics. Whereas the older tradition thinks of consciousness as a kind of **receptacle** for perceptions and images, the principle of intentionality holds that consciousness is a relation which humans have to objects, both real and imagined. The term “intentional” merely refers to the idea that consciousness always intends an object, in other words, that consciousness is always consciousness of something. This principle underpins the phenomenological movements in philosophy and the social sciences. It also accords with views being expressed today by physical scientist regarding the nature of consciousness.

The relational view of consciousness holds radical implications for the nature and structure of human desire and of the nature of self, implications which in the first instance were realized and developed by Simone de Beauvoir. (See Fullbrook and Fullbrook, forthcoming 1997 for an account of the origins of these ideas in Beauvoir’s work). If consciousness is a binary relation reaching from the individual to the work of objects, then consciousness continuously requires objects for its existence, and so must continuously **project** itself toward the world. Brentano’s principle makes “the existence of consciousness depends on a perpetual transcending of itself towards an object; everything is situated outside consciousness: things, truths, sentiments, meanings, and one’s self”. [Beauvoir, 1960, pp. 215-6] This relation structure of consciousness completes the human being endlessly to project his or her existence beyond the present. Under this view, every act of consciousness begins as the need for an object, or, in other words, as a **lack** of being. This is what Beauvoir means when she says that consciousness “defines the present as lack” and why she identifies this lack as the ultimate basis of human desire. [Beauvoir, 1944, p. 47] The projective nature of consciousness means that stasis or equilibrium is alien to the human manner of being. “One never arrives anywhere”, says Beauvoir “there are only points of departure”. [1994, pp. 53-54]

This vision of humankind offered by Beauvoir, turns the vision of Locke and of Neoclassical Economics upside down. Rather than seeing the human being as characterized by inertia, as dependent upon sensory stimulation to be moved to action. Beauvoir sees us as intrinsically active, as continuously bound up in projects due to the intentional structure of consciousness. Whereas the radical empirical tradition of mind, from

Locke to Arrow, declares that all pleasure is a consequence of stimuli acting on the body. Beauvoir derides their metaphysics by declaring “All pleasure is project.” [1944, p. 23] She shows (1946) that from the intentional theory of consciousness it follows that “It is desire which creates the desirable, and the project which sets up the end.” [Beauvoir, 1970, p. 15] This is a thesis which, before Brentano’s principle and Beauvoir’s development of it, was supported by folk wisdom but by no philosophical argument. For example, Bertrand Russell, also writing in 1946, seizes upon the wrong-headedness of Locke’s sensationalist theory of desire, but without being able to back up his intuition with philosophical argument.

...to say that men only desire pleasure is to put the cart before the horse. Whatever I may happen to desire, I shall feel pleasure in obtaining it; but as a rule the pleasure is due to the desire, not desire to the pleasure. [Russell, 1946, p. 595]

The relational view of consciousness also negates the Neoclassical view of a person’s self as a fixed entity residing **in** consciousness and knowable by introspection. If consciousness is a relation rather than a container, then a person’s self (or selves) can only be, like anything else, an intermittent **object** of consciousness. Rather than an internal entity—a “ghost in the machine”—self is an image of being which forms and reforms through the vicissitudes of life. The existential self is continuously in process of construction and of reconstruction. It is an ongoing project. Moreover, **it is a project whose shape other people continuously influence**. This social and dynamic conception of the human individual offers no sanctuary for either a fixed set of preferences or for a set which is independent of other people’s preferences. Under the intentional view of consciousness, individual subjectivities, rather than being perceived as static, autonomous and a social, are perceived as dynamic and interdependent, that is to say, **intersubjective**.

Beauvoir is most famous for her account in **The Second Sex** (1949) of how, with respect to women, the formation of **individual** selves, is an intersubjective and open-ended process, centred on the imitation of models perceived as fitting and desirable. Whereas it was traditional to conceive of gender in the Lockean mode, that is, as a simple, unmediated and solitary relation between the individual and her or his body, Beauvoir, employing the theory of intersubjectivity which she had developed over the previous decade, demonstrated that gender is, in the main, an intersub-

jective phenomēno. the enormous success of Beauvoir's methodology in the broadest psycho-sociological context begs its application to the more limited context of economic desire, and especially to the concept of **homo economicus**. The celebrated polymath, René Girard, is the pivotal figure in this interdisciplinary process. His elaboration of the structure of **inter-subjective desire** (Girard calls it "triangular" or "mimetic desire") yields an elegant analytical framework which has already found application in diverse fields, indiverse fields, including, literary criticism, anthropology and economics. [Girard, 1965; 1977] Girard, like most people, regards it as self-evident that an individual's desires are influenced by what he or she perceives to be the desires of other people. Girard offers a model of this "desire according to Another", in the same way that Bentham offered a model of "desire according to Oneself". [Girard, 1965, p. 4]

In developing his model, Girard employs the special metaphor of the triangle. Whereas **intrasubjective desire** (Girard calls it "linear desire") can be represented by a straight line running from the subject to the desired object A, intersubjective desire presumes a **mediator** who is perceived by the subject as desiring object A. The mediator is someone, either real or imagined and either an individual or a group, whom the subject holds in some degree of respect. Under the theory of mimetic desire, it is the mediator's desire for an object which makes that object "desirable in the eyes of the subject. The mediation begets a second desire exactly the same as the mediator's." [Girard, 1965, p. 7] Girard introduces the concept of "distance", social or intellectual or economic, between the "universe" of the subject and that of the mediator. This enables him to identify "two fundamental categories" of the mediation of desire.

We shall speak of **external mediation** when the distance is sufficient to eliminate any contact between the two spheres of possibilities of which the mediator and the subject occupy the respective centers. We shall speak of **internal mediation** when this same distance is sufficiently reduced to allow these two spheres to penetrate each other more or less profoundly. [Girard, 1965, p. 9]

From an economist's point of view, what is so remarkable about this conceptual framework is how suggestive it is, indeed, how well it fits the standard marketing procedures and consumer patterns of affluent economies. Girard explains this correspondence as follows.

When modern theorists envisage man as a being who knows what he wants, or who at least possesses an “unconscious” that knows for him, they may simply have failed to perceive the domain in which human uncertainty is most extreme. Once his basic needs are satisfied (indeed, sometimes even before), man is subject to intense desires, though he may not know precisely for what. The reason is that he desires **being**, something he himself lacks and which some other person seems to possess. The subject thus looks to that other person to inform him of what he should desire in order to acquire that being. If the model, who is apparently already endowed with superior being, desires some object, that object must surely be capable of conferring an even greater plenitude of being. It is not through words, therefore, but by the example of his own desire that the model conveys to the subject the supreme desirability of the object. [Girard, 1977, pp. 145-6]

3.3. The Intersubjectivists

It is highly fitting that the work of Intersubjective Economics’s leading theorist, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, is characterized not only by its commanding and cosmopolitan intellectually, but also by its good temper and generosity towards other metaphysical frameworks. [Dupuy, 1992]. The research program of the intersubjectivists arises not out of opposition to existing ones, but rather out of a wish to extend serious and systematic inquiry across a larger subset of economic phenomena. Intersubjective Economics is opposed to other “Schools” only in so far as they would impede or discourage knowledge and understanding of economic phenomena not covered by their particular sets of preconceptions. Unlike the Neoclassical commitment to hedonistic atomism, the Intersubjectivist commitment to the metaphysics of intersubjectivity is conditional upon its suitability to the economic phenomena under investigation. The new enterprise regards its preconceptions not as ends to be defended but rather as means to understanding the empirical. This reversal of the standard methodology of the social sciences is perhaps Intersubjective Economic’s most radical aspect.

It is important to identify as precisely as possible the class or classes of economic phenomena which the Intersubjectivists aim to colonize into the realm of knowledge. To this and it seems advantageous, especially so as to make clear the boundaries between Neoclassical consumer theory

and Intersubjective consumer theory, to introduce into economics a new pair of terms. Girard's analysis of human desire suggests two fundamental economic categories. His bifurcation of desire between that based on the desires of others and that which is not, implies that every commodity's demand has its origin in one or the other or some combination of the two subclasses of desire. In other words, consumer demand divides between **intrasubjective demand** and **intersubjective demand**. As the human lot rises above the level biological subsistence, it is argued that intersubjectidemand—which is metaphysically excluded from the Neoclassical research program and which Intersubjective Economics has been founded to investigate.

A pure and, therefore, theoretically interesting case of intersubjective demand, is the demand for fiat money, it being desired or valued only because other people value it. But in an advanced economy, money is not alone in illustrating the salience of the intersubjective dimension. Today not only do the elements of style, fashion and social cachet enter into everything from plumbing to **haute couture**, but also pop culture comprises a significant and ever growing share of the consumer economy. Intersubjectivists, drawing directly upon the philosophical legacy of Beauvoir and Girard, emphasize the importance of existential lack in generating these contemporary consumer desires. Dupuy conceives of the individual agent as “a being radically incomplete, in a state of lack”. [Dupuy, 1988, p. 85] Similarly, Thierry Levy identifies the existential lack as “the foundation of the exchange”. [Levy, 1995b, p. 90] In intersubjective markets “the desire of the agent is the desire to exchange in order to obtain a social identity, a social recognition”. This creates a situation, continues Levy, where “each individual considers the other as a model to imitate. This assumption creates a self-referential structure.” [Levy, 1994c, p. 13] Jean-Pierre Dupuy offers a useful elementary model of what he calls the “mimetic universe” and Levy calls the “intersubjective process”.

Two subjects, **A** and **B**, reciprocally imitate themselves. The object of their mutual imitation is by hypothesis [267] indeterminate. But suppose that a noise, a false rumour reaches **A** to the effect that **B** desires... object **O**. From now on **A** knows what he should desire ... : he makes the first move, indicating in this way to **B** the object **O**, and when **B** manifests in his turn his interest in **O**, **A** obtain proof that his initial hypothesis was correct. His representation, although perhaps implausible **a priori**, is **self-**

realized. This emergence of an objective fact, of an exteriority by the closure on itself of a system of actors who all imitate each other, has a vigour which grows as the number of actors increases. The most absurd rumours can focus a crowd unanimously on the most unexpected object, each member finding the proof of the object's value in the look or the action of all the others. The process takes place in two phases : the first is a game of mirrors, ... in which each watches the others for signs of a coveted knowing and which sooner or later ends by precipitating everyone in the same direction; the second is the stabilization of the object which has emerged, by forgetting the arbitrariness inherent in the conditions of its genesis...

This phenomenological description of the world of imitation can be clarified by mathematical modelling. A very active branch of formal economics today explores the role of what it calls the intersubjective influences in economic activity. [my translation] [Dupuy, 1992, pp. 267-8]

Consumer desire is only one area of the realm of **intersubjective economic effects**. Financial speculation merits comment here, because, besides conforming to Dupuy's model, it also establishes a clear overlap between Keynesian and Intersubjective economics. In Chapter 12 of his **The General Theory** Keynes offers an original account of speculation and "the conventional basis of valuation". [Keynes, 1973, p. 154] André Orléan and others have explicated this section of Keynes's work in terms of intersubjective effects. [Orléan, 1988, 1989a] Keynes distinguishes between buying a security solely for yield and buying it for appreciation in value. The latter entails a strategy of choosing to buy standard items which it is hoped that other people will subsequently choose to buy. Keynes's account describes a market situation where, as with intersubjective consumer markets, buyers' choices are interdependent and where the desirability of an item is a function of other people's desire for that item.

The Intersubjectivist program includes an expansion of the concept of rationality. Traditionally, definitions of rationality are framed implicitly and exclusively in terms of intrasubjective situations. But the rationality/irrationality dualism is now being explored in the context of intersubjective situations. Orléan, for example, in a study of the role of intersubjectivity in financial speculation, argues for "the rational nature of **mimétisme** in situations of uncertainty". [Orléan, 1989a, p. 261]

4. In Conclusion : Water and Designer labels

“The label costs a lot, but it’s great buzz to put on a Versace or an Armani suit. Designer clothes are lovely. The label makes you feel brilliant. That’s why you spend the money,” she explains. And John? “I like the details, the logo on the pocket. It makes me feel good when I’m wearing designer clothes because they cost so much. I just like them more. [Sunday Times : Style, 5 May, 1996, p. 8]

Houmanidis notes that Adam Smith’s famous water and diamonds exemplum of scarcity’s part in determining exchange-value was preceded, and, most likely, inspired by Ferdinando Galiani’s remark, earlier in the eighteenth century, that a biological calf is not nearly so valuable as a calf of gold. [Houmanidis, 1978, p. 604] But however it is illustrated, this particular “paradox of value”, which turns on the contribution which scarcity makes to exchange-value, has been the conundrum around which value theory has revolved for a quarter of a millennium. The advent of Intersubjective Economics stresses a different paradox of value, on which turns on the contribution which scarcity makes to exchange-value, has been the conundrum around which value theory has revolved for a quarter of a millennium. The advent of Intersubjective Economics stresses a different paradox of value, one which turns on the contribution which the economic desires of the Other makes to exchange-value, and which is illustrated by the water which is free and the designer label which triples the value of a piece of clothing. I have tried to show how the seventeenth-century metaphysical lens of Neoclassical Economics blocks from view the economic phenomena which lie behind this other “paradox” of value. It would, of course, be wrong to suggest that the Intersubjectivists are first to explore this hidden territory, Caroline Foley and Thorstein Veblen are two notable predecessors. But today’s explorers have the great advantage of bringing to their explorations a metaphysical lens as powerful as the one the Neoclassicalists brought to the realm of intrasubjective demand. By contrasting the capabilities of the two metaphysics, I hope to have aroused curiosity about what remains a still largely unexplored realm of economic phenomena.

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Abstract

EDWARD FULLBROOK : *Consumer Metaphysics : The neoclassicalists versus the intersubjectivists*

Like any body of knowledge, any theory of consumer desire or theory of use-value rests on a set of metaphysical propositions. This paper traces the development of and makes explicit the philosophical presuppositions on which the Neoclassical assumption of independent demand functions for individual consumers stands or falls. A parallel analysis is then carried out for the presuppositions of the new Intersubjective Economics, whose consumer theory assumes that in an advanced economy there exists for many commodities an interdependency between individual demands. The essay includes a survey of some of the key Intersubjectivist works and an extensive bibliography of the same.

ARTHUR M. OKUN "EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY - THE BIG TRADEOFF" : ΑΞΙΟΛΟΓΗΣΗ ΜΕΤΑ ΑΠΟ ΕΙΚΟΣΙ ΧΡΟΝΙΑ

ΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΟΣ ΚΑΡΑΓΙΑΝΝΗΣ

Πανεπιστήμιον Πειραιώς

Εισαγωγή

Το 1975 εκδόθηκε η εργασία του Arthur Okun που πραγματεύεται την αιτιατή σχέση μεταξύ της οικονομικής ισότητας και της παραγωγικής αποτελεσματικότητας ή αποδοτικότητας.¹ Σκοπός του παρόντος άρθρου είναι να εξετασθούν τα βασικά επιχειρήματα του συγγραφέα από θεωρητικής σκοπιάς και στη συνέχεια να αντιπαραβληθούν προς την πραγματικότητα. Στο πρώτο τμήμα του άρθρου θα αναλυθεί η θέση του Okun για την αντίθεση μεταξύ οικονομικής ισότητας και αποδοτικότητας και θα παρουσιασθούν οι προτάσεις του για τη θέσπιση ενός τρόπου οικονομικής ισότητας που δε μειώνει την αποδοτικότητα των ατόμων. Στο δεύτερο τμήμα θα αξιολογηθεί η θέση του Okun για τη σχέση μεταξύ υλικών κινήτρων και οικονομικής αποδοτικότητας. Στο τρίτο τμήμα θα εξετασθεί, σε αντιπαραβολή προς την πραγματικότητα, η διασύνδεση μεταξύ της ανισότητας των ευκαιριών και τα συνεπαγόμενα οικονομικά κίνητρα.

1. Εκτός αυτού ο Okun αντιπαραβάλλει την πολιτική ισότητα που πηγάζει από ένα δημοκρατικό σύστημα με την οικονομική ανισότητα που εκπορεύεται από ένα καπιταλιστικό σύστημα. Επίσης, διερευνά τις συνέπειες που θα επέλθουν σε τυχόν κομμουνιστική μεταμόρφωση του Αμερικανικού πολιτικό-οικονομικού συστήματος. Στο άρθρο μας δε θα αναφερθούμε στις θέσεις αυτές του Okun.

1. Το δίλημμα και οι λύσεις του

Ο Πρόεδρος του Brookings Institute προλογίζοντας το βιβλίο του Okun τονίζει (σ. vii) ότι οι διαφορές στα εισοδήματα των ατόμων εξυπηρετούν “ως είδος κινήτρου” οδηγώντας στην αύξηση της αποδοτικότητας των χρησιμοποιούμενων παραγωγικών πόρων. Θεωρεί ότι στην ουσία αυτό είναι το βασικό σκεπτικό του Okun και το επεκτείνει δίνοντας μια αντίστροφη σχέση μεταξύ της οικονομικής ισότητας και αποδοτικότητας.²


Σύμφωνα με τον Okun, υπάρχει ένα ύψος και αριθμός αιτιών οικονομικών ανισοτήτων που μπορούν να διορθωθούν με το υπάρχον σύστημα του “δημοκρατικού καπιταλισμού” (σ. 83). Με τη διόρθωση και απάμβλυνση αυτών των ανισοτήτων, δηλαδή εάν ισχύει η κατά Rawls (1971, σσ. 83-4) ισότητα ευκαιριών, τότε όπως ισχυρίζεται ο Okun (σσ. 83,88), δεν επέρχεται μείωση της οικονομικής αποδοτικότητας. Η ισότητα οικονομικών ευκαιριών ως προοίμιο μιας δίκαιης κοινωνίας που υποστηρίζει ο Rawls δεν είναι δυνατόν να επεκτείνεται πέραν ορισμένων γενικών μεταβλητών των βασικών αγαθών όπως η εκπαίδευση, η υγεία, η διατροφή, και άλλα παρόμοια. Δεν επιφορτίζει σε αυτή την έννοια των ίσων ευκαιριών η ατομική ευφυΐα, η προσωπική επιθυμία, αλλά ακόμη και η επίδραση που δέχεται το άτομο από το οικογενειακό και κοινωνικό του περιβάλλον. Το τελευταίο για να ισχύει θα πρέπει να έχουμε μια κοινωνία ρομποτοειδών σαν αυτή που περιέγραψε ο George Orwell (1984) και η οποία είναι μακριά από την ελεύθερη δημοκρατική κοινωνία που εξετάζουμε. Σύμφωνα όμως με τον Okun πρώτος στόχος της οικονομικής πολιτικής για την επίτευξη της ανάπτυξης και σταθερότητας είναι η εξάλειψη εκείνων των διαστρεβλωτικών παραγόντων που οδηγούν σε “άδικη” και επιζήμια ανισότητα εισοδημάτων και ως εκ τούτου σε “αφύσικη” ανισότητα ευκαιριών.

Ας εξετάσουμε λεπτομερέστερα τη θέση του Okun ότι υπάρχει αιτιολογημένη και μη αιτιολογημένη οικονομική ανισότητα μεταξύ των ατόμων που επιδρούν στο ύψος της αποδοτικότητάς τους. Υποθέτουμε ότι η υπάρχουσα ανισότητα ευκαιριών εκκίνησης των ατόμων σε μια οικονομία είναι: $I_r = I_n + I_a$. Όπου I_n είναι η οικονομική ανισότητα ευκαι-

2. Για μια ανάλυση της πολύπλευρης έννοιας της οικονομικής ισότητας και τις διαφορετικές διαστάσεις και τρόπους υπολογισμού της βλ. Sen (1989).

ριών που οφείλεται σε αποκλειστικές ατομικές διαφορές αυτών των ίδιων των ανθρώπων και I_a η ανισότητα ευκαιριών που οφείλεται σε “αδικίες” και θεσμικές ελλείψεις του συστήματος.

Όπως φαίνεται από το διάγραμμα 1 με το οποίο μπορεί να αναπαρασταθεί η ανωτέρω θέση του Okun, με αιτία άνιση εκκίνησης. I_n και τη λειτουργία σχετικών ελέγχων θα έχουμε το μέγιστο δυνατό να επιτευχθεί προϊόν Q^* , ενώ με την ύπαρξη I_r θα έχουμε το πραγματικό παραγόμενο προϊόν Q . Συνεπώς η διαφορά $Q^* - Q = Q_a$ θα δίνει τη διαφυγούσα παραγωγική δυνατότητα που οφείλεται στην ύπαρξη και επίδραση της αδικαιολόγητης και άδικης ανισότητας I_a . Εάν θέλουμε να ελαχιστοποιήσουμε το Q_a θα πρέπει να ελαχιστοποιήσουμε το I_a , όπως φαίνεται από το διάγραμμα, όπου συνδέεται αντιστρόφως η οικονομική ανισότητα με το ύψος της αποδοτικότητας (καμπύλη IPr). Με το διάγραμμα αυτό δείχνεται ότι εάν μειωθούν οι ανισότητες ευκαιριών που δε δικαιολογούνται βάσει των ατομικών διαφορών επιδεξιότητας, ικανότητας, κ.λπ. των ατόμων, θα αυξηθεί το παραγόμενο προϊόν, δηλ. η οικονομία θα κινηθεί προς το Q^* . Με άλλα λόγια, όπως παραδέχεται και ο Okun (σ. 84), το I_a είναι συμπληρωματικό αγαθό της αποδοτικότητας, δηλαδή όταν μειωθεί αυτό μειώνεται και η διαφυγούσα παραγωγικότητα.




Διάγραμμα 1

Στην πραγματικότητα όμως υπάρχουν ποικίλοι παράγοντες που δημιουργούν το Ια. Μερικοί από αυτούς είναι οι εξής οι οποίοι μπορούν να εξαλειφθούν με θεσμικές κυρίως μεταβολές:

- (1) Ανυπαρξία ελέγχου και δικαιολόγησης της συσσώρευσης πλούτου.
- (2) Φοροδιαφυγή και άλλες παράνομες ενέργειες
- (3) Αναξιοκρατία που προκαλείται εκτός των άλλων λόγων και από την εγωιστική συμπεριφορά των πολιτικών ώστε να έχουμε μείωση της αποδοτικότητας (Karayiannis, 1995).
- (4) Ιδιαίτερη και ευνοϊκή μεταχείριση από την διοίκηση περιοχών της χώρας και ομάδων ατόμων.
- (5) Ατέλειες νομικού πλαισίου και “ανοχή του νόμου” για παραβάτες οικονομικών αδικημάτων.

Παρά το γεγονός ότι ο παραπάνω κατάλογος των αιτιών “αφύσικης” και αδικαιολόγητης ανισότητας ευκαιριών και εισοδήματος είναι ατελής, φαίνεται ότι με αμελητέου οικονομικού κόστους διορθώσεις μπορούν αυτές να εξαλειφθούν. Με την εξάλειψή τους στην επερχόμενη γενιά, σύμφωνα με τη διασύνδεση κινήτρων-αποδοτικότητας, αναμένεται να αυξηθεί η παραγωγική δυνατότητα της οικονομίας με δεδομένους τους παραγωγικούς πόρους.

Ο Okun, στη συνέχεια (σσ. 88-90), εξετάζει την περίπτωση εκείνη όπου έχουν διορθωθεί όλες οι θεσμικές και άλλες αδυναμίες του συστήματος που αποτελούσαν δημιουργία “άδικων” ανισοτήτων ευκαιριών και δείχνει ότι θα υπάρξει αντίθεση (tradeoff) μεταξύ της οικονομικής ανισότητας που προέρχεται από τη διαφορετική παραγωγική προσπάθεια των ατόμων και τη συνέχιση της προσπάθειας αυτής. Εάν θέλουμε να παρουσιάσουμε διαγραμματικά τις ιδέες και προτάσεις του Okun για την εμφάνιση της αντίθεσης ισότητα-αποδοτικότητα θα έχουμε το ακόλουθο διάγραμμα.



Διάγραμμα 2

Όπου: (EE) η καμπύλη ισότητας ευκαιριών και αμοιβής, (EM) η καμπύλη συνδυασμού διαφόρου ύψους ισότητας (ανισότητας) Y&W και ατομικού υλικού κινήτρου διαφορισμού του ατόμου, (MA) η καμπύλη κινήτρου απόδοσης, και (EU) η καμπύλη αντίθεσης μεταξύ της ισότητας ευκαιριών (εκτός αυτών που δεν έρχονται σε αντίθεση με την αποδοτικότητα) και του ύψους της ατομικής και συνολικής αποδοτικότητας.

Όπως φαίνεται από το παραπάνω διάγραμμα σε ύψος πλήρους ισότητας ευκαιριών (E^*) έχουμε στο σημείο (Y^*) πλήρη ισότητα εισοδήματος (Y) και πλούτου (W). Στο σημείο αυτό πλήρους ισότητας αντιστοιχεί μηδενικό οικονομικό κίνητρο για βελτίωση της θέσης του ατόμου.

Με πλήρη ανισότητα (σημείο 0 στο κάθετο άξονα) έχουμε το μέγιστο ύψος επίδρασης του κινήτρου της οικονομικής ανισότητας (σημείο K^*). Σε αυτό το σημείο αντιστοιχεί η μέγιστη αποδοτικότητα (A^*) που είναι αποτέλεσμα της επίδρασης του κινήτρου διαφορισμού υλικής ανταμοιβής. Στο σημείο (A^*) έχουμε τη μέγιστη δυνατή αποδοτικότητα ως αποτέλεσμα μικρής ισότητας ευκαιριών μεταξύ των ατόμων. Από το άλλο μέρος, στο σημείο (E^*) όπου έχουμε μέγιστη ισότητα ευκαιριών αντιστοιχεί μικρή αποδοτικότητα οφειλόμενη στον ατομικό διαφορισμό και κίνητρο. Η καμπύλη (EU) δηλαδή δείχνει την αντίθεση μεταξύ ισότητας και αποδοτικότητας που τονίζει ο Okun (σσ. 82-4). Σημειωτέον ότι η αντίθεση αυτή εμφανίζεται όταν έχουν διορθωθεί όλες οι ανισότητες των ευκαιριών (π.χ. φύλο, εκπαίδευση, υγεία, κ.λπ.) που οδηγούν σε αύξηση της αποδοτικότητας.

Μετά από αυτά, ο Okun, εξετάζει τι θα συμβεί στο σύστημα και στην αποδοτικότητά του εάν οι εναπομείναντες οικονομικές ανισότητες είναι αποτέλεσμα καθαρά της “δίκαιης” οικονομικής δράσης των ατόμων. Υιοθετεί ως παράγοντα μείωσης των οικονομικών αυτών ανισοτήτων το φορολογικό σύστημα και ερευνά εάν και κατά πόσο μια ανακατανομή του πλούτου διαμέσου αυτού αυξάνει ή μειώνει την αποδοτικότητα των ατόμων. Αυτό που συμπεραίνει είναι ότι, με την αναδιανομή του πλούτου διαμέσου του φορολογικού συστήματος- εκτός των σοβαρών διαρροών και κόστους που θα επέλθει στη μετακίνηση τμήματος πλούτου- η ισχύς του κινήτρου θα μειωθεί με συνέπεια να επέλθει μείωση της αποδοτικότητας (σσ. 92-3). Βέβαια ο Okun αναγνωρίζει ότι ορθά υπάρχει μια φορολογική πολιτική, όπου φορολογούνται υψηλά τα πολύ πλούσια άτομα με στόχο τα έσοδα αυτά να διατεθούν στη βελτίωση της “οικονομικής εκκίνησης” των φτωχών (σσ. 105-6).³ Όπως επίσης αναγνωρίζει ότι με τη βελτίωση του οικονομικού επιπέδου των απόρων, ανικάνων προς εργασία, κ.λπ. ατόμων, η αποδυνάμωση του κινήτρου της παραγωγικής προσπάθειας είναι μικρή έως αμελητέα (σ. 107).

Η κατακλείδα της εργασία αυτής του Okun (σσ. 18-9) είναι να δοθεί μεγαλύτερη έμφαση από το Κράτος στην εξάλειψη των άνισων ευκαιριών (π.χ. εκπαίδευση, υγεία, φύλο, κ.λπ.) που διαθέτουν τα άτομα στην εκκίνηση της “κούρσας” για την οικονομική επιτυχία. Με τον τρόπο αυτό, υποστηρίζει ο συγγραφέας (σσ. 119-20), το “μείγμα” ελεύθερης

3. Για μια ανάλυση των επιδράσεων του αναδιανεμητικού ρόλου του Κράτους στην παραγωγική αποτελεσματικότητα βλ. Κορλίνας (1982, σσ. 51-62).

καπιταλιστικής οικονομίας και δημοκρατίας θα γίνει περισσότερο επιτυχές, ή με άλλα λόγια, ο διαχωρισμός πολιτικών και κοινωνικών δικαιωμάτων από την εξουσία του χρήματος θα επιτευχθεί καλύτερα, με συνέπεια μια ευνομούμενη και ευημερούσα κοινωνία.

2. Κίνητρα και οικονομική αποδοτικότητα

Ο Okun κάνει σαφές από την αρχή της ανάλυσης του ότι η οικονομική ανισότητα μεταξύ των ανθρώπων λειτουργεί ως σύστημα επιβράβευσης και τιμωρίας που απολήγει στην αύξηση της αποδοτικότητάς τους, η οποία με τη σειρά της- και με την προϋπόθεση ότι δεν έχουν όλοι την ίδια αποδοτικότητα- οδηγεί σε αύξηση της οικονομικής ανισότητας (σ. 1). Με άλλο λόγια, ο Okun τονίζει ότι η οικονομική ανισότητα θα λειτουργήσει ως βασικό κίνητρο για την αύξηση της αποδοτικότητας, δηλαδή: οικονομική ανισότητα → κίνητρο βελτίωσης & υπάρχοντες τρόποι → αύξηση αποδοτικότητας. Με αυτή τη διασύνδεση που εισάγει ο Okun καταλήγει στο συμπέρασμα που είναι και η βασική θέση του βιβλίου του ότι πέραν της δυνατότητας που υπάρχει η αύξηση της ισότητας ορισμένων οικονομικών ευκαιριών λόγω φύλου, χρώματος, κ.λπ. να οδηγήσουν σε αύξηση της αποτελεσματικότητας, οι περισσότερες προσπάθειες περιορισμού των οικονομικών ανισοτήτων θα λειτουργήσουν ως αντικίνητρο που θα οδηγήσει σε μείωση της παραγωγικής αποτελεσματικότητας και σε συρρίκνωση της παραγωγής.

Το πρόβλημα των αρνητικών κινήτρων των φτωχών εργατών που επικαλείται ο Okun (σ. 109), ότι δηλαδή με την οικονομική βοήθεια από μέρους του κράτους η θέληση και η προσπάθεια εργασίας τους θα μειωθεί, είναι αρκετά παλιό και ανάγεται στα τέλη του 17ου και αρχές του 18ου αιώνα όπως έχουμε δείξει σε σχετική μας μελέτη (Καραγιάννης, 1989). Η πιθανότητα να υποκαταστήσουν οι φτωχοί, άνεργοι, κ.λπ. τη θέλησή και προθυμία τους για εργασία με αύξηση της επιθυμίας για ανάπαυση, είναι πραγματική. Αλλά παραβλέπεται το γεγονός ότι εάν διανοιγούν οι καταναλωτικές δυνατότητες και ευκαιρίες των ατόμων αυτών, τότε μπορεί να λειτουργήσει το κίνητρο υλικής και κοινωνικής βελτίωσης το οποίο θα οδηγήσει σε μείωση αυτής της υποκατάστασης. Εάν το άτομο δεν έχει “γευτεί τα φρούτα” της υλικής βελτίωσης, πως ζητούμε να προσπαθήσει να την επιτύχει αφού δεν τη γνωρίζει; Συνε-

πώς το δόγμα “άσε τον φτωχό εργάτη πεινασμένο για να δουλέψει περισσότερο” που υποστήριζαν ορισμένοι εμποροκράτες, μόνο σε περιορισμένη έκταση μπορεί να ισχύει.

Το ερώτημα που ζητάμε να απαντήσουμε είναι εάν τα άτομα θα δραστηριοποιηθούν έντονα επειδή γνωρίζουν ότι υπάρχει οικονομική ανισότητα ως επιβράβευση ή τιμωρία των ενεργειών τους προσπαθώντας ο ένας να υπερνικήσει τον άλλον; ή γιατί θα προσπαθήσουν να βελτιώσουν τη θέση τους και αυτή η προσπάθειά τους εάν έχει διαφορετική ένταση ή αποτελέσματα θα οδηγήσει στην εμφάνιση οικονομικής ανισότητας μεταξύ τους; Ο Okun απαντά το πρώτο ενώ εμείς υποστηρίζουμε ότι ισχύει το δεύτερο. Με άλλα λόγια, ο Okun θεωρεί την οικονομική ανισότητα ως κίνητρο (επιβράβευση και τιμωρία) (σ. 48), ενώ εμείς πιστεύουμε ότι είναι δικαιολογημένο αποτέλεσμα της διαφορετικής παραγωγικότητας της εργασίας, της ιδιαίτερης ικανότητας του ατόμου, και της χρήσης των παραγωγικών μέσων από τα διάφορα άτομα. Ας δούμε αναλυτικότερα το θέμα αυτό χρησιμοποιώντας γενικές ιστορικές καταστάσεις.

Είναι γεγονός ότι εκτός από τα υλικά κίνητρα υπάρχουν και τα ηθικά τα οποία κατά καιρούς λειτούργησαν σε διάφορες κοινωνίες. Η θέσπιση και λειτουργία αυτών των υλικών και ηθικών κινήτρων εξαρτάται από την ιδεολογική εξωτερίκευση της κοινωνικής ζωής και τις ηθικές της αρχές. Η εμφάνιση αλτρουιστικών κινήτρων είναι μη αυτοφυσείς στον άνθρωπο όπως έδειξε και η σύγχρονη βιολογία (βλ. Dawkins, 1976, σσ. 26-7, 86, 93, 179,377-8) και για αυτό οι φωτισμένοι ηγέτες της ανθρωπότητας επέμεναν στην εκπαίδευση και διδασχία των ανθρώπων να υιοθετήσουν ή και να αυξήσουν αυτό το επίκτητο κίνητρο. Κάτι που σημαίνει ότι για να λειτουργήσει με ίδια αποτελέσματα το αλτρουιστικό κίνητρο με αυτό του ατομικού οφέλους, θα πρέπει το πρώτο να έχει την ίδια ισχυρή απήχηση στα άτομα όπως το δεύτερο. Αυτό προαπαιτεί εκ βάθρων αναδιάρθρωση του φιλοσοφικού, ηθικού, οικονομικού και πολιτικού στοχασμού και σκοπού των ατόμων. Συνεπώς, σε μια υλιστική κοινωνία όπως η δική μας, να μεν η λειτουργία υλικών κινήτρων σε γενικές γραμμές θα είναι περισσότερο αποτελεσματική από ότι η λειτουργία άλλων κινήτρων εκτός και εάν αυτά έμμεσα καταλήγουν σε υλιστικά οφέλη όπως για παράδειγμα η επιθυμία και τάση για επιτεύγματα που τόνισε ο McClelland (1961, σσ. 110, 114-5). Στην παρακάτω ανάλυση, αμελώντας τις διάφορες επιδράσεις που προέρχονται από

την ισχύ μη υλιστικών κινήτρων θα επικεντρώσουμε την προσοχή μας στην επίδραση των υλικών χωρίς βέβαια αυτό να σημαίνει ότι και τα άλλα κίνητρα δεν επενεργούν.

Θα πάρουμε απλά παραδείγματα με ιστορικές βάσεις για να εξετάσουμε χρησιμοποιώντας λογική ανάλυση εάν ισχύει μια τέτοια διασύνδεση. Ένας μικρό-παραγωγός σίτου στον Μεσαίωνα της Δύσης παράγει ένα πλεόνασμα, δηλαδή περισσότερο από ότι του χρειάζεται για άμεση κατανάλωση η οικογένειά του. Το εναπομένον τμήμα της παραγωγής- σύμφωνα με τις επικρατούσες συνθήκες της εποχής- αφ' ενός δεν έχει δυνατότητα να το ανταλλάξει με διαφορετικά αγαθά αφού τα πλησίον του νοικοκυριά που απάρτιζαν την αγορά (χωριό) παρήγαγαν όμοιο προϊόν, και αφ' ετέρου δεν αποτελεί στην ουσία ιδιοκτησία του, αφού ο φεουδάρχης θα το απαιτήσει καταναγκαστικά. Και τίθεται το ερώτημα: ο παραγωγός αυτός θα συνεχίσει και θα εντείνει τις προσπάθειές του την επόμενη περίοδο για να παράγει το ίδιο αν όχι υψηλότερο επίπεδο προϊόντος; Η προφανής απάντηση είναι όχι εάν επιδιώκει την προσωπική του υλική ικανοποίηση και όχι των άλλων εκτός της οικογενείας του, δηλ. εάν δε συμπεριφέρεται "καταναγκαστικώς αλτρουιστικά". Η βασική αιτία που δε θα αυξηθεί η παραγωγικότητά του και η προσπάθεια εργασίας του είναι ότι δεν προσδοκά να βελτιώσει την οικονομική του θέση και αυτό γιατί δεν μπορεί να χρησιμοποιήσει το πλεόνασμά του για το σκοπό αυτό. Όπως φαίνεται από αυτό το απλό παράδειγμα, δεν υπάρχει κίνητρο βελτίωσης της θέσης, άρα δεν υπάρχει αυξημένη προσπάθεια κάτι που δείχνει ότι προηγείται το κίνητρο της οικονομικής διαφοράς.

Με τη δημιουργία των κρατών στην Ευρώπη, την υποχώρηση του αυστηρού καθολικού δόγματος της πενίας ως προοίμιο της μελλοντικής θέσης του ανθρώπου στον Παράδεισο, τη λειτουργία των εμπορών, κ.λπ. παράγοντες που μετέβαλλαν δραστικά το οικονομικό-κοινωνικό αλλά και πολιτικό περιβάλλον στην Ευρώπη, από τον 15ο αιώνα και μετέπειτα, το σκηνικό αλλάζει.⁴ Ο ίδιος γεωργός τώρα, είναι κάτοχος μεγάλου μέρους του πλεονάσματός του σε σίτο (αφαιρούνται οι φόροι), και έχει τη δυνατότητα διαμέσου της λειτουργίας του εμπορίου να το ανταλλάξει με υλικά αγαθά που θα αυξήσουν την ευημερία του. Υπάρχει δηλαδή η δυνατότητα οικονομικής βελτίωσης (κίνητρο) γι' αυτό και

4. Για τις οικονομικές και κοινωνικές συνθήκες της περιόδου αυτής βλ. Χουμανίδης (1991, Κεφ. I-IZ).

ο γεωργός θα αυξήσει την παραγωγική του προσπάθεια. Εάν αυτός ο γεωργός κατορθώσει ανακαλύπτοντας νέους τρόπους βελτίωσης της παραγωγής να αυξήσει το οριακό προϊόν ή να μεταβάλει προς το καλύτερο την ποιότητα του προϊόντος, τότε θα διαθέτει ένα μεγαλύτερο πλεόνασμα από τα άλλα μέλη της κοινωνικής ομάδας του χωριού του.⁵ Στην περίπτωση αυτή διαμέσου της ικανότητάς του διαφοροποιείται οικονομικά έναντι των άλλων. Συνεπώς, υπάρχει το κίνητρο (βελτίωση ζωής) που οδηγεί σε αυξανόμενη οικονομική προσπάθεια (αποδοτικότητα) από την οποία εκπορεύεται η οικονομική διαφοροποίηση έναντι των άλλων (οικονομική ανισότητα).

Ας υποθέσουμε ότι η ανωτέρω διασύνδεση αιτιών- αποτελεσμάτων έλαβε χώρα την πρώτη ιστορική περίοδο T εκκίνησης της ελεύθερης ή καπιταλιστικής οικονομίας. Τι θα συμβεί τώρα λ.χ την περίοδο T+1; Ο κοινωνικός περίγυρος του γεωργού αυτού που κατόρθωσε να έχει υψηλότερη υλική ευημερία έναντι των άλλων, θα προσπαθήσει να τον μιμηθεί παρακινούμενος από τα ψυχολογικά συναισθήματα της “ζήλιας” και της “τάσης για επικράτηση”. Θα προσπαθήσουν οι άλλοι γεωργοί δηλαδή να μειώσουν το οικονομικό χάσμα που τους διαφοροποιεί έναντι εκείνου που πρώτος βελτίωσε την οικονομική του ευημερία. Στην περίπτωση αυτή έχουμε πάλι ως βασικό κίνητρο την προσωπική οικονομική βελτίωση που ενδυναμώνεται από τη διαφαινόμενη δυνατότητα επίτευξης της (μίμηση και ανταγωνισμός), κάτι που θα απολήξει σε αύξηση της οικονομικής προσπάθειας. Με λογική θεώρηση αυτή είναι η άμεση αιτιατή διασύνδεση που παρατηρείται, δηλαδή: κίνητρο βελτίωσης και υπάρχοντες τρόποι → αύξηση αποδοτικότητας → οικονομική ανισότητα. Με άλλα λόγια, η οικονομική ανισότητα είναι έμμεσο αποτέλεσμα των ενεργειών του ατόμου που προκαλούνται από μια αιτία (κίνητρο) που οδηγεί σε άμεσο αποτέλεσμα (αποδοτικότητα).

Εάν θέλαμε να εκφράσουμε με μαθηματικό συμβολισμό τη θέση του Okun και τη διαφορετική θέση που αναπτύξαμε, θα είχαμε:

5. Αναφερόμαστε στο παράδειγμα αυτό μόνο στην καινοτομική δραστηριότητα ως πηγή οικονομικής διαφοροποίησης αν και θα μπορούσαμε να την αντικαταστήσουμε με άλλους παράγοντες όπως, τύχη, εξουσία, μη νόμιμες ενέργειες, κ.λπ. που θα είχαν το ίδιο αποτέλεσμα. Για την επίδραση των κινήτρων στην επιχειρηματική δραστηριότητα βλ. Καραγιάννης (1996).

Θέση Okun: $E = f(K)$, όπου $K = g(I)$, και

$$\frac{dE}{dK} > 0, \frac{dK}{dI} > 0$$

Άλλη θέση: $I = f(E)$, όπου $E = g(K)$, και

$$\frac{dI}{dE} > 0, \frac{dE}{dK} > 0$$

όπου: E η αποδοτικότητα, I η οικονομική ανισότητα, και K το κίνητρο βελτίωσης + μίμηση + ανταγωνισμός

Μολονότι σε γενικές γραμμές υφίσταται κάποια αντίθεση μεταξύ οικονομικής ισότητας και αποδοτικότητας στη συνέχεια θα εξετάσουμε περισσότερο την έννοια και την έκταση των οικονομικών ανισοτήτων, των οποίων η μείωση κατά τον Okun μπορεί να οδηγήσει σε μείωση της παραγωγής.

3. Οικονομική ανισότητα και κίνητρα

Η Σκύλα και η Χάρουβδη, δηλαδή η επιλογή μεταξύ της οικονομικής ισότητας και της οικονομικής ανισότητας που τονίζει στο βιβλίο του ο Okun (σσ. 51, 81-2, κ.ά.), έχει να κάνει με δεδομένη κατάσταση. Το δίλημμα αυτό εμφανίζεται όταν υπάρχουν ίσες ευκαιρίες για όλους σε βασικά θέματα όπως η υγεία, η εκπαίδευση, η διατροφή, ο μη ρατσισμός και διάφορα άλλα σχετικά. Επίσης το δίλημμα αυτό αποτελεί απόρροια της ελεύθερης οικονομικής δράσης των ατόμων και διορθώνεται μόνο με αυξανόμενο κόστος για την κοινωνία και οικονομία, σύμφωνα με τον Okun.

Ας δούμε περισσότερο αναλυτικά τις διάφορες πηγές οικονομικής ανισότητας που τόνισε ο Okun. Ας εξετάσουμε πρώτα τη διασύνδεση μεταξύ πολιτικής και οικονομικής δύναμης και την εξ αυτών “σχετική ανισότητα ευκαιριών”. Ο Okun (σσ. 10-11) ορθά αναγνωρίζει ότι στην πραγματικότητα υπάρχει άμεση σχέση οικονομικής και πολιτικής εξουσίας και εξ αυτού υπάρχει και διαφορετική ισχύ των πολιτικών και κοινωνικών δικαιωμάτων των ατόμων. Δηλαδή, ένας πλούσιος ενισχύει

οικονομικά την πολιτική εκστρατεία ενός πολιτικού ο οποίος με τη σειρά του τον προστατεύει -όσο μπορεί- έναντι του νόμου ή ενισχύει τις οικονομικές του δραστηριότητες. Οι σελίδες των εφημερίδων στις περισσότερες δημοκρατίες του πλανήτη μας τα τελευταία χρόνια έχουν αναφέρει αρκετό αριθμό τέτοιων περιπτώσεων. Φυσικά υπάρχουν πολλές περισσότερες αλλά οι “απατεώνες” (με την οικονομική και πολιτική έννοια) με τη συνεχή δραστηριότητά τους και τις γνώσεις που αποκτούν έχουν αναπτύξει ένα υψηλό συγκριτικό πλεονέκτημα έναντι των “φυλάκων του νόμου”. Δυστυχώς δε μιλάμε για οριακές περιπτώσεις αλλά για περιπτώσεις που επιδρούν λόγω της επωνυμίας στη μιμητική συμπεριφορά των νομοταγών πολιτών.

‘Αμεση συσχέτιση με το θέμα της οικονομικής βοήθειας προς τους πολιτικούς έχει και η “νόμιμη” χρηματοδότηση των εκλογικών εκστρατειών των πολιτικών υποψηφίων. Ο Okun (σσ. 24-5) δεν αντιτίθεται προς τη φανερή χρηματοδότηση των υποψηφίων από υποστηρικτές υψηλού εισοδήματος με το επιχείρημα ότι “ο καθένας δικαιούται να διαθέσει το χρήματά του όπου θέλει”. Αναμφισβήτητα αυτό είναι ένα δικαίωμα της ελεύθερης αυτοδιάθεσης της ιδιοκτησίας του ανθρώπου, αλλά τι συμβαίνει όμως όταν οι εκλογικές εκστρατείες των κομμάτων χρηματοδοτούνται “καταναγκαστικά” από το δημόσιο προϋπολογισμό; Κατά πρώτο, η χρηματοδότηση αυτή δεν είναι εθελοντική από μέρος των ατόμων, αλλά η κρατική εξουσία ή το σύνολο των κομμάτων αποφάσισαν να διαθέσουν τμήμα των φορολογικών εσόδων για να “διαφημίσουν” το προϊόν τους, δηλαδή το εκλογικό τους πρόγραμμα. Δεν αμφισβητείται ότι τα έξοδα διαφήμισης των προϊόντων μιας ιδιωτικής επιχείρησης κατά μεγάλο μέρος (αν όχι στο σύνολο) πληρώνονται από τους τελικούς καταναλωτές. Αυτό αποτελεί- όπως ισχυρίζονται μερικοί- κόστος της πληροφόρησης διαφορετικών προϊόντων, το οποίο ο καταναλωτής υφίσταται επιλεκτικά. Δηλαδή είναι στην επιλογή του εάν αγοράσει το διαφημιζόμενο προϊόν. Στην περίπτωση όμως της διαφήμισης των πολιτικών προγραμμάτων των κομμάτων με χρηματοδότηση από τα φορολογικά έσοδα, ο καταναλωτής (δηλ. ο πολίτης), δεν έχει την ευχέρεια επιλογής αλλά καλείται καταναγκαστικά να συμμετάσχει σε αυτό το κόστος. Για τον λόγο αυτό η κρατική χρηματοδότηση των κομμάτων είναι μάλλον καταναγκαστική παρά εθελοντική. Εκτός αυτού, η χρηματοδότηση αυτή των κομμάτων έχει τα εξής σοβαρά μειονεκτήματα: (α) όσο αυξάνεται η χρηματοδότηση αυτή, τόσο αυξάνεται η

επιθυμία των υποψηφίων για αυξανόμενες δαπάνες προεκλογικής εκστρατείας, (β) αποστερούνται χρηματικοί πόροι οι οποίοι θα μπορούσαν να χρησιμοποιηθούν εναλλακτικά αυξάνοντας τη γενική ευημερία (βελτίωση της ποιότητας παρεχομένων κρατικών υπηρεσιών) ή την παραγωγικότητα (έργα υποδομής), (γ) δεν ελέγχεται ο τρόπος χρησιμοποίησης μέρους των φορολογικών εσόδων από τους νόμιμους δικαιούχους που στην ουσία είναι οι φορολογούμενοι, (δ) παρέχεται η δυνατότητα δημιουργίας ενός μηχανισμού οικονομικής εξουσίας από πλευράς των κομμάτων με υπαλλήλους, τροφοδοτούσες επιχειρήσεις, κ.λπ. που δεν είναι τίποτα άλλο στην ουσία από μηχανισμό εγκλωβισμού ψηφοφόρων, και (ε) δημιουργείται μια “βιομηχανία” παραγωγής ενός “προϊόντος” που δεν είναι τίποτα άλλο από την υπακοή στο κόμμα και την απώλεια της ατομικής ελευθερίας και αξιοπρέπειας. Είναι αρκετά σοβαροί οι παραπάνω λόγοι ώστε να επανεξετασθεί η κρατική χρηματοδότηση των κομμάτων όχι μόνο ως προς το “σκεπτικό” της, αλλά και ως προς τον τρόπο και το ύψος διάθεσης των χρημάτων.

Μια άλλη πηγή οικονομικής ανισότητας- εμφανής σε μερικές μικρές χώρες- είναι οι “γνωριμίες”. Εάν κάποιο άτομο αλλά έχει αποκτήσει πλούτο με μη “ορθές” (νομικά και εθιμικά) ενέργειες και δεν ελέγχεται για την απόκτηση αυτού του πλούτου, τότε το άτομο αυτό μπορεί να διαθέσει μέρος του πλούτου του για να αποκτήσει “υψηλά” ιστάμενες γνωριμίες διαμέσου παροχής χρηματικών ενισχύσεων στους πολιτικούς και σε άλλα εξουσιαστικά μέλη της κοινωνίας (αστυνομία, δικαστές, κ.λπ.). Οι γνωριμίες αυτές θα βοηθήσουν αν όχι το ίδιο το άτομο αλλά τα παιδιά του να ξεκινήσουν διαθέτοντας ένα συγκριτικό πλεονέκτημα έναντι των άλλων. Σε περίπτωση που δεν ισχύει η αξιοκρατία σε μια κοινωνία, αλλά επιδρούν διαφορετικά υποκειμενικά κριτήρια, τότε δημιουργείται μια οικονομική ανισότητα η εξάλειψη της οποίας, όπως ομολογεί ο Okun (σ. 76), δε θα επιφέρει κόστος αλλά αύξηση της αποδοτικότητας στην οικονομία.

Η απάμβλυνση της οικονομικής ανισότητας διαμέσου της αναδιανεμητικής χρήσης του φορολογικού συστήματος είναι το μόνο μέτρο που εξετάζει ο Okun (Κεφ. 4). Υπάρχουν όμως, κατά την άποψή μας, και άλλα μέτρα που μπορούν να θεσπισθούν και τα οποία να είναι λιγότερο καταναγκαστικά. Για παράδειγμα, μπορεί να θεσπισθεί η επιβράβευση με κοινωνικά και πολιτειακά βραβεία των πλουσίων που εθελοντικά διαθέτουν χρήματα για τη βελτίωση του βιοτικού επιπέδου των πτωχών.

Η “προπαγάνδισή” υπέρ της αλτρουιστικής συμπεριφοράς των πλούσιων- τα ευνοούμενα μέλη της κοινωνίας- είναι άλλος ένας τρόπος για να προκληθεί εθελοντική αναδιανομή (σε κάποιο εύρος) πλούτου.

Εκτός από αυτές τις περιπτώσεις μη ορθής δημιουργίας οικονομικών ανισοτήτων υπάρχουν και άλλες που οφείλονται στην ύπαρξη θεσμικών ατελειών του συστήματος και κυρίως ως προς τον έλεγχο της συσσώρευσης πλούτου. Γι’ αυτό και μια δίκαιη κοινωνία δεν πρέπει να εξαντλεί τη δικαιοσύνη της στη γενική αναδιανομή του πλούτου αλλά στον κατά περίπτωση αδιαφανή πλουτισμό. Κάτι τέτοιο βέβαια είναι αδύνατο να εφαρμοσθεί σε κοινωνίες όπου δεν υπάρχει ουσιαστικός έλεγχος απόκτησης του ατομικού πλούτου. Στην ουσία, η ανυπαρξία ελέγχου καταλήγει σε διαστρέβλωση του οικονομικού κινήτρου και των ίσων οικονομικών ευκαιριών στα άτομα, αλλά και πέραν αυτού, κάτω από το κίνητρο της μίμησης και σε διαστρέβλωση της ορθής ηθικά και κοινωνικά συμπεριφοράς του ατόμου.

Συμπέρασμα

Από την παραπάνω αξιολόγηση των προτάσεων του Οκun για την εξάλειψη των διαφόρων αιτιών που αποδυναμώνουν τα οικονομικά κίνητρα, όπως έγινε φανερό, παραμελούνται πολλές θεσμικές και πραγματικές αντιδράσεις που εάν ληφθούν υπόψη καταστρατηγούν τις προτεινόμενες λύσεις. Από το άλλο μέρος, τονίσθηκε στο παρόν άρθρο ότι η αντίθεση μεταξύ πλήρους ισότητας και πλήρους αποδοτικότητας, μολονότι πραγματική, δε βρίσκει αποφασιστική απάντηση από τον Οκun. Το δίλημμα όμως που θέλει να τονίσει ο Οκun παραμένει, και η περαιτέρω εμφάθυσή του μπορεί να αποδώσει νέες και πληρέστερες προτάσεις για την επίλυσή του. Η δεσμευμένη επιλογή μεταξύ δύο “κακών” της Σκύλας (οικονομική ισότητα) και της Χάρυβδης (χαμηλή αποδοτικότητα), επίσης μπορεί να υπερπηδηθεί από τη δημιουργική προσπάθεια του ανθρώπου και από την ικανότητά του να βρίσκει λύσεις που εκτονώνουν πιεστικά διλήμματα.

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Abstract

ANASTASIOS KARAYANNIS : *Arthur M. Okun "Equality and Efficiency - The Big Tradeoff" : An appraisal after 20 years*

In the present paper Okun's well known analysis with regard to the tradeoff between equality and efficiency is re-examined in the light of modern institutional approach. In the first part of the paper Okun's treatment of inequality as a motive for increasing productivity is analysed. In the second section this treatment is critically examined from the logical and historical point of view. In the last section further institutional factors concerning the above tradeoff are examined.

THE PRINCIPLES OF GEOPOLITICS AND THE CASE OF THE GREEK SPACE IN SOUTH-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

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Introduction

The analysis and definition of the term Geopolitics are imposed by the need for its determination. The approach of Greece's geopolitical position and the international prerequisites deriving therefrom will explicitly emerge through the elucidation of the said term and the knowledge of its content.

«The first and foremost purpose of Geography is to make war». The above provoking title was willfully used by the French geographer and geopolitician Yves Lacoste in one of his most important theoretical essays. (Ed. Maspero, 1976). The essence of the term in question lies on this provocation.

The utility of geography is dual: on one hand, it helps at the organization of the war or the defense of the geographical spaces which are attacked and, on the other, at the economic-political organization of those spaces during the peace periods.

According to Ladis K.D. Kristof¹ the modern theorist of Geopolitics examines the geographical map of the earth to distinguish what the nature advises us to do given our preferences and not what the nature imposes to us.

1 See: Ladis K.D. Kristof, The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IV (March 1960).

Except Napoleon who clearly declared that the politics of a State is located on its Geography, Harold and Margaret Sprout² note that Geography influences all immaterial and material phenomena which display territorial dimensions and variations on the surface of the earth or in relation to the earth; they also note that in all periods the international politics shows «*more or less distinguishable patterns of compulsion and subjugation, influence and compliance, patterns which are reflected on political terms with an intense sense of the Geographical Space*».

Consequently, the Geographer directs its effort to the stressing of the natural dimension of the risks the societies run of being subordinate to similar patterns of influence and compulsion, as if there existed a possibility for a hot event, to avoid that risk through the intervention of the political leaderships of the planet.

Thus, the risk of war does not derive from Geography or from Geopolitics, one of Geography's analytical methods. The risk of war will always exist as long as there are natural resources necessary to the economic development of the human societies, the loss or scarcity of which portends both the dependence of one National Social Formation, or a group thereof, to others and the transfer or the decay of the threatened societies, viewed as the basic constituents of a State.

According to Colin Gray³, the power of the general geopolitical theory lies on the fact that it sets the local action or interaction within an international framework [...] those who want to comprehend the geopolitical dimensions of the international security must assimilate the essential notions of Geopolitics.

From the Geographer and father of Geopolitics F. Ratzel (1844-1904) we learn that Geopolitics is the Geography under the service of the politics of the State⁴. We must also stress the following definition of Ratzel's student, K. Haushofer (1869-1946): *Geopolitics will be -and must be- the geographical conscious of the state. Its object is the study of the great vital interrelations of modern man within the framework of the contemporary space while its aim is the coordination of the phenomena which link*

2 See: H. and M. Sprout, *An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International Politics*, Center for International Studies, Princeton 1968, p. 21.

3 See: Colin Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands and the Technological Revolution*, Crane, Rusak for the *National Informations and Strategic Center*, New York 1977.

4 See: Friedrich Ratzel, *La Géographie Politique*, Fayard, Paris 1987.

the State with the space.

In 1963, Saul Cohen⁵ wrote that the quintessence of Geopolitics is the study of the existing relation between the international politics of power and the corresponding geographical characteristics, mainly those geographical characteristics on which the sources of power are developed.

Michel Foucher⁶ considers Geopolitics as an aggregate method of geographical analysis of specific social and political situations regarded within their geographical framework, which method is combined with the usual speculations (I would say ideological conceptions) typical of those situations.

In our effort to formulate a definition of our own we would say that: we may call Geopolitical analysis of a geographical system of unbalanced distribution of power the method that studies, describes and foresees the behaviours and the consequences of both the relations of the opposing and distinctive international political actions of redistribution of power and their ideological metaphysics, within the framework of the geographical zones where those politics are implemented.

Moreover, I believe that it is necessary to note that since Geopolitics analyzes the juxtapositions between specific opposing international powers, distinguishable in terms of quality and number, its foremost concern is to take scholastically into account the speculations and conceptions that all of those powers have or develop for themselves.

The duty of the geopolitical analysis is to keep its distance from the emotional confusion of the above mentioned speculative conceptions and to reach impartial conclusions. When I say impartial conclusions I must stress that I reject notions such as realistic, fair or morally correct conclusions.

The geopolitical method indicates the application of those conclusions and reveals the dynamics and the orientations of the international phenomena determined by space and time. In that sense, Geography is a non-moralist approach. Of course, the geographers will always be influenced by moral intuitions deriving from their specific cultural background. This background is a balanced function of the requisitions of the geographical whole where they believe they belong or the purposes of which they believe that they serve. History shows the rest.

5 Saul Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*, 1963.

6 See: M. Foucher, *Fronts et Frontières*, Fayard, Paris 1991.

The geopolitical approach is imposed neither by legal superstructures and international organizations, nor through -willingly or unwillingly- inapplicable moral exhortations. The geopolitical approaches are dominated only by one: the logic of power of the international ruling social and economical cores. Unfortunately, the results of the geopolitically stronger actions are «legalized» -after they have been established- by the legal decisions of the international organizations. There are many relevant examples.

A. The broader international system from the geopolitical structure viewpoint: evaluations

In this second part of the issue we are obliged to present a more general picture of the international system which will help us to specify the Greek space the way it seems to function in the SE Mediterranean space.

The vacuum of authority derived from the fall of the Soviet Empire, which had been a centrally ruled and coherent political, economic and, mainly, defensive system is now clear. This vacuum is noticeable due to the lack of two main coefficients: a) the fundamental “**focal authority**” which is the dominant component marking any organized system and b) the “**final organizer**” of the system. The term final organizer means the final administrator of the system, at least for a time without any visible end. It may seem strange that we do not consider Washington as being the final administrator of the system, as anyone would expect; yet, this is not inexplicable. The blame for this must be put, among others, on the ruling political faction of Washington that has ceded a major part of its hegemonic competence to Bonn aiming at:

- a) the fastest possible absorption of the German economic surplus in the East (Central and Eastern Europe) which derived from the detaching of large quantities of international and domestic surplus (see White Book), and
- b) the revival of the fears of the peoples of Western Europe for the «restoration» of a «German Europe».

The planners of Washington consider these two facts a general direction which -they believe- will permit them to withdraw an important part

of their attention from the European continent on Bonn's expenses to turn it towards the emerging and boiling markets of SE Asia and the Pacific Zone.

In our view, this probable (for others clear) consideration on the USA's behalf to the German side has two extents:

- a) on one hand, the coming out of Germany to the Mediterranean through the Adriatic Sea, and
- b) the German conquest of the regional Central European markets and the transformation of the broader European space (Western and Central Europe) to a Mark zone.

This picture of the more general geopolitical planning will have been accomplished only when there is an answer to the question that occupies us all: does Washington accept a co-hegemony of the planet with Bonn? The answer is *negative*. The things are more clear and, at the same time, more complex for the brains of the USA's geopolitical planning:

1) The governing political faction of Washington takes into account that a part of the American multinational enterprises makes business from Germany. It also recognizes that although the German national expansion to the East incriminates the national Germany at the conscious of the European peoples, it strengthens at the same time the American mechanisms of detaching of international relative surplus value.

2) Moreover, in every region of apparent expansion of the political and economic power of Bonn (Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe) Washington creates opposing supports which at any time will be able to destroy the establishing powerful German economic empire.

Greece never had a place in the framework of the geopolitical planning of the Continental Powers, being a Maritime Power itself. If *Athens runs away with similar choices its future will be obscure in the international environment*.

Considering the above we must take seriously into account the tactful effort of the governing political faction of Washington to involve the British factor in the European case, aiming at the strengthening of the USA's Balkan and West European rears with a NATO presence of European origin. However, this planning does not take into account the British interests and aims at the use of London as a «breakwater» for an eventually uncontrolled Germany, as it was the case during the 2nd World

War. This role has been assigned to Mr. John Major given that, due to her completely different but correct views, Mrs. Thatcher has been replaced.

3) However, the reflexes activated in the European peoples have already worked towards this direction; the rupture of the famous «French-German axis» and the creation of a discrete English-French collaboration is an example; the latter is likely to «support» the nuclear presence of France at the Pacific and we mentioned before that the strategic and economic planning of Washington is directed towards this region. However, we must not forget that there lie some of the most important consignments of the British Commonwealths international economic History.

4) The presence of London, Paris and Washington at the Pacific Zone functions on two levels:

- a) it secures the said region from a probable Chinese and Japanese expansion and integration, and
- b) it tries to share it out in time among those three poles of economic-political power.

The intermediate juxtapositions between Paris and Washington, e.g., in the matter of the French nuclear tests, are rather explicable under the logic of the internal moves of this still unbalanced system of regional domination, until a medium- short-term balance within the system is achieved. Besides, the return of France in the military branch of NATO has proved the truth of the above as far as the rallying of the «Germany-fearing» powers under the auspices of USA is concerned. Naturally, the sharing of the cards in the Pacific remains a Washington's competence that seems that has completely adopted the doctrine split and rule, mainly whenever this must be applied to the Great Britain and France. Besides, it is well known that there are not permanent friendships and alliances among States; there are only permanent interests⁷.

5) On the other side, one of the primary objectives of the USA is the accession of C.I.S. into the above System of Domination in the Pacific, and in particular in the form of power multiplier of the American character of this System for two additional reasons:

- a) The USA will safeguard the control of the eastern axes of expansion of Germany, and

7. This is Lord Palmerstones famous utterance (NB).

- b) They maintain the control of the evolution of the giant geopolitical entity called China which does not seem ready, at least for the time being, to undergo the «Russian solution».

After the above analysis crucial questions arise: what if things will not evolve in this way? What if the societies do not accept the destructive methods of capital accumulation through the detachment of domestic and international super value? What if the societies react against their coercive transformation to «reserve economic forces» aiming at the more intense absorption from the number of the unemployed and to a downgrading of their living conditions as well as to a rupture of any existing social plexus? What if the German Europe, pursuing the creation of a concrete European zone of influence, persists with the shatter of the national money (and the national economies as a result) through the increase of the deposit rates or the fall of the official discount rates? (this has happened three times during the last two years within the European Union of the 20 million of unemployed).

Then... then we shall have to discuss about local breakdowns of the above structure, inevitable national-social conflicts and, naturally, as far as the Balkans are concerned, about a general conflagration set off by the «national-minorities» issues and the protection of the «human rights», issues that will be created or motivated by the social-economic dynamics of the populations that will be forced to move in the Balkan space.

Now, let us focus our attention to the SE Mediterranean, since the picture of the form of the general system has been presented.

B. The description of the geopolitical conjuncture in the SE Mediterranean: theory and action

B.1. The German geopolitical conception (Continental Powers) and the vertical zones of dependence between North-South

Ratzel's theory of vital space lead K. Haushoffer, his disciple, to conceive the vertical division of the planet to «vital zones» of influence of 1) the USA (Panamerican zone of North-South) 2) Germany (Euro-African zone of North-South) 3) Russia (Panrussian zone of North-South) and 4)

Japan (Zone of Asian «prosperity»).

The influence zone of each of the above four metropolitan powers is analyzed in four levels: a) the military, b) the economic, c) the political, and d) the cultural level. The scaling of use of those methods by the metropolitan powers on the regional national formations is inversely proportional to the grade of the defensive, economic, political and cultural autonomy of those formations.

Of course, nothing prevents the implementation of the four methods of pressure at the same time of a combination thereof; the last regional conflicts are an inconetstable evidence of it.

B.2. The Anglo-Saxon geopolitical conception (Maritime Powers)

On the contrary, the Anglo-Saxons (Mahan, MacKinder, Spykman) developed a «horizontal» geopolitical conception in relation to the above mentioned «vertical» German one.

The Anglo-Saxon analysts of Geopolitics laid emphasis on the naval powers and on the so-called «base of operations»⁸ which are localized on the so-called «ring of Underdevelopment»⁹ and on the «Australian ring of Development»¹⁰, which emphasis was determinative for the possibilities of the Naval Powers (USA, Britain, W. Europe) to exert counterbalancing tendencies against the geopolitical block of Eurasia (Heartland according to MacKinder), namely against the geographical zone comprising the unified Germany and the former Eastern Block.

Conclusions: The first conclusion deriving from the above analysis is that the conflict between the German-Russian and the Anglo-Saxon tendencies has been (particularly during the Cold-War era) vertical. However, both geopolitical conceptions had, and still have, an intersection point: the Mediterranean Sea and its gates of access, namely the Balkans at the North, with Asia Minor also comprised therein, Cyprus and Suez at the South-East, the Maghreb at the South and Gibraltar at the West.

Yet, the analysis in the first paragraph shows the solution of the prob-

8. Lands used as war or political basis-facilities of the metropolitan powers (NB).

9. Namely, the horizontal ring of the Third World countries which comprises, among others, the 1,500,000 adherents of Islam (NB).

10. Argentina, Brasil, South Africa, Australia, New Zeland (NB).

lem between those two opposing tendencies¹¹; there is only one solution: the split of Yugoslavia to satisfy those two geopolitical players (Continental and Naval Powers) in the region of South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. We shall make ourselves clear in the following paragraph.

B.3. The rectilinear commercial axis Port Said-Scopje-Rotterdam as geopolitical key of the evolutions in SE Mediterranean and the Balkans.

Through the examination of the main commercial streams of the regions we conclude as follows:

1) The main volume of the commercial transports of high- or medium-technology from the Northern, Western and Central Europe to the Middle East, Maghreb, India and SE Asia passes through Scopje and the Port of Thessaloniki, the Balkan gate, and Suez, the Middle-East gate. At the same time, the main volume of fuel transport from Middle East to the Western, Northern and Central Europe passes through the same geopolitical gates of the axis of transport Suez-Thessaloniki-Scopje.

1a) The pipe-line connecting Kourtalan (Diyarbakir, SE Turkey) with Alexandrette can be easily controlled by the foreign factor who can easily handle the means of revolt of the Curdish element in the region to «black-mail» an eventually «disobedient» Turkey. Taking into account the permanent and uncompromising territorial claims of Syria on the said region of Hatay the foreign interventions may very easily create an explosion at this region. Besides, this is the reason, among others, why there are too many important NATO air bases in this inflammable region, the presence and operation of which has been ascertained by the international community during the recent Gulf War.

If we take into account the factor of the water resources control of the rivers Tiger and Euphrates from Turkey through the ambitious and giant project of G.A.P., as well as the permanent rivalry between Syria and Israel for the Golan plateaus and the sources of river Jordan and the similar situation between Iraq and Israel, we can easily explain the turn of Turkey to Israel and vice versa. Both countries have many profits to gain: on one hand, Israel needs the Turkish air bases in the South of Turkey to

11. For the control of sea, air and land commercial routes (NB).

strike the rear of Syria in case of conflict as well as the good will of Ankara for his water supply, while Turkey needs the permanent threat of Israel at the rear of Iraq and Syria which might increase the security coefficients in case of conflict with these Arab states. This conflict is undouptable because of Turkey's hydro-geopolitics in the region.

Unfortunately, Greece has waited the 90s to proceed to the recognition of Israel and now it is concerned about the Turkish-Israel defensive relations. We would say that this is a rather belated concern.

1b) The complex of the pipe-lines joining the deposits of Kirkuk with the Sidon Port in Lebanon¹² and the deposits of Bahrain with the same Port¹³ are completely controlled by the Anglo-American bases in Cyprus.

2) If we draw a line starting from Amsterdam, the seaport of the free oil market of Rotterdam and ending at Port Said, the transit point of approximately 40% of the Middle-East oil, this will be a straight line which crosses Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia -the fabrication of Holbrouk- Cossovo, Scopje, the middle foot of Chalkidiki -which the Scopjen maps present as part of the unredeemed Macedonia of the Aegean Sea!- and Dodecanese. The distance on this straight line between Rotterdam-Scopje is about 1500 km while the distance between Scopje-Port Said, on the same line, is approximately 1650 km; that is, the capital of this four-nation State is in the middle of the commercial route connecting the most important oil-exporting point with the most important point of its free market.

As far as the region of Sporades and Dodecanese (SE Aegean) is concerned, for more than 20 years they have been the target of the Turkish pretensions supported by absurd and contrary to the international law arguments. This is proved by the well-known Turkish litigation of the Treaty of Lausanne, the curious, so called gray zones at the Aegean etc.

3) The matter of the transport arrangement of the huge deposits of Bakou and the pipe lines routes which in any case end at the SE Mediterranean adds another serious element to the definite evaluation of the strategic significance of the SE Mediterranean basin.

4) The last fact which I shall record concerns the off-shore oil deposits of the NE Aegean; recently, the proposal for their joint exploitation with

12. The route is: Kirkuk-Hadita-Kashr al Ashrak-Sidon (NB).

13. The route is: Bahrein-Rash Tanoura-Kashr al Ashrak-Sidon (NB).

Turkey under the supervision of the USA is supported even from Greek politicians.

However, despite any ill- or well-intentioned criticism, we must let the perspectives of solutions appear. The straight nationalist views, the xenophobe conceptions do not offer any solutions; they create the prerequisites of isolationism which harm the Mediterranean, Balkan and European role of the country. Thus, we have to make clear that the exploitation of the off-shore oil deposits in the Aegean and Ionian sea may proceed in collaboration with the Overseas (ARAMCO) and European (B.P.-SHELL) cartels. However, this must be done honestly and fairly for our country, quickly and with no roll of drums. We do not see any reason why we must assign Turkey partner in the Greece's underground wealth. This will be achieved only when we, the Greeks, manage to satisfy both the interests of the international oil cartels and of our country and stop bargaining with powers and groups of interests which never **belonged, do not belong and will never belong** to our naval geopolitical space. Not only it is obvious that this is a wrong orientation but it is also natural that those powerful international corporations will resort to compulsive measures against our country. *One of these is the hot event in the Aegean in order to follow the policy of the hot regulation of the Metropolises that support and are supported by those oil interests. But then it will be too late.*

5) On the other hand, our country must quickly proceed to the development of the Greek arms industry which must be able to supply our country with military electronic technology and mechanical-electronic equipment. In this case we create all those prerequisites which permit the signature of projects of co-production of arm systems with productors and geopolitically relative countries such as Israel or other overseas countries¹⁴.

If the above are realized, the expenditure for armaments will be an im-

14. In a yet unpublished survey of a Special Scientist of the Ministry of Defense, Mr. G. Mourtos, it is mentioned that: Despite the friendly feelings of the Argentinians for our country, Ancara has tried to win over Buenos Aires. When Greece did not respond to the repetitive proposals of Argentina for a collaboration in the field of the nuclear technology where the latter invested large sums, it turned to Ancara. As a consequence, the Argentinian General Director of the Ministry of Defense Mr. Alfonso Saratso, who had also been Argentinas representative at the Initiative of the 6 for Peace and Disarmament was appointed Ambassador of Argentina in Ancara.

portant development factor for the fields of High Technology and, consequently, Added Value products, eg., electronics, mechanical, chemical, marine, steel industry products. Beyond the strengthening of the country from the national security point of view, those fields may cause the rise of the whole system of the declining Greek economy characterized by stagflationary phenomena, fall of industry, unemployment and retailer attitude.

The mere supply of armament systems is the main reason for the dependence of the country's defense, for the non-productive expenditures which strike its already problematic economy and for its discredit in the international balances of an already anarchic international system. We must not forget Henry Kissinger, the «magician» of the American foreign policy who declares that *in the world of diplomacy a loaded gun is always more effective than a brief.*

6) The University sector should already proceed to the promotion of all fields (Technology, Geography - Geopolitics, International Politics, International Economics, Turkish, Balkan and Cultural studies) which are able to prepare high-level specialized scientists who will organize Institutes and Centres for the study of the international geopolitical environment of Greece. Those Centres within the framework of the Greek Universities and under the the States control would be able to produce ideas and orientations for the drawing of the axes of a serious and long-term foreign and defense policy.

Conclusions

a) The economic control on Greece's behalf of the northern part of the commercial axis Rotterdam-Port Said in the East Balkans (an important branch starting from Scopje and ending in Budapest, Bucharest and Sofia where the trade of the Balkan ports in the Black Sea is conducted, i.e. Konstanz, Varna and Burgas, respectively) may offer a long-term help to the normal evolution of Greece-F.Y.R.O.M. relations.

b) The control of this commercial route and the possibility to check it (eg., through the control of the Dardanel from the eventual metropolitan administrator of Turkey) is an important factor of power against the Eur-

asian powers which take commercial advantages from it¹⁵.

Thus, it is clear what a resolute attitude means to the Greek foreign policy. It is the policy which will ensure:

- I) the quick integration of the horizontal (Balkan) axis of the Egnatia highway,
- II) the vertical land electric railway axis N-S,
- III) the complete, indisputable and absolute economic (oil) and defense control of the Aegean on Greece's behalf,
- IV) the quick strengthening and promotion of the domestic arm industry,
- V) the strengthening of the Higher Education in the above-mentioned fields.

Yet, it is equally easy to foresee the risks of a submissive, compliant and vague foreign policy.

It is time to move with a long-term planning, without any pacifist populism and without any self-interested exploitation of the geopolitical issues of concern for our country. No one wishes the war unless he is a psycho. Those who put such dilemmas are not honoured by them. It is time to stop pretending that we do not understand otherwise the price we shall pay will be high.

15. We must not forget the interest of NATO in the past for this axis which had been manifested with the formation of AIRBORNE BRIGADE together with tactical air support and of A.M.F. (L), under the gradual or flexible response doctrine.

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EPISTEMOLOGY, ETHIC AND SOCIAL RESPONSABILITY OF THE SEARCHER IN BUSINESS SCIENCES

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Research process in organisations points out two questions:

-Why to intervene in organisation?

-How to intervene?

This paper wants to show the meaning of ideology in research process.

Ideology can't be forgotten, because it is crystalized deeply in the thought linked with the past and experiences, and above all in irregular development depending on the meeting situations. The main problem is to identify conditions avoiding wrong effects of ideology on research, not to eliminate ideological influences. In fact when a researcher doesn't identify ideological influences, he cannot measure the consequences on his own work, he supresses the reflexion element useful in the manifestation of a relative objectivity [Garcia M. 1993].

Epistemology takes scientific knowledge as an analysis field. This short definition is very subjective in fact :

- scientific knowledge is not explained;
- we give each person the possibility to define, with his own or in a group, scientific knowledge;
- obviously, we are free to choose scientific methods;

This freedom gives a very big responsibility to the researcher, if he wishes to have scientific qualification to his work.

It becomes necessary to build an ethic, especially when the researcher chooses human organisations as an experimental field. Hegel defines ethics as an organisation for social relationships, in opposition to morality whose purposes are principals of individual action.

For example, we must forbid experimental processes leading to the destruction of the organisation. Anyway, if this situation should happen, I think the researcher will be sent back to his studies by the organisation. Intervention in organisation must be guided to increase performance, because scientific research in organisations introduces modifications. The researcher must be able to propose and to use management tools and technics, on the one hand to help people, and on the other hand to control the respect of scientific knowledge targets.

Ethics and morality come with the researcher as a social responsibility whose components are obligations:

- obligation to answer the reals problems, with fitted modalities;
 - obligation to report with communication methods, on the scientific knowledge situation;
 - a third obligation to turn scientific knowledge towards social and economic progress, in the case of research in management;
- these three previous obligations lead the researcher into a process of involment by methods and results of research.

Non-implication for the researcher means failure for these obligations, the one who doesn't get involved, doesn't have to give any answer.

But, how to avoid invervention in social scinces?

Simply by Teaching, the Imparting of scientific knowledge settles a mobality of intervention on the society. Then, it seems, that we have to consider wholly our methods of intervention.

The responsibility of the researcher becomes a social responsibility, he must report his results to his own community. There we have to point out a scientific ideology, giving us reference marks to intervene, and to keep the target of scientific purpose on line.

Choosing an experimental process to obtain scientific knowledge enforces the responsibility in improving the preformance of the organisation, used as an experimental field.

The aim isn't to lead intervention as a consultant, but we have to manage with this secondary product of intervention. This fact leads us to build management tools and technics closer to scientific knowledge, and to do

that scientifically.

Books of Smith and Ricardo didn't lay stress on scientific interest from firms. Firms are excluded from analysis by the determinism of profit maximisation and by the market rules leading human choices. That, in spite of their writings on the importance of firms and managers' behaviour in economic systems. The exclusion of organisations as a research field is operated by division of labour and individual interest.

The development of microeconomics introduces a lot of elements like technics, psychology, sociology and institutional constraints. However maximisation of profit and market rules are kept as unescapable propositions [Walras L. 1926, p. 213].

Taylor introduces autonomy in management, however he creates management rules to reach the target of maximisation of profit over constraints, rationalizing human behaviours [Braverman, p. 98-105]. Thus he points out that human behaviours may be not rational. There we see a big change in the management problematic, managers not only can behave, but must behave [Taylor 1911 (1957-1967 pp. 43-45, pp. 118-119)].

We can verify by experimentation that division of labour productivity if the outlet does exist. But it seems that new constraints on production like flexibility, quality and unsteady into demand question us over the pertinency of this approach. Thus we have the feeling that Taylor's problematic was to rationalize behaviours in order to adapt them to the classical rules working on free market economy, to hold up the target of productivity. However, without going ahead in the field of denial market existence [Reddy 1984; Polanyi 1944], we think that the market does exist even when it is hardly organized and when it does work badly. This fact shows out an interesting field for researchers.

Market uncertainty points out needs of information, partially satisfied by accountancy, marketing and finance knowledge. Information reduces uncertainty but above all information is looked for organized actions with a target to modify market equilibrium or to reduce one or more market constraints. Human organisation influences not only itself, but the market too, and widely the environment. Then management opens a new field, it must take in account the general view beyond juridical limits of organisations.

Positivist philosophy introduces a dichotomy between science and action [Comte A. pp. 32-34]. According to this reflexion led with scien-

tific method shows the way toward essential beings and then to the best way in decision making. Phrenology is a great example of this scientific ideology.

The question in management science is not to know if thought happens before action nor if cumulating actions leads to knowledge, but to pull out of reflexion and action methods and knowledge which permit to go ahead scientifically [Savall H., Zardet V., Janv. 1995].

Here we introduce a relation between the scientific researcher, the field of intervention and the scientific method he uses in order to obtain scientific information, to build a theory. The question becomes "Is method concerned before or built during confrontation with experience"? [Savall H., Zardet V. Janv. 1995].

In our case, experiences were conducted in the same way with building a knowledge and a methodology, allowing verifications thanks to successive experimentations.

Management was born with integration of economics methods and action process, then It seems that experimental process is a better way as knowledge vector in management science than economics methods.

Science is a corpus of propositions in order to explain real world. These propositions can be invalidated by empiric observations, obviously the condition of invalidation is that the observation must be lead with scientific method. This definition introduces an exigence of explanations as an irreductible scientific criterium.

We must find first, the relation with the real world. Already a difficult task, because it seems the management field is a social and economic building convertible in accordance with general or special characteristics.

The result of research is scientific when the causal link between explanation and effect is realized. this involves a method which warrants the quality of explanative hypothesis. The positivists propose mathematics (thesis of symmetry) [Comte A. in Blaug 1987 pp. 5,6], however we know that mathematics points out a potential link. This method is very insufficient not only because you have to prove by another method the existence of the link between causes and effects but also you must go on with exigence to explain the link.

We have to add another problem, unvalidation of a conjecture can proceed from several origins: the proposition; the method; the experimental process, the experimental field. Then it's not only a problem of

explanation but more important an observation problem. We have to accept the existence of unobjective observations forbidding a true and fair view of the research situation [Blaug 1987 p.7]. This introduces two consequences, first searcher must not make observation but descriptive hypothesis, second we have to refute the positivist proposition of objective scientificity of the scientific researcher.

Then we have two types of hypothesis, descriptive hypothesis and explanation hypothesis. [Savall H. Cours de méthodologie expérimentale, DEA Gestion Socio-Économique 1991].

All methods are acceptable if they respect scientific base and finality, even if method evolves close to knowledge. Scientific purpose and ideology must avoid no scientific bearings. Here we have to admit that scientific purposes and experimental field. Coherence couldn't exist without lisibility in experimentation process.

A third type of hypothesis comes from experimentation process when we have to reproduce a fact to verify a result. We name it direction hypothesis.

A theory begins with hypothesis converging in description and explanation of facts. Clarification in causality scheme enables to see the field of implication, with reproductible concepts inducing a scientific reflexion.

Finally, with the development of knowledge, principles and scientific laws are built in order to explain facts in a clearly defined scientific field.

All true theories are those which have resisted unvalidation [Popper in Blaug pp. 16-19], throwing back an hypothesis can't be sufficient, this invites us to make a hypothesis hierarchy to classify their importance in theory or experimental model.

It's a big advantage, it permits to put regular evolution in theory and epistemology, on the other hand we must keep a great prudence, an epistemologic choice for an evolutive method is different from laxism or empirism. Obviously evolution in hypothesis must be identified and measured.

It's here in this relation with reality, that we can point out scientific information. However scientific process must be regularly regenerated by checking and testing a new or old hypothesis, by intervention process in teaching and intervening.

It seems that an epistemologic choice for a changing acquisition method of scientific knowledge, enables easy adaptation, without an important

crisis. Continuity is wished in this case, even if isn't always possible. In fact organisations or managers aren't always available for experimentation, nor the researcher. This last fact settles the need of regrouping researchers in teams.

This evolutive approach isn't an expression on intellectual laxism or an empiricism dictated by daily management of scientific research. In opposition we have to refer to a method whose approach contains indicators allowing the validation or the unvalidation of an hypothesis, but also methodologic changes.

The story of management points out that methodological conceptions have been and are always different today. This paper concerned a proposition of a concept for management sciences.

Management is a round about discipline, with many human sciences concerned. This situation determines various methods to approach organisations. The risk is to lose scientific purposes with a methodologic individualism, forbidding the range of contributions and results.

What are the main points in the work of the scientific researcher in management sciences?

- first : the measure seems to be a common purpose, we search elements whose relative weight explains economic and/or social performance or no performance;

- second : scientific processes begin with an induction phenomenon and an ex-ante methodology due to a feeling of proximity of two phenomenums in the researcher's brain;

- three : in management we undergo a lack of absolute mark point (positivist), above all when we choose to intervene in organisations;

- four : organisations evolve with their own dynamic process, which is slowed down, modified or accelerated by a lot of factors and events. Among this events, scientific research action seems to be important.

When a scientific researcher in management sciences must take into account all these points, he must choose between two methods:

- working out of the organisations, to avoid being influenced and to influencing organisations, then you accept a limited scope;

- working in and out of organisations and you must accept to be a object of science by the fact that you have some influences in the organisation.

The first method is borrowed from human literary sciences, the second seems to me more interesting. This is the problematic of neutrality or independence.

What the researcher wants is independence, neutrality is an illusion in human organisations, but we have to build a method to take scientific knowledge. Here we have a social purpose for management sciences, it is an answer to the first question.

Why intervene? to look for scientific knowledge...

But immediately you have to answer the second question, How to intervene? which commands a social responsibility in the performance of the organisation, since we modify by influences the dynamic process [Rapport de la commission Pineau-Valencienne 1991].

Then management science mustn't be built about an object but about a project. It becomes necessary to make a third category of hypothesis, directive hypothesis [Séminaire de thèse 1994, Savall H].

We can establish an order of hypothesis in knowledge process, first, observation with descriptive hypothesis, second explanations with explanatory hypothesis, and in third position direction hypothesis identifying elements to reproduce a phenomenon. These directions settle new experimental materials for observations and to set again descriptive hypothesis with better quality than first.

Conclusions

This option for experimental process involves the scientific researcher in a economically and socially acceptable project. Thus Ideology gives not only a representation of the organisation, but also a place for the researcher in organisation [Blaug 1987 pp. 40-41; Savall H. Zardet V. 01/1995]. Researcher comes to improve performance, who could replace him better, since he knows better than anyone thanks to scientific knowledge. He could become a militant, if we consider the special statute of scientific research in France, by teaching and intervening, scientist contributes to society development.

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Obituary

Professor Dr Jakob Krabbe a brilliant scientist, fine character with an international reputation past away.

Jacob Jan Krabbe was born at Hoogeveen, a provincial town in the Netherlands, on February 11th, 1928. After completing his secondary education in 1947, he spent a couple of years in the then new Republic of Indonesia, where he worked in banking and trade. Back in the Netherlands, he studied economics at the Nederlandsche Economische

Hoogeschool in Rotterdam, now University. During his study Krabbe paid a great deal of attention to the theoretical ideas of Professor L.M. Koyck and to Professor J. Tinbergen's view on development programming.

In 1974 Krabbe published his dissertation entitled : *Individueel en Collectief Nut* (Utility, considered Individuality and Collectively) in which he put some organic ideas in welfare theory. Krabbe's *Historisme in Economisch Denken* appeared in 1983, followed by a series of articles on environmental and resource economics and on History of Economic Thought. In some of it the ideas of Georgescu Roegen are discussed as well as in his recent publication : *Historicism and Organicism in Economics : The Evolution of Thought* ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers (1996) p. 106.

After graduating in 1963, Jaap Krabbe was appointed to the staff of Wageningen Agricultural University, first as assistant, later as senior lecturer and as associate professor. He taught economic theory, environmental economics and theory of economic thought. During a few years of reorientation he functioned as head of the department of general economics. He set up a cooperation programme between Wageningen Agricultural University and the Agricultural University Debrecen, in Hungary. Finally, he functioned as visiting professor of economics at Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of Chania (Crete), Greece. Krabbe was member of the editorial boards of : "International Journal of Social Economics",

"Archives of Economic History", "Wageningen Economic Studies", "International Journal of New Ideas and Secretary of I.S.N.I. (International Society for the Intercommunication of New Ideas).

The Greek Chapter of I.S.I.N.I. and the "Archives of Economic History" express to M^{rs} Meta Krabbe and family their condolences.

Dear Jaap we shall meet you again in eternity.

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JACOB KRABBE : *Historicism and Organicism in Economics : The Evolution of Thought*. ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1996, pp. 188*

The distinguished academic teacher Dr. Jacob Krabbe published the above monograph which begins with **Chapter I** (“Concept and Matrix”), his exploration on the evolution of economic thought during 19th century.

Dr. Krabbe says that after the Napoleonic conquests the socio-economic system in Germany, still agrarian of a feudal society, began to develop rapidly. In this environment flourished the economic thought of the militants of the Historical School. Between 18th-19th century until the apogee and decline of the Classical School, with its last follower John Stuart Mill (1848), the naturalist doctrine of the leader of this School, Adam Smith, was based on the message of laissez-faire and advised no government intervention. It was the same doctrine that triumphed throughout the world.

In Germany the ideas of the voluntarist Friedrich List impacted on the soil for the appearance of the Historical School (W. Roscher, K. Knies, B. Hildebrand) which criticized the Classicists using a method partly organicist, as Dr. Krabbe underlines. The Younger Historical School (K. B cher, L. Brentano, G. Schmoller) followed more or less the same way of the Old Historical School. With Schmoller, the Younger Historical School had already cultivated the fertile soil in the New German Empire shaped by Bismark who adopted the Verein f r Sozialpolitik (Society of Socioeconomic Policy). Schmoller was oriented towards the social question, while Karl Menger in Austria was impacted partly by Roscher who had followed from another point of view the New Organicism (p.1).

Dr. Krabbe goes on and says that Historical School impacted also on

* The present book review was printed two weeks before the sudden demise of our beloved colleague Jacob Krabbe.

the Institutional School as well as on Social Economics, Agricultural Economics, Environmental and Resource Economics. Krabbe notes that there is also here a link with Alfred Marshall's thought (p. 2). Krabbe is referring to Locke who impacted on Montesquieu, Hume and Rousseau and on the whole era of Enlightenment, in general.

The author observes that Enlightenment had a historical character, as the writers of this period had any intention for essential changes. Thus Professor Krabbe touched the old debate about the influence of the Physiocratic School in French Revolution and also outside France. Any way the author underlines that Montesquieu's basic idea was of a kind of social progress like Locke's "social contract" (p. 3) because Montesquieu was favourable for a social process of the kind of an evolving causality in social relationship in a "natural order".

For Montesquieu, Krabbe says, there is a spiritual process which impacts on the social process and social organization. From page 4 ff. the Secretary of I. S. I. N. I. presents the main ideas of the Physiocrats beginning from the transitional period. He starts with Boisguillebert and from page 6 explores Romanticism which is governed by the idea of historicism and organicism. He rightly supports that the Physiocratic School was individualistic and mentions the contact between Catherine II of Russia with Mercier de la Rivière when the Great Imperatrice exchanged ideas with him about the validity of natural laws.

Dr. Krabbe is referring to Rousseau, Herder and Kant as a bridge between Enlightenment and Romanticism. Herder conceived a harmonious connection between culture and biological-oriented nature and he, as Roscher later, did assume that human existence is rooted to organic nature (p. 6). Kant was balanced between an idealistic conception of the world and an empirical approach. The author does not omit to refer also to Schopenhauer's pessimistic romanticism and to Dilthey who followed the way of historicism and organicism excluding Nietzsche who had a minor significance in this field. Krabbe, in this part of the book, is very right when referring to Fichte who, in discordance with my view, was nearer to the Romantic School as well as Hegel's dialectics. Anyway Krabbe rightly notice that Fichte was nearer to the Romantic School.

In **Chapter 2** ("Predecessors of German Historicism") the writer explores Medieval Scholastic economic thought, Mercantilism, Physiocracy, Pre-Classical economic thought and especially David Hume whose philos-

ophy is inspired by human passion dominated by egoism.

David Hume is individualist, although he does not omit to mention a collective meaning of utility which bridges Hume with Bentham's utilitarianism. In following, Professor Krabbe speaks about Smith's economic doctrine of self-interest and the invisible hand (p. 10) as well as of the factors of production: Land, Labour and Capital. At the end of this part, Dr. Krabbe explores Sismondi's philosophical approach and in tandem his humanistic ideas. Like Werner Sombart who with Max Weber belong to the Youngest Historical School, Sismondi gave a great attention to the formation of wealth in a capitalist society. He criticizes, from the voluntaristic point of view, the laissez-faire doctrine and presents his own opinion of interventionism in the economic life in order to rationalize it.

Professor Jacob Krabbe exposes also Adam Müller's romantic approach which reflects individualism and rationalism adopting like Friedrich List the idea of Nation and its economics. Müller, leader of the Romantic School, exercised a critic against the capitalist way of production by proposing corporationism and above all formulating an organically-oriented view of society (p. 11).

The political approach concerns more to List who is searching for a National Economy having as starting point the German Union. Dr. Krabbe finishes Chapter 2 with the remark that List's stages of economic development was a tool in his hands in order to present on one hand the economic evolution and on the other the productive and social forces into a larger idea, the National one.

In **Chapter 3** Professor Krabbe analyses the phenomenon that he calls Historical School which has been also social-oriented but not characterized by a uniform paradigm (in accordance with Kuhn's terminology) (p. 15). The Historical School, Krabbe continues, had an heterogeneous paradigm as it appears in the work of some followers of the School: Knies, Bücher, Brentano, Inama-Sternegg while the whole School is governed by a social-economic orientation. Wilhelm Dilthey, Krabbe says, was a philosopher and a historian who formulated similar ideas with Gustav Schmoller. Herein Krabbe maintains correctly that the Historical School is distinguished for its economic historicism which partly coincides with organicism (p. 16). In the same page (footnote 11) Krabbe is saying that term "paradigm" was first used by Wilhelm Roscher.

The corner-stone of the Historical School's doctrine is based on Histo-

ry containing habits, customs, tradition, religion, institutions, etc. and above all an agreement with the old prayer *Veni Creator Spiritus* (p. 17). The Historical School is also familiar to politics, ethics and social reforms. The ideal type of man for the School is **homo societatis** in opposition to the ideal type of man for the Classical School, the **homo oeconomicus**. The former man is **altruist**, the second is **selfish**. The Historical School, thus, by its basic doctrine prepares the soil for the Chair's Socialism and the State's Socialism.

In following Professor Krabbe compares the similarities of Held, Inama and Knapp from one side and Conrad, Kohn and Brentano from the other (p. 19). The former are called by Krabbe fundamentalists and the latter reformers (ib.).

Chapter 4 is dedicated to the analysis of the Old Historical School's doctrine and its leader Wilhelm Roscher, founder of economic historicism and organicism (p. 21). Roscher tried to integrate the doctrine of Classicists and their deductive method which concerns the determination of the laws of development. Krabbe referring to Knies correctly underlines: "Knies placed the scientific 'praxis' towards real socio-economic situations that were thought to be historically grown" (p. 29).

Krabbe analyses also Bruno Hildebrand's political economics, who had dealt with the ethical dimension of economic thought. Hildebrand, of course, maintained the validity of individuality but he investigated this within a society which forms a whole while the individual is a part of it.

Roscher, as far as economic development is concerned, adopts the idea of land through the examination of institutions as of important value for the search of economic phenomena so as to approach to Proudhon's mentality (p.31) but without coinciding with him.

In **Chapter 5**, entitled "Independents in the School's second generation", Professor Krabbe writes about Bücher's historically oriented approach. For Krabbe, Bücher presents a remarkable philosophical aspect and he had conceived several tendencies in the socio-economic evolution, and especially concerning the rise of the European town with "an analogy between town and the medieval courts characterized by statute labour" (p. 39). Karl Bücher was strictly an economic historian also his exploration on the economy concerns only Europe and so it escaped from him the economic evolution of the Asian space. Anyway, Bücher formulated a very interesting scientific research influenced by Roscher, Marx and the philos-

opher and historian Dilthey. Bücher was also concerned with the division of labour and its rhythm (*Arbeit und Rythmus*) distinguishing two kinds of labour: the “needs-oriented labour”, for a primitive society or a less developed one, and the “income-oriented labour”, a distinction which according to Krabbe concerns more the modern societies.

In the same Chapter Professor Jacob Krabbe is referring to Philippovitch’s contribution as an idealistic approach. Philippovitch was a Neo-Kantian writer like Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, his contemporaries, and he assumed that in the course of time people’s ideas develop through the experience of the advantages and disadvantages of economic political principles in connection with the thought of “creative spirits”. Philippovitch did not omit to investigate the meaning of freedom from two aspects: the individual and the collective on which the social structure is erected. Philippovitch is also interfering more to this structure in order to present its evolution from the side of Economic History without combining his research with the deductive method (p. 44). At this point Krabbe says that Philippovitch made a distinction concerning two main stages in the economy: the «closed home economy» and the «market economy». Philippovitch marched further and he spoke for the corporative economic behaviour in order to conclude that the most important element in a Social Policy is the organization of the labour force, in other words the assurance of sufficient wages and the legal protection of the worker (p. 48).

In **Chapter 6** (“Menger’s new organicism”) the author presents the ideas of the leader of the Austrian School (pp. 49 ff.).

Karl Menger is also well known for his “*Methodenstreit*”, the debates with Gustav Schmoller who finally accepted the complement of the deductive method with the inductive-historical method. However, the leader of the Austrian School adopted an homogenous method in economics devoted to the principle of naturalism. He never accepted that social sciences are independent from natural sciences (p. 49). Any way, Karl Menger made a distinction between a mechanistic and an organicistic approach characterizing the organicistic concept in economics as the product of human economic calculus, as Krabbe supports (p. 50). This approach is interpreted by the fact that individual, as a part, is influenced by the whole of a society’s economic organicism. From this point of view the novelist-late Friedrich von Hayek was impacted by Karl Menger.

Karl Menger was one of the founders of the theory of marginal utility (with Stanley Jevons and Léon Walras) which he called it “last satisfaction’s want” or “last importance’s use”.

Krabbe when writing about the famous “Methodenstreit” makes a comparison between Plato and Aristotle (p. 51) and repeats that Herder and Dilthey impacted on Menger. Krabbe is also referring to another militant of the Austrian School, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, who adopted the concept of the marginal utility and presented an amalgamated formation of it with the role of time in the individual estimation (pp. 53 ff.). The author at this part underlines the Schumpeterian contribution to Austrian School by the concepts of economic significance and the supply function. Krabbe finishing this Chapter says correctly: “The Austrian thought, concerning the economic system, is ordered by consumers and entrepreneurs” and that the element of scarcity “remained beyond Menger’s scope”. More clear, Krabbe says, is the concept of scarcity in Georgescu-Roegen and in Goudzaard. And Krabbe says that Menger connects economic calculus with environmental policy discussing like Jevons the subject of the exhaustion of natural resources (p. 57).

In **Chapter 7** entitled “Schmoller founder of the Younger Historical School” Krabbe writes about the ideas of his favourite economist, Gustav Schmoller and his “idealistic approach” that put forward the idea that the economic process forms part of the great process of nature (p. 59). Schmoller was not a naturalist but he did not disregard completely the natural laws. He grasped not only the importance of habits, customs and morals including ethics but also the importance of natural elements (p. 61).

Krabbe confesses that it is a great mistake to say that Gustav Schmoller used only the inductive method (ib.) because he maintained the value of the completion of the deductive with the inductive-historical method. This is his method of logical dualism (pp. 62 ff.).

It is true that Roscher followed the same path as Lujo Brentano. Professor Krabbe also says that Schmoller linked up with Darwin’s ideal on analogies between biological and social life. The same idea prevailed in Quesnay’s economic thought and also in the Italian Montanari and the English Petty during the transition period from voluntarism to naturalism. Any way, we cannot deny that Schmoller was sympathetic to the idea that there is an analogy between the division of labour and the biological life as Herbert Spencer and Karl Bücher maintained (p. 64). Jacob Krabbe in

the same Chapter presents us an interesting Table of a socio-economic system and of three other systems (Technological, Decision system, Capital and Nature system) along with their subsystems (p. 66). Depicting the Table, Krabbe presents clearly Schmoller's approach through an original way in order to grasp better the relation between technological development and the extension of production.

In **Chapter 8** Dr. Krabbe describes Schmoller's followers of the "Younger Historical School" (pp. 73 ff.) referring to Johannes Conrand who was oriented towards the ideas of Bruno Hildebrand and Wilhelm Roscher as well as to Gustav Cohn who was attracted by utilitarian thought and Brentano who anticipated ideas familiar of the modern welfare state.

Conrand considers the progress of technology which he bounded it with economic history. And Krabbe adds: "Conrad took in consideration «... the history of economics not strong enough to support a typically historic variant of economics» (p. 75). For Conrad production means an increase in value which is generally the result of human activity in relation to nature". Conrad was -writes Krabbe- a statistician who speaks for heuristic-technical task of statistics on which "comparative statistics should be based" (ib.). Krabbe says that "Conrad's economic politics had an applied type of welfare theory" (ib.). Gustav Cohn, like Adam Müller, considers Middle Ages not as a period of obscurity and rejects the idea that the method of the natural sciences is suitable for socio-economic studies taking in account the ethical factor. At this point Krabbe concludes that Cohn maintained that "all science arises from life and is used in the service of life as well" (p. 76).

Krabbe also is referring to Brentano as he was properly related to his concept of society and its development. He conceived society in relation to its development (p. 78) and he conceived: "... the original family unit more and more integrated in ever larger and stronger social structures". Brentano was impacted by Schäffle, an utilitarian philosopher, and he placed man in a collective plexus of wants which are of two kinds: the individual biological and the collectivist-social formulated in a social intercourse. Brentano's judgment of wants is governed, concerning the individual, by a hedonistic behaviour which is transformed in the human society as a common good (p. 80).

Krabbe continues exploring the Fundamentalists: Adolf Held, Inama-

Sternegg and Georg Friedrich Knapp insisting more on Inama-Sternegg (p. 81 ff.).

Karl Theodor von Inama-Sternegg was economist, sociologist and historian. He conceived social science as a public administration assigning a normative nature to it without sharing the rigorous stand of Cohn and Held, as Krabbe says (p. 85). Concerning the ethical and political element in the economic thought, Sternegg considered Economics as a rather independent branch of social science. Any way, he investigated Economics from two points of view, the one was individual and the other social. Sternegg also adopted Hilderbrand's distinction of economic stages based on "Geld" although he appears to differentiate his own opinion from Hilderbrand's regarding the first stage of Nationalwirtschaft maintaining that money (no coins) and credit were not unknown (p. 86). The Holland writer describing the fundamentalist doctrines is also referring to Georg Friedrich Knapp whose approach was like Stein's and Sternegg's, of a juridical dimension and thus he conceived an account money (pp. 87-88).

Krabbe in **Chapter 9** writes about Historical School's Youngest Representatives making the distinction of two streams: the reformers and the fundamentalists. He presents the economic ideas of Werner Sombart and Arthur Spiethoff. The former is known for his distinction of economic stages and especially of capitalism's stages and also of his attempts to save Karl Marx's theory of surplus value. The latter is known for his research on the economic crises. Spiethoff was attracted by the old method for the distinction of economic stages following Sombart's traces (Frühcapitalismus-early capitalism and Hochcapitalismus-matured capitalism).

Krabbe's thought is occupied by Max Weber too. Weber was a catholic spirit, a philosopher (Neo-Kantian) and sociologist (f.e Richert) bounding Sociology with Economics. Weber, as Krabbe underlines, was an institutionalist (p. 97) orienting his thought towards socio-economic development, in other words he explored the "cadres" of the economy and not its mechanisms. Krabbe at this point speaks about the well known Weber's contribution on the development of capitalism. A thesis that was discussed by Hosbawm who supported, in opposition to Weber, that Belgium, a catholic country, was industrially developed, in opposition to Holland, a country not remarked by any influence of Protestantism for the development of capitalism.

Closing Chapter 9 Krabbe speaks for the economic stages in relation with economic development referring also to the different critics exercised by Harold Wright, A.W. Coats, P. Sten who all examined Schmoller's influence in the Anglo-Saxon world.

In **Chapter 10** Professor Krabbe presents us a remarkable picture of Institutionalism. Krabbe begins with the founder of the 20th century Institutional School, Thornstein Veblen. Institutionalism, Krabbe observes, opened the door for Darwinian ideas perceiving natural inclinations and other biological aspects of human behaviour. I think that Darwin's ideas less impacted on Institutionalism because the School was mainly inspired by Pierce, James, Watson and Dewey as well. Krabbe says correctly that Veblen's ideas do not present similarities with Marxian thought. Krabbe observes also that John Hobson can be considered as a precursor of institutionalism (p. 102) and adds that Henry George's "Progress and Poverty" (1879) was not irrelevant, too, with institutionalism (p. 103). In following, Dr. Krabbe refers to John Maurice Clark who belongs to the Neo-Institutionalist School. He connected the concept of progress with equilibrium. There is no doubt that the Neo-institutionalists accepted more or less the economic mechanisms without excluding from their research the "cadres" and the long-run process of the economic system. Thus, the Neo-Institutionalists, too, are not familiar with an idea concerning static equilibrium. Dr. Krabbe presents these interesting distinctions referring also to Allan Gruchy who in his "Contemporary Economic Thought" (1979) contributes on Neo-Institutional Economy (p. 104). Professor Krabbe also mentions Wagner, Dietzel and, Herkner, three militants of the State Socialism who can be considered as representatives of the German institutionalism because of their organistic approach. It is true that the three mentioned economists were based on the social principle searching for a social equilibrium independent of socialism and capitalism.

From page 107 Krabbe writes about the latter Institutionalists as well as about John Kenneth Galbraith, Clarence E. Ayres, Lazaros Houmanidis and Gunnar Myrdal. However, Krabbe does not stop here and he presents Joseph Schumpeter and Joan Tinbergen as Institutionalists (pp. 109-111). Schumpeter is considered by Krabbe as a link between German and Anglo-Saxon Economics. The author says that the main work of Schumpeter "History of Economic Analysis" (1954) was more a work of historical description and gave particular attention to the principles of in-

stitutional analysis (p. 111). Tinbergen is characterized rightly by Krabbe as a macro-economist and a social reformer who explored the social problem from the institutional point of view too. At the end of this Chapter Professor Krabbe is referring to the psychological contribution of Georg Katona and his efforts to combine man and environment in an antagonistic point of view. Krabbe presents Professor Emeritus Dr. Anghel Rugina and the theory of equilibrium versus disequilibrium on a law of evolution in the development of economic ideas in order to conceive a general stable equilibrium. This could be achieved with a monnaie-numéraire 100% (pp. 111-112). In following, Krabbe mentions John O'Brien's ethics and Kurt Dopfer whose approach is partly evolutionary and holistic (p. 112).

In **Chapter 11** Krabbe writes about Georgescu-Roegen's "Bioeconomics". It is a deep analysis of Roegen's organistic ideas resulting from economic mechanisms versus organicism with biological elements that concern economic problem which means scarcity and pollution (environment analysis). Krabbe refers the entropy law as it was argued by Georgescu-Roegen and the foggy future of humanity. At this point Krabbe says that Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen like Karl Menger paid a great deal of attention to causality, i.e. geographical frontier and time (p. 116). Time means duration of process as well as evolution. Georgescu-Roegen, says Krabbe, rejected the hedonistic philosophy introducing integrally an altruistic analysis into the utility functions. Any way George-scu-Roegen, continues Dr. Krabbe, postulates on the idea of hierarchy of wants.

Chapter 11, and the other Chapters of Krabbe's book as well, is written with thoughtfulness, originality and exactness.

Chapter 12 is entitled "Aspects of Cultural Diversification" where Dr. Krabbe mentions Ludwig von Mises's neo-liberalism which is spreading in the world trying to establish peace and a decreasing national formation between nations. I do not think that neo-liberalism can obtain a target like that which -in my view- as it appears in Krabbe's writings is not acceptable by him. Krabbe begins from religion, ideology and customs in other words from culture and institutions. His exploration leads the social groups to a peaceful coexistence as well as to an altruistic individual behaviour. Cultural identities offer facilities for a better society and a world's society with a cultural pluralism. Krabbe does not stop here and he begins with the methodological aspects supporting Marshall's idea of a represen-

tative firm or representative household. The main problem for Krabbe is “to obtain a society through an organistic approach”. Krabbe writes that “the systems theory is a theoretical framework which allows the incorporation of a mechanistic approach using holistic ideas”. And the Holland economist rightly underlines: “The economy is considered as a set of systems within a system” (p. 121).

Dr. Krabbe in following expresses his own thoughts and is referring to social values cultivated within the social groups working between two poles: the isolation and the cooperation because the social conflicts may be vanished. Isolation for Krabbe is a fallacy and in tandem a social sickness while meritocracy is the best way for common welfare (pp. 122-123). The subculture is also a barrier against any progress as cultural diversification has a significant economic aspect and in last analysis ethical system which was the main idea of Schmoller that determines the value economic system. It is true that the different historical rises and declines were a consequence of religious, or economic, or political causes and above all of moral decay.

From **Chapter 13** Krabbe explores the economic systems Theory referring to the Club of Rome’s model of DYNAMO approach with diagrams, dynamic equations and graphical output which are mentioned in Howard Odum’s ecology (p. 126). Krabbe speaks also for STELLA’S model mentioning Barry Richmond, one of Jay Forrester’s followers. In following, Krabbe explores the reconciliation of different economic systems under the idea of organistic equilibrium with Jan Tinbergen’s mechanistic approach, the feedback regulating mechanism and George Dalton who elaborated the various components of the process of socio-economic change (ib.). Krabbe dedicates paragraphs also to W. W. Rostow’s institutional thought as it is presented in his “The stages of economic growth” (1960) as well as to Barry Field for the evolution of property institutions and other Neo-Institutionalists (pp. 127-128).

In pages 128-132 Professor Krabbe analyses the meaning and significance of organicism in economic systems theory presenting a very interesting Table of historicism and organicism and in conclusion he presents Wilhelm Heijman’s “ecologism” as a paradigm in economics (p. 131).

In **Chapter 14** (“Efficient sustainability: An Institutional Approach”) Krabbe begins presenting the contribution of the Historical and Institutional Schools in order to prove their importance for economics (p. 133).

He mentions Johan Tordenston “who investigated the impact on economic growth of well-enforced property rights versus not well-enforced property rights”. Tordenston, says Krabbe, has in account that arbitrary seizures of property at the expense of regular taxes undermines the economic growth while property rights without a security result to inefficient allocation of capital.

Krabbe makes the distinction of a difference between two worlds: the world of market and the world of nature. He also maintains that: “the environment policy is directed towards integrating economic processes in a natural ecosystem and to an economizing on stocks of natural resources” (ib.). This policy gives priority to the preservation of nature. It must not escape our attention the fact that Jacob Krabbe is a prominent ecologist-economist and admires Georgescu-Roegen. Krabbe keeps on and invokes a relation in the study between economic mechanisms and environmental policy.

From this kind of research it appears the opposition between scarcity and the efforts for efficiency of the market of goods, as well as in the market of services with a common efficient sustainability (p. 134). These efforts are directed by the efficiency behaviour economic principle as it was formulated by Roscher. The Classical model, Krabbe says, means that the quality of goods concerned is given by the ones that are negotiated by taking into account the cost of production utility as it was given, and the formation of prices in a free market of pure competition: namely without frictions and in which nobody, producer or consumer, is in position to influence the level of prices (ib.). In following, Krabbe makes a very interesting remark saying rightly that Physiocrats had in mind the ecosystem (ib.).

Closing this part Professor Krabbe makes reference to Tinbergen and Frish concerning the dynamisation of the above mentioned static economic model. He observes that it is impossible to achieve a dynamic system of development without an institutional efficiency. Krabbe does not accord with the aspect of naturalism or Apollonean concept of an economic system versus equilibrium. He reflects that only with natural-hedonistic behaviour of the individual all things are going well. Krabbe invokes it as economic policy in parallel with the force of the most efficient institutions. This is the voluntarist-Dionysean aspect according to which men must intervene in economic life in order to obtain the rational order. Krabbe at this point tries to open a new path in Economics as all members of I. S. I. N. I., including myself, try to fulfill this.

In **Chapter 15** the author investigates the “Perspectives of Organistic Thought” beginning with a retrospect from 18th century and the birth of Economic science during the era of the Enlightenment. He connects the Philosophy of this century with technological and organizational ingenuity. Romanticism in 19th century pushed forward, Krabbe says, the economic thought following the footsteps of the Physiocratic naturalism. Krabbe also expresses his fear of pollution effects, the tolerance of natural resources and the mismanagement of the firms as well as national economies. The author advancing in his historical exploration observes that: “Historicism and Organicism were by no means the monopoly of the Historical School as well as the Institutional School remarks that historicism was also a part of Classical thought f. e. Smith, Malthus and James Mill in accordance with T. Hutchison.” The author says that the descriptive and historical method concerns Alfred Marshall and that the famous “Methodenstreit” continues for decades, and in my opinion this is a very good remark.

Economists use mathematics in an extremistic way, a danger that was noticed by economists like Alfred Marshall and others and also -in my view- by politicians-scientists like Poincaré. We can add also Ludwig von Mises and Andre Marchal from today’s economists.

Krabbe maintains that Hutchinson although he investigated predictability and causality in economics missed any organic-oriented law of development (p. 150). John Hicks from his side discusses the principle of causality in the context of induction on an empirical basis (ib.).

In conclusion, the Holland writer says that historicism and organicism “can be seen as attempts to step up the boundaries of methodological individualism” (p. 151).

Professor Dr. Krabbe does not omit to use in his marvelous work the mathematical tool with attention; but above all in his thought prevails the natural, social, institutional and environmental factors.

In the Epilogue, the Wageningen’s University Professor makes an investigation of the matter that he has already presented to us in his book. His excellent work is full of thoughtfulness and original ideas.

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G.P. VLACHOS - A.V. ALEXOPOULOS : *International Organizations and Shipping Policy (in Greek)*, ed. A.Stamoulis, Athens - Piraeus 1996, p. 283

This work explains and illustrates the most important maritime organizations which are directly or to some extent connected with the marine environment. It consists of four parts and numerous tables and appendices at the end of each part. This book can also be proved useful for students and practitioners interested in the field of International Law.

The Charter of the United Nations was established as a consequence of the United Nations Conference on International Organization held at San Francisco and was brought into force in October 1945. Part I of this work presents a brief analysis of the rise of international institutions and the structure of the world community before the birth of the United Nations. In particular before the birth of the United Nations. In particular, it examines the period from the years of Ancient Greece and Rome and how international law and custom were implemented, the medieval period and the French Revolution, the Vienna, Paris and Hague conferences and the work of the League of Nations. Finally it deals with the United Nations system and the law-making functions of the specialized agencies.

The active participants in the field of merchant marine shipping are not only states but also intergovernmental and non-governmental international organizations. Many of them work in close association with governments and they are undoubtedly making a major contribution towards the development of international trade. International organizations engaged in shipping vary in competence and power. Among them, a special place belongs to intergovernmental organizations that are established on the basis of multilateral international treaties. Part II examines the origins, role, structure and work of IMO. It also incorporates all the conventions and amendments adopted by the organization in the fields of maritime safety, marine environment protection, marine technology, navigation, legal and facilitation matters. The last section of this part refers to

other specialized bodies of the United Nations system whose scope is far wider but nevertheless affects shipping such as UNEP, WMO, ILO, GESAMP, UNESCO and private organizations such as the International Chamber of Shipping, OCIMF, Protection and Indemnity Clubs, INTER-TANKO and the International Association of Classification Societies.

Part III examines solely the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which was established by the General Assembly in 1964. The efforts of developing countries could go no further than negotiating with other groups of countries under the auspices of UNCTAD. This part concentrates on the liner conference system, starting from early investigations in liner and tramp shipping, that is to say, U.S. Shipping Acts 1916, 1984, the Alexander Report and the CENSA Code, towards the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences and Shippers' Councils. In addition, it discusses the political factors involved in the international trade scene, the need for unitisation and the economics of containerization (development of container fleets).

Part IV is devoted to European Union shipping policies. It first offers a brief analysis of the historical and commercial overview of E.U. shipping law, in other words the foundation treaties the 1986 package (regulations 4055/86, 4056/86, 4057/86, 4058/86) and the E.U.'s relations in shipping matters with the rest of the world. It then goes on to discuss in detail the right of establishment and the perspectives on registration through the Commission's proposals and the European Parliament's reports. In particular, the E.U. register (EUROS) proposal and legal basis are presented as well as the E.U. reaction to the U.N. Convention on Registration of Ships, 1986 and the Council Regulation on the transfer of ships from one register to another within the E.U. are examined. Reference is also given to flags of convenience fleets and flag discrimination, and the hardly new concepts of offshore registries and international registries through the initiatives of some member States. The last section of part IV covers the concept and merits of cabotage, drawing its attention to the arguments presented, attempting to distinguish among member states in those which have, do not have or have limited cabotage restrictions. However, as the authors pointed out, after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, changes in the E.U.'s practice in some respects could prove useful.

In the part of Ancient Greece (pp. 15, 16) the author speaks about States-Nations and not Gities States. This is a basic mistake which must be

corrected in a new edition. Anyway the book includes a detailed, though selected bibliography, notes and documentation. In conclusion it provides an interesting and detailed analysis of a subject on which many scholars and technocrats engaged in shipping matters would find it a valuable source.

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G.P. VLACHOS - A.V. ALEXOPOULOS : *Techno-economic Aspects of Maritime Transport and Protection of the Marine Environment*, (in Greek) ed. A. Stamoulis, Athens - Piraeus, 1995 pp. 259

The as above work discusses the problem of ship-generated pollution. After presenting a detailed historical background of the most important issues of marine pollution, mainly under customary law, it goes on to analyze accidental and operational pollution from ships.

Chapter I discusses the various types of accidents at sea which lead to both casualties of ships and cargoes. Through lists and tables the major pollution incidents during the period 1967-1993 are presented, while emphasis is being added to the roles of human factor and the ageing tanker-fleets globally. In addition a brief analysis of accidents emanating from blow-outs and collisions between vessels and offshore installations as well as the carriage of dangerous cargoes by sea based on the I.M.D.G. code are presented.

Chapter II deals entirely with operational pollution from ships. It particularly refers to shipbuilding, maintenance and scrapping operations, ballasting and deballasting operations, loading and unloading operations, sewage and garbage which result to deleterious effects for the marine environment and account for almost 83% of the total ship-generated pollution.

Chapter III refers to port and slop management procedures and how a slop reception facility should be operated today. The Mediterranean Sea is provided as a relevant case study. In addition, the safety management techniques and the systems operating on board i.e. load-on-top system, segregated ballast tanks, crude oil washing, inert gas systems, are discussed in detail. Lastly it gives information regarding the alternative tanker designs as opposed to double hull - double bottom requirements.

Chapter IV discusses the international legal framework relating to marine pollution through the work of IMO. The authors attempt to illustrate

the relevant convention provisions such as MARPOL, SOLAS, CLC and to explore the practical implications and whether current law is adequate to tackle issues such as pollution by oil from ships, civil liability provisions, dumping regulations and emergency plans for combating oil pollution.

Chapter V draws its attention on the new concept of double hull - double bottom in tanker designs and the relative unlimited liability of the shipowner under the U.S. Oil Pollution Act 1990, whereas Chapter VI refers to monitoring and control of marine pollution by the European Union directives, particularly after the wrecks of the Aegean Sea and Braer in European waters, as well as the Greek statutes and law applying to marine pollution matters.

Finally Chapter VII deals with marine pollution at the regional level, that is to say, the most important regional conventions and bilateral agreements pertaining to each topic, i.e. pollution from ships, land-based pollution, pollution from the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed.

This work is entirely based on maritime economics principles and it proves to be useful for evaluating marine policy matters deriving from international and national forums as well as shipowners' associations or independent owners' enterprises.

The book contains a selected bibliography, although it is rather difficult to cover all possible dimensions exclusively in any one work but makes it a primary sourcebook for marine environmental matters.

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ΙΩΑΝΝΟΥ Θ. ΜΑΖΗ : *Γεωπολιτική των Υδάτων στη Μέση Ανατολή (Αραβικές χώρες-Ισραήλ-Τουρκία)*. Πρόλογος : Ομοτίμου Καθηγητή Σπ. Καλογερόπουλου-Στράτη, εκδ. Τροχαλία, Αθήνα 1996, σσ. 421.

Ο μοναδικός εν Ελλάδι ερευνητής οικονομικών-γεωγραφικών και γεωπολιτικών θεμάτων συμβάλλει και πάλιν με το ανωτέρω έργο του.

Εις τον Πρόλογον, ο σεβαστός Καθηγητής μου και ρέκτης του Διεθνούς Δικαίου και των Διεθνών Σχέσεων κ. Σπ. Καλογερόπουλος-Στράτης, υπογραμμίζει τα σημαντικά σημεία του βιβλίου του Καθηγητού του Ιονίου Πανεπιστημίου κ. Ιωάννου Θ. Μάζη, ο οποίος εκθέτει τα προβλήματα τα οποία ανακύπτουν εις την περιοχή της Γονίμου Ημισελήνου. Ο συγγραφέας, από της πλευράς του, προβαίνει εις ανάλυσιν της εννοίας και σημασίας της Γεωγραφίας και της Γεωπολιτικής και εΐτα, εισερχόμενος εις το θέμα του, τονίζει την εκβιαστική πολιτική της Τουρκίας προς τους γείτονάς της εις την περιοχή της Γονίμου Ημισελήνου, η οποία στηρίζεται επί του ελέγχου του ποταμίου συστήματος του Τίγρητος και του Ευφράτου, χωρίς όμως και να παραλείπη να αναφέρει και άλλας χώρας της περιοχής, αι οποίαι έχουν αποδυσθή εις μεταξύ των ανελέητον αγώνα δια την επί των ποταμίων υδάτων επικράτησιν.

Η *Εισαγωγή* του βιβλίου μας προσφέρει ανάλυσιν της γεωγραφικής εικόνας της περιοχής με εμπειριστατωμένας πηγάς, αι οποίαι ήδη αναγγέλονται από του Προλόγου.

Εις το *Κεφάλαιον Α'* γίνεται η παρουσίασις του όλου διπλωματικού πλαισίου και παιγνίου, καθώς επίσης παρατίθενται τα υδρογεωπολιτικά μπλοκ Άνω Ιορδάνου-Λιτανί, Β. Τίγρητος-Ευφράτου, Τίγρητος και Ευφράτου με πλήρη ανάλυσιν του νομικού καθεστώτος της διασυνοριακής γραμμής των ποταμίων υδάτων κατανομής. Και ενταύθα, πλην του παρατιθεμένου Πίνακος (σελ. 60), ακολουθεί και η αναφορά εις τας εξελίξεις του θέματος, των συμφωνιών και διαφωνιών, και των προβλημάτων της ξηρασίας εις την περιοχήν (σελ. 61). Εΐτα ακολουθεί λίαν

ακριβής όσον και εκτεταμένος Πίναξ (σελ. 62), καθώς και τα αφορώντα εις τους κώδικας και τους κανόνες του Ελσίνκι, λαμβανομένης υπ' όψιν της ενότητας του αποθέματος ύδατος και της λεκάνης απορροής, οπότε και υποδεικνύεται εις τον αναγνώστην η σημασία του ευλόγου και ισοτίμου μεριδίου (σελ. 65). Ενταύθα, επίσης σημειούται η εγωιστική θέσις της Τουρκίας διεκδικούσης την απόλυτον κυριαρχίαν επί των υδάτων χαρακτηρίζουσα τους Τίγρητα και Ευφράτην διασυνοριακούς ποταμούς και όχι διεθνείς (σελ. 67). Από της σελ. 71 μέχρι της σελ. 122, ο συγγραφεύς, παραθέτει, εις την Αγγλικήν και Ελληνικήν, τους κανόνες του Ελσίνκι σχετικώς με τας χρήσεις των υδάτων των διεθνών ποταμών κ.λπ.

Εις το *Κεφάλαιον Β'* εκτίθεται η υδρογεωπολιτική των κρατών της περιοχής (σελ. 123 κ.έπ.), ένθα ο αναγνώστης θαυμάζει τα αναγραφόμενα στοιχεία και την πάντοτε συνοδεύουσαν αυτά και το κείμενον πλουσίαν βιβλιογραφίαν. Εκ της σελ. 149, ο Καθηγητής κ. Ι.Θ. Μάξης παραθέτει την επιτευχθείσαν προσωρινήν συμφωνίαν της Ουάσινγκτον, αναφορικώς με την Δυτικήν Όχθην και την Γάζαν, του Ισραήλ. Εν συνεχεία, γίνεται αναφορά εις το μέλλον των υψιπέδων του Γκολάν (σελ. 151), της Λωρίδος της Γάζης (σελ. 152) και της Ιορδανίας -σημαντικόν παράγοντα της περιοχής (σελ. 154 κ.έπ.)- διά να ακολουθήση η Συρία (σελ. 161 κ.έπ.), η παραγωγή της υδροηλεκτρικής ενεργείας και τα συνδεόμενα με αυτήν εργοστάσια και τας διαφόρους χρήσεις εν σχέσει προς την Βιομηχανίαν, τας αστικές χρήσεις και την Γεωργίαν, η οποία θα ήτο ανύπαρκτος άνευ των αποθεμάτων ύδατος. Κατόπιν τούτων, ο κ. Μάξης μας ομιλεί περί Ιράκ, Συρίας, Τουρκίας και των προβλημάτων των σχετιζομένων με τας χώρας αυτάς, ιδιαιτέρως επισημαίνων το φράγμα του Μπέκμε (σελ. 180), χωρίς να παραλείπει να αναφερθή και εις το Τουρκικόν υδρογεωγραφικόν δίκτυον και το φράγμα Ατατούρκ (σελ. 195), ως επίσης και εις την στρατηγικήν σπουδαιότητα σειράς άλλων φραγμάτων του Great Anatolian Project, εις την Ν/Α Τουρκίαν (σελ. 197).

Δυστυχώς, ο παρατιθέμενος Πίναξ της σελ. 199, μολονότι λεπτομερειακός και ορθός, είναι λίαν μικρός δια να αναγνωσθούν τα εις αυτόν γραφόμενα, θα πρέπει δε -κατά την γνώμιν μου- εις την νέαν έκδοσιν, ο χάρτης τούτος να περιλάβει ολόκληρον την σελ. 199. Το *Κεφάλαιον Β'* εις το τέλος του συνοδεύεται με την παράθεσιν των διαφόρων εγγράφων-τεκμηρίων εις Ελληνικήν και Αγγλικήν γλώσσαν (σσ. 205-229).

Εις το *Κεφάλαιον Γ'* ο κ. Μάζης εξετάζει τας σχέσεις Τουρκίας-Συρίας και, ειδικώτερον, το προκύπτον ζήτημα εκ Χατάϊ-Αλεξανδρέττας και των υδάτων του Ορόντη. Εις το *Κεφάλαιον* τούτο ο αναγνώστης παρακολουθεί τας σχέσεις των δύο γειτονικών χωρών και το οξύτατον πρόβλημα της κατοχής πάσαις Συριακών εδαφών από την Τουρκίαν, ενώ υπεισέρχεται εις το όλον παίγνιον των αντιθέσεων και ο Κουρδικός παράγων, ως αντίβαρον εις την γεωπολιτικήν των υδάτων. Πέρα όμως τούτων, ο Καθηγητής κ. Μάζης, μας εκθέτει και το θέμα των σχέσεων Τουρκίας και Ιράκ (σελ. 273 κ.έπ.), καθώς και εκείνας μεταξύ Συρίας και Ιράκ, ένθα μας δίδεται η ευκαιρία να γνωρίσωμεν το όλον θέμα της Εγγύς και Μέσης Ανατολής εις όλην την έκτασίν του και πολυπλοκότητά. Εκεί όμως όπου φαίνεται η επίπονος προσπάθεια του συγγραφέως είναι ο παρατιθέμενος Πίναξ (15) τον οποίον μας παραθέτει (σελ. 281), κατόπιν επεξεργασίας στοιχείων και διαφόρων πηγών, ενώ από της σελ. 305 και κατόπιν εκτίθενται τα κείμενα των σχετικών εγγράφων συνοδευόμενα με την μετάφρασίν των.

Μετά την ανωτέρω σειράν των τριών *Κεφαλαίων* και των συνδεόντων τούτα εγγράφων ακολουθούν τα *Συμπεράσματα* (σσ. 363-381), ένθα ο Καθηγητής Ι. Μάζης υπογραμμίζει ότι τα αναφερθέντα, υπ' αυτού γεγονότα, δεν είχαν αιτίαν την μόνην σχέσιν μεταξύ υδατινών αποθεμάτων και υδατινών πόρων αλλά και έτερα γεωπολιτικά γεγονότα. Πάντα δε ταύτα έχοντα ιστορικήν διάρκειαν χωρίς όμως και να αναφέρη την χρονικήν περίοδον των γεγονότων τούτων χρήσιμον διά τον αναγνώστην. Εν πάση περιπτώσει -κατά τον συγγραφέα- το όλον πρόβλημα δέον να τεθή ιδιαιτέρως, μετά την λήξιν του Β' Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου, με την εξέλιξίν της επιστήμης και της τεχνολογίας και με την εμφάνισιν του Κράτους του Ισραήλ εις τον χώρον τούτον των υδατινών συμφερόντων. Κέντρον των διενέξεων τούτων είναι -ως μας αναφέρει ο συγγραφεύς- οι ποταμοί Νταν (Λίβανος), Μπαντά (Γάζα) και Χαשמανί (Ν. Λίβανος). Το δε όλον πρόβλημα είναι περιπεπλεγμένον υπεισερχομένων και ιδεολογικών παραγόντων, ως το πολεμικόν Τζιχάντ και αι βασικά Τουρκικά προτεραιότητες, όπως το να πεισθεί το Ισραήλ -παρά το προφανές συμφέρον του- να μην βοηθήσει εις την ίδρυσιν ανεξαρτήτου Κουρδικού Κράτους (σελ. 365). Δεν υπάρχει αμφιβολία ότι η Τουρκία από πλευράς γεωγραφικής βρίσκεται εις πλεονεκτικήν θέσιν εφ' όσον ελέγχει τας πηγάς του Τίγρητος και του Ευφράτου παραλλήλως με την στρατιωτικοδημογραφικήν της ισχύν εκβιάζουσα και συγ-

χρόνως ζητούσα συμπαράστασιν από μέρους της Συρίας και του Ιράκ. Όθεν, το Ισραήλ, ευρίσκεται εις θέσιν απειλής των συμφερόντων του από μέρους της Τουρκίας χωρίς όμως -ως λέγει ο κ. Μάζης- να αποκλείεται και σύρραξις της Τουρκίας με την Συρίαν και το Ιράκ. Βεβαίως, πάντα ταύτα εμπλέκονται και με συμφέροντα των Δυτικών Δυνάμεων εις την περιοχίν, αδυνατουσών όμως να εξεύρουν ειρηνικήν όσον και σώφρονα λύσιν. Το μόνον επίτευγμα -έστω και σαθρόν- υπήρξεν η Συμφωνία του Καμπ Ντέιβιντ (1979) μεταξύ Αιγύπτου και Ισραήλ. Και γράφω σαθρόν, δεδομένου ότι κατά τα γεγονότα του Περσικού Κόλπου τον οποίον η διπλωματία εβάπτισεν «Κόλπον» απέδειξαν ότι η Αιγυπτιακή δύναμις ήτο λίαν διστακτική να ανοίξη πυρ κατά του στρατού του Ιράκ.

Κλείων την βιβλιοκρισίαν μου ταύτην πληροφορώ τον αναγνώστην ότι ο κ. Καθηγητής παραθέτει και τους Κανόνας του Ελσίνκι από σελ. 369 κ.έπ. εις την Αγγλικήν και εν συντομία, τα κυριώτερα σημεία των συμπερασμάτων του, καθώς επίσης κατατοπιστικούς χάρτας και την βιβλιογραφίαν. Αύτη αποδεικνύει το εύρος των γνώσεων του συγγραφέως συν άμα δε την έντεχνον χρήσιν των πλέον εμπειριστατωμένων πηγών προς συγγραφήν του πράγματι αξιολόγου έργου του.

Ο αναζητών να εύρει λάθη και μόνο λάθη εις τα γραφόμενα δέον να αναμνησθη ότι εν βιβλίον μελετάται με σκοπόν να εξεύρη ο αναγνώστης τι τούτο προσφέρει, διότι άλλως ουδέν βιβλίον θα άντεχε εις ακόβουλον κριτικήν.

Κρίνων με την αγάπην, η οποία πρέπει να διακατέχη τον αναγνώστην ενός βιβλίου -κατά τον Wilhelm Roscher- το βιβλίον του Καθηγητού κ. Ιωάννου Θ. Μάζη τιμά το Πανεπιστημιακόν Ίδρυμα εις το οποίον διδάσκει, την επιστήμην του, προσφέρων θετικώς και πάλιν με το νέον του σύγγραμμα εις τον πνευματικόν πλούτον της χώρας μας.

ΛΑΖΑΡΟΣ Θ. ΧΟΥΜΑΝΙΔΗΣ

Ομότιμος Καθηγητής Πανεπιστημίου Πειραιώς

ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΟΝΙΚΑ ΝΕΑ - NEWSLETTER

**Ελληνική Εταιρεία Οικονομικής Ιστορίας
Ε' Εθνικόν Συνέδριον Οικονομικής Ιστορίας
"Η Οικονομική Ιστορία της Επτανήσου κατά τον 19ον και 20ον
Αιώνα"**

ΚΥΘΗΡΑ

30-31 Αυγούστου και 1η Σεπτεμβρίου 1996

Παρασκευή 30 Αυγούστου 1996

ΕΝΟΤΗΤΑ Α'

Α' Εναρκτήριοι Συνεδρία:

Πρόεδρος : Ηλίας Μαρσέλλος

- 17.45' Υποδοχή Επισήμων - Έναρξις Εργασιών του Συνεδρίου
- 18.00' Χαιρετισμοί Νομάρχου Πειραιώς, Επάρχου Κυθήρων,
Προέδρου Κοινότητος Φρασιών, Πρυτάνεων Παν/μίων,
Προέδρων Τοπικών Σωματείων, φορέων, επαγγελματιών
Ενέσεων, Εκπροσώπων Τοπικού Τύπου
- 18.35' *Ομιλία του Καθηγητού Jacob Krabbe : Man's alienation
form nature and its reconciliation : an ecological and
institutional economic approach"
- 19.15' Ομιλία του Καθηγητού Λαζάρου Θ. Χουμανίδη : "Η
Οικονομία εις την Επτάνησον, από της εποχής της πρώτης
Γαλλοκρατίας (1797 - 1799) μέχρι της Ενώσεως (1864)"

Δείπνον

* Λόγω του αιφνιδίου θανάτου του Καθηγητού Krabbe την ομιλίαν του παρουσίασε εν περιλήψει ο Καθηγητής κ. Χουμανίδης, αφού πρώτον το Συνέδριον ετήρησεν ενός λεπτού σιγήν εις μνήμην του εκλιπόντος Γραμματέως της I.S.I.N.I.

Σάββατον 31 Αυγούστου 1996

ΕΝΟΤΗΤΑ Β'

Α' Συνεδρία:

Πρόεδρος : Δ. Νικολετόπουλος

- 9.30' Ομιλία του κ. Δ. Νικολετόπουλου : "Το Χρονικόν Ιδρύσεως της Ιονικής Τραπέζης"
- 10.15' Ομιλία του κ. Χρ. Μπαλόγλου : "Δύο μεγάλοι Επτανήσιοι Ιστορικοί της Οικονομίας : Ανδρέας Ανδρεάδης, Αριστ. Σίδερης"
- 11.00' Διάλειμμα δια καφέ
- 12.05' Ομιλία του κ. Ι. Μάζη : "Η σημασία της διδασκαλίας της Γεωοικονομικής και Γεωπολιτικής δια τον χώρο της Κέρκυρας"

Συζήτησις

Γεύμα

Β' Συνεδρία :

Πρόεδρος : Ι. Μάζης

- 17.45' Ομιλία του καθηγητού κ. Κων/νου Ζώη : "Περί των Ναυλοσυμφώνων στα Επτάνησα κατά τις αρχές του 19ου αιώνα"
- 18.30' Ομιλία του κ. Ηλ. Μαρσέλλου : "Περί των τριών Δημοσιονομικών Νομοσχεδίων στα Κύθηρα κατά τις αρχές του 19ου αιώνα"
- 19.15' Ομιλία του καθηγητού κ. Γεώργιου Λεοντσίνη : "Εποχική μετανάστευση από τα Κύθηρα προς τις τουρκοκρατούμενες ελληνικές περιοχές και Ελληνική Επανάσταση"

Συζήτησις

Πέρας των εργασιών του Συνεδρίου

Δείπνον

Κυριακή 1η Σεπτεμβρίου 1996

Επίσκεψις εις την πανήγυριν του χωριού Ποταμός

Απογευματιναί εκδηλώσεις

Εισηγηταί του Συνεδρίου

1. JACOB KRABBE, Wageningen Agricultural University, President of the Department of Economics.
2. ΛΑΖΑΡΟΣ ΧΟΥΜΑΝΙΔΗΣ, Ομότιμος καθηγητής Παν/μίου Πειραιώς, Πρώην Πρύτανης του ιδίου Παν/μίου, Επισκ. Καθηγητής Wichita State University κ.ά., Αντιπρόεδρος International Society for the Intercommunication of New Ideas (I.S.I.N.I.), Επίτιμος Πρόεδρος της Ελληνικής Εταιρείας Οικονομικής Ιστορίας.
3. ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΣ ΝΙΚΟΛΕΤΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Διδάκτωρ Οικονομικών και Εμπορικών Επιστημών, μέλος συμβουλίου Ανων. Εταιρειών και ΕΠΕ, Επιχειρηματίας, Πρόεδρος Ελληνικής Εταιρείας Οικονομικής Ιστορίας.
4. ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ ΜΑΖΗΣ, Αναπληρωτής Καθηγητής Ιονίου Πανεπιστημίου, Πρόεδρος «Τμήματος μετάφρασης και διερμηνείας», Επισκ. Καθηγητής Παν/μίου Οξφόρδης.
5. ΧΡ. ΜΠΑΛΟΓΛΟΥ, Διδάκτωρ Οικονομικών Επιστημών Πανεπιστημίου Φρανκφούρτης.
6. ΚΩΝΣΤΑΝΤΙΝΟΣ ΖΩΗΣ, Οικονομολόγος, Διδάκτωρ Πανεπιστημίου Παρισίων (Sorbonne I.), Καθηγητής Τ.Ε.Ι. Πειραιώς.
7. ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ ΛΕΟΝΤΣΙΝΗΣ, Αναπληρωτής Καθηγητής Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών.
8. ΗΛΙΑΣ ΜΑΡΣΕΛΛΟΣ, Οικονομολόγος Προϊστάμενος Τμήματος Διεθνών και Ευρωπαϊκών Σχέσεων Παν/μίου Αθηνών, ε.ε. Καθηγητής Τ.Ε.Ι. Αθηνών, Αντιπρόεδρος Εταιρείας Κυθηραϊκών Μελετών.

The Fifth National Congress of the Greek Economic History Society helded in the island of Kythera (30-31 August - 1 September) with the subject : The Economy in Eptanissos during 19th-20th centuries.

Organizator of the Conference was Elias Marcellos who presented a paper very interesting indeed as also very interesting were and the other papers presented by : Demetrios Nicoletopoulos President of the Greek Economic History Society, Lazaros Houmanidis (University of Piraeus), Constantinos Zois Technological Education Institute, John Mazis (Ionian University), Chr. Baloglou (Phd Frankfurt University), Leontsinis (University of Athens).

ΛΗΦΘΕΝΤΑ ΒΙΒΛΙΑ, ΠΕΡΙΟΔΙΚΑ, ΑΡΘΡΑ - BOOKS, MAGAZINES AND ARTICLES RECEIVED

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ψεις θαλασσίας διακίνησης των αγαθών και της προστα-
σίας του θαλασσίου περιβάλλοντος*, εκδ. Α. Σταμούλης,
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